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ABSTRACT 
Never Settled: Community, Land, and the Politics of the Urban Commons in Bangkok 
 
By 
Hayden Shelby 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in City and Regional Planning 
And the Designated Emphasis in  
Global Metropolitan Studies 
University of California, Berkeley 
 
Charisma Acey, Chair 
 
Since its inception in 2005, Thailand’s Baan Mankong (“Secure Housing”) policy has 
garnered international acclaim for its success in supplying affordable housing to communities 
throughout the country’s urban areas. The program has been hailed as both empowering and 
effective because of its communal land tenure arrangements, innovative financial model, and 
participatory processes, which emphasize the role of networks of communities in guiding 
residents through the upgrading process. Though these community networks have received a 
great deal of attention and praise, researchers have too often spoken of them as a monolith. Few 
scholars have taken seriously the differences that exist between networks and the political 
implications of those differences. In this dissertation, I trace the trajectories of the community 
networks involved in Baan Mankong by looking not just at their immediate creations, but by 
stepping back to examine how they have formed as a result of and alongside evolutions in the 
concept of community itself. To do this, I begin with the Thai word for community—
chumchon—and trace the evolution of the term and concept through seven decades of 
government programs, social movements, intellectual traditions. I then analyze how two 
prominent community networks involved in Baan Mankong result from these various influences 
and how their current political motives and institutional arrangements impact the communities 
they work with. This analysis points to the different possible political potentials of community in 
the planning context and how the role of communities with respect to policies can change when 
social programs grow in size and popularity.  
In Chapter 1, I introduce the networks under study and discuss their significance with 
respect to the Baan Mankong policy. I then review several bodies of literature relevant to the 
study of Baan Mankong and similar policies. Finally, I discuss the methods and theoretical 
frameworks I employ in this investigation.  
In the Chapter 2, I look to the era in which the word chumchon originated, when rural 
villages became the focus of both the mobilizations of the Communist Party of the Thailand and 
the counterinsurgency efforts of the Thai government and western powers. I weave together 
many social and political trends to understand how chumchon made its way into the lexicons, 
imaginations, and practices of opposing political movements.  
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In Chapter 3, I then demonstrate how, over the course of the latter half of the twentieth 
century, chumchon came to be applied not only to rural villages, but also to a particularly type of 
urban settlement, what are often called “slums.” Just as was the case in the era of the insurgency, 
in the urban context chumchon became the focus of both government programs and popular 
mobilizations against the state. These efforts to manage and utilize chumchon to serve different 
political interests were carried out in part by members of chumchon themselves, but they were 
also organized by a growing number of professionals, from government employees to organizers 
employed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Influenced by the global spread of 
practices of community development and community organizing, as well as lessons from the 
time of the insurgency, these professionals forged a number of common practices, though often 
in service of very different ideologies and political goals. It was out of this complex field of 
ideas, practices, and new professions, that slum-based community networks and community-
based urban housing policies emerged. The most well-known among these is the Baan Mankong 
policy and the community networks associated with it.  
In the second half of the dissertation, I turn to the present era, looking at these networks 
and their work on two different scales. First, In Chapter 4 I examine the networks themselves, 
describing their organizational structures, rhetorics, and ways of operating on the ground.  In 
doing so, I look at the networks from both a comparative and a relational perspective. This 
means that I first analyze the similarities and differences of the individual organizations before 
pulling back to look at how those similarities and differences function in the larger contexts of 
the Baan Mankong policy and urban politics more broadly. This wider focus shows how the two 
approaches have both, in their own way, been integral to sustaining Baan Mankong over the past 
15 years.  
Following this examination of the networks themselves, in Chapter 5 I zoom in to the 
level of the community, looking at how the networks affect the social, political, and material 
formations of chumchon. Through an analysis of four chumchon case studies and employing the 
framework of the urban commons, I discuss how communities’ relationships with other 
organizations and larger political movements influence how they manage their collective 
ownership of land and resources. This small-scale examination of chumchon brings to light the 
everyday, human impacts of the Baan Mankong policy. It also highlights the lived reality of 
holding land and debt in common, both the benefits and the hardships. Furthermore, because the 
case studies represent communities that belong to different networks and began their projects at 
different points in time, I am able to trace how the process of doing Baan Mankong has changed 
as the program has “gone to scale” and various government entities have recognized the potential 
benefits to the state of having poor populations self-manage and take responsibility for urban 
development. I conclude that the process of creating the collective land and resources entailed in 
many newer Baan Mankong projects, far from being a political project of “commoning,” are 
more accurately described as “being commoned.”   
In Chapter 6, I conclude by reflecting on what it means for a policy to be a success and 
the many unintended consequences of success. Baan Mankong’s declared success has resulted in 
its growth and expansion across Thailand. As the program model is replicated across the urban 
landscape, it reproduces particular physical forms, lifestyles, and modes of being a community. 
This replication carries with it a risk of producing de-politicized forms of community that 
function primarily as a means of managing poor populations. However, within the increasingly 
rigid structures of the established policy, as one network demonstrates, the prospect of using 
community as a base of political mobilization still exists. These dual possibilities of 
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community—management versus mobilization—serve as both inspiration and caution for 
planners seeking to learn from best practices and replicate programs deemed successful.
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Preface 
 
 This dissertation makes great use of the Thai language throughout. From the first 
chapters’ analysis of the evolution of the word chumchon to quotations from key informants to 
excerpts by Thai scholars, I rely on forms of translation and transliteration to speak across the 
different languages and contexts. Creating this kind of dialogue is a messy art, and I make no 
claims to having done it “correctly.” However, I have tried to be as transparent as possible in my 
efforts. This preface is an explanation and extension of this ethos of transparency. 
 I have employed two main methods of incorporating Thai into this dissertation. Within 
the main text, I include italicized transliterations of many Thai terms used by informants. A list 
of many of these words and their translations can be found in Appendix B. Over the ten years I 
have been learning Thai, I have been exposed to a number of different systems of Thai 
transliterations. Representing Thai to English speakers is notoriously difficult, and every system 
has its pros and cons. Some authors employ some version of the International Phonetic Alphabet 
to capture the greatest possible variation of sounds. However, this requires that the readers know 
this alternative alphabet. I suspect as many of my readers are literate in Thai as know the IPA. I 
have therefore opted for a simpler version that employs only English characters. Reluctantly, I 
am mostly adhering to the Royal Thai General System of Transcription (RTGS). I say reluctantly 
because the system has a number of shortcomings. First, it cannot account for vowel length and 
tone. Second, it employs representations of some sounds that are counterintuitive to the English 
reader. The most glaring example of this is in the case of aspirated consonants, which use an 
accompanying –h to distinguish them from their unaspirated counterparts. Thus, ph and th make 
the sounds at the beginning of “pad,” and “tab,” respectively, rather than “phone” or “thatch.” 
This system has led many English-speaking acquaintances to recall to me with great fondness 
their vacations to Fuket in which they visited the island of Koh Fi Fi. However, using this 
imperfect system allows one to make the distinction between these aspirated sounds and their 
unaspirated counterparts, symbolized by the lone p and t, which make sounds similar to those at 
the end of “lap” and “at.” While I adhere to this and most other conventions of the RTGS, I 
depart in a few ways. First, I use what I consider to be a more accurate phonetic spelling of 
certain vowels, including the อื, อึ, and เอือ, for which I use –eu  and –eua instead of simply –u  and 
–ua. I also replicate common spellings of well-known proper names that depart from this system, 
including that of the policy at hand, Baan Mankong. For Thai scholars cited who have their own 
recorded preferences for spelling their full Thai names, I have adhered to their preferences. I also 
follow the academic convention of citing Thai authors by their first names in the text and listing 
them first name first in the bibliography. 
On that note, all Thai people whose full names are used are public figures. People for 
whom I use only nicknames (beginning with the titles “Pi” or “Khun”) are not public figures and 
have not given me permission to use their names, so I have given them pseudonyms. This brings 
me to a final departure from the RTGS. For the nicknames of informants who are older or more 
senior than I am, I spell their titular appellation Pi instead of the Phi. I first learned Thai through 
the Benjawan Poomsan-Becker system of transliteration that spells the word this way. It is how I 
have always written the word, how I wrote their titles in my fieldnotes, and how I think of them. 
The title conveys respect, and I cannot bear the thought that readers might accidentally 
pronounce their names (even as pseudonyms) with a Fi in front.  
The second way in which I represent Thai in this dissertation is applied only to longer 
phrases and quotes. For these, I use footnotes to include the translation in Thai characters. I do 
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this under the assumption that most people who are capable of comprehending anything of this 
length can most likely read Thai text and will find it easier to read the Thai script rather than a 
lengthy transliteration.  
Finally, a note on how I went about learning and translating all of this language is in 
order. My own training in Thai began in 2009 when I was Peace Corps volunteer in a rural 
village in the southern province of Surat Thani for two years. Over the past ten years, I have been 
tutored by over a dozen formal language teachers and been corrected and coached by perhaps a 
hundred more informally. I am grateful to all of them, for as much as they have taught me the 
Thai language, they have also taught me something even more key to carrying out this 
research—humility. While I take great pride in my Thai abilities, I am not, nor will I ever be, a 
native speaker. There were numerous moments during fieldwork when I got lost in rapid 
exchanges, doubted my comprehension, or thought I understood something only to later realize I 
had gotten it completely wrong. Because of this, I made every effort in the field to check my 
understanding as I went. The most immediate version of this took the form of whispered 
paraphrases with friends and coworkers during meetings, often followed by more in-depth 
debriefings during long car rides through Bangkok traffic on the way home. During these 
exchanges, collaborators and I sorted out the meanings of more than individual words, as they 
inevitably offered their own readings of what was going on. In this way, the immediate necessity 
of understanding language created an opportunity for first-line analysis. As a result of these 
back-and-forths, my own interpretations are indelibly melded with those of the people who are 
the subjects of this research, and I believe the research is all the richer for it.  
On a broader level, I checked my understanding by presenting preliminary findings to the 
three main organizations involved in this research—the Community Organizations Development 
Institute (CODI), the National Union of Low-Income Community Organizations (NULICO), and 
the Four Regions Slum Network (FRSN)—to get their feedback on my interpretations, which 
mostly confirmed what I had understood. I also took advantage of a handful of colleagues and 
academic mentors who speak English, running my interpretations and translations by them to 
ensure accuracy to the extent possible.  
Of course, “accuracy” is often impossible. Many sticky words and phrases have caused 
me a great deal of consternation over the course of fieldwork. “Empowerment” is a prime 
example. The English literature on Baan Mankong and similar programs is rife with it. It is used 
frequently by Thais who speak English, and everyone seems to agree that the word’s meaning 
can be translated to the Thai context. However, no one can agree on exactly how to do it. Some 
simply use a Thai-ified pronunciation of the English word. Others say kan hai amnat kap-. Still 
others believe that this suggests too much agency on the part of a “giver” of power and opt for 
kan sang amnat hai kap-, which implies a more collaborative process of “building” power with 
others. Many more use multiple possible translations, seemingly interchangeably. From my 
vantage point, it seems that those who use these translations in Thai are nearly always people 
who also speak English and are referencing the English word, either implicitly or explicitly. I do 
not believe most non-English speakers use Thai words or phrases that would clearly be translated 
as “empowerment” in the sense it is used in English. I have therefore used only the English word 
in this dissertation. This is just one example among many instances in which I have had to make 
decisions as to when and how to translate across the two languages.   
All of this being said, my translations are not the final word (pun intended) in this 
conversation. As this dissertation demonstrates, defining terms is a political process. The 
meanings of words and how they are translated can have profound consequences for those to 
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whom they are applied. I anticipate that some of the ways I use language will be called into 
question or spark debate. I look forward to the insights such exchanges may produce.   
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leadership at CODI, including Pi Khiao, Pi Kan, Pi Jiap, Pi Ti, Off, Joy, Lapat, and too many 
others to name, I thank you for taking me along on many visits and catching me up when I fell 
behind. In NULICO, Pi Ang, Pi Wao, Mae Nong, and Mae Dao, your dedication has been an 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
Early in the morning on May 2, 2018, hundreds of residents of Thailand’s poor urban 
settlements gathered outside the United Nations in Bangkok. Many waved small paper flags 
printed with slogans like “The right to housing is a human right!”1 and “Poor people are not 
criminals. Being poor is not a crime.”2 Others had hand written larger posters that were more 
directly related to the goal of the day: “We don’t want to be trespassers… Release the lock on the 
61 communities so our brothers and sisters can rent.”3 The purpose of the demonstration was to 
demand new negotiations with the Ministry of Transport and the State Railways of Thailand 
(SRT) in order to establish 30-year rental agreements for communities living on SRT land. In 
2000, the Four Regions Slum Network (FRSN), the slum-based movement that had organized 
this protest, had successfully negotiated such agreements for 61 communities. However, in the 
nearly 20 years since the original negotiations, urban land pressures had intensified, evictions 
were increasing nationwide, and it was now deemed necessary to expand the opportunity for 
long-term leases more communities on SRT land.  
 After starting the demonstration at the Bangkok United Nations building in a symbolic 
appeal to universal rights, the protesters planned to march a half kilometer down the wide 
promenade of Ratchadamnoen Nok Road, past numerous government offices to the Ministry of 
Transport to make their demands. As nine o’clock rolled around, people began to gather their 
belongings and signs to start the march. In the midst of the hubbub, I passed Pi Na, an NGO 
organizer and “mentor” (phi liang) of some of the communities of the FRSN.  
“Our brothers and sisters from NULICO haven’t come,”4 she told me, and asked if 
perhaps I knew where they were.   
“I don’t know,” I responded.  She shrugged, looked around one more time, and walked 
off to attend to more pressing matters. I turned to my phone to check for messages that might 
point to the whereabouts of the NULICO contingent. 
As it turned out, I would find a few members of the National Union of Low-income 
Community Organizations (NULICO), another community network, after arriving at the 
Ministry of Transport. The group had intended to send 150 representatives to the demonstration, 
but only a dozen showed, and they had gone directly to the ministry, wary of marching through 
the street. They waited and watched as the FRSN crowd pour in, noisily laying down tarps, 
arranging their signs, and chatting over mid-morning snacks. The NULICO members looked on, 
hesitantly discussing their next moves.  
Like the FRSN, NULICO is a network of poor urban communities, created for the 
purpose of connecting those with little power in the hopes of increasing their ability to access 
rights to land and housing in the city. Also like the FRSN, NULICO plays a prominent role in the 
acclaimed Baan Mankong housing policy.  
Baan Mankong is a slum upgrading program that works through the establishment of 
communal land rights and community-based financing for physical upgrading. It is what is 
                                                
1 สิทธิที+ อยู่อาศัยคือสิทธิมนุษยชน 
2 คนจนไม่ใช่อาชญากร ความจนไม่ใช่อาชญากรรม 
3 เราไม่อยากเป็นผู้...บุกรุก...จงปลดล็อก 61 ชุมชน เปิดให้พี+ น้องเราได้เช่า 
4	พี+ น้อง สอช. ไม่มา	
 
2 
known as a participatory slum upgrading program in the development world. Completing a 
Baan Mankong project involves years of organizing community members, creating community 
savings groups, finding new land if staying in place is not an option, negotiating with 
landowners, navigating complex government bureaucracies, and ultimately constructing new 
housing and infrastructure. It is an arduous and confusing process, and residents who undertake 
these projects often rely on the received wisdom and support of community leaders who have 
more experience in such matters. That is where NULICO and the FRSN come in.  
Both NULICO and the FRSN are community networks that help communities implement 
Baan Mankong projects. However, beyond this basic similarity, the two organizations have little 
in common, and the demonstration at the Ministry of Transport marked one of the first real 
attempts at collaboration between the networks in the fifteen-year history of the policy.  
 
 
Figure 1: FRSN members with signs saying “Housing Rights are Human Rights” and “Reform 
Urban Land for Housing for Poor People”at the Ministry of Transportation. May 2, 2018.  
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Figure 2: FRSN member with sign saying “We don’t want to be trespassers… Release the lock 
on the 61 communities so our brothers and sisters can rent” at the Ministry of Transportation. 
May 2, 2018.  
While the organized mass of FRSN members confidently set up camp, rallied each other 
with rousing speeches through a speaker system on a pickup truck up front, and even chatted 
with the police and soldiers monitoring the activities, the handful of NULICO members observed 
cautiously from sidelines. Over the course of the day, even as the protest proved successful and 
representatives were called up to speak to government officials, some of the NULICO contingent 
migrated even further from the crowd, observing from across the street out of concern that they 
did not have the requisite written permissions to demonstrate. The majority remained at a 
distance or had gone home by the time the Minister of Transport emerged from the building to 
announce that the parties had reached an agreement to create a joint committee to look into 
opening more land for rental, make site visits to communities, and hold further meetings in the 
coming weeks to move the proposal forward. The announcement was met by cheers and 
applause from the legions of FRSN members. The two NULICO leaders who had been selected 
to sit in on the negotiations as representatives emerged from the building elated. One exclaimed 
to me that she had never been part of negotiations like that before, where they got nearly all they 
asked for. NULICO’s approach, she said, was more “compromising,”5 and she herself had never 
actually been part of the negotiation before. It was always people “higher” than her who sat at 
the table.  
The role this NULICO member was used to was one in which she worked alongside 
government administrators, helping to carry out projects and train other community leaders to do 
the same. Over the years, many NULICO leaders have become adept at accounting, writing 
grants, collecting community-level data, and providing proper documentation of project progress 
for the government agencies involved in Baan Mankong. The most senior members of the 
network do interact with government officials regularly, but in a very different capacity from 
what the representative at the SRT negotiations had experienced that day. They are almost 
always sitting alongside staff of the government agency that administers Baan Mankong, and, as 
                                                
5	แบบประนีประนอม 
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the representative expressed, the stances of NULICO at these meetings are decidedly less 
staunch.  
The demonstration and negotiations of May 2 were undoubtedly a success in terms of the 
goal to open negotiations for SRT land rental. However, much work was left to be done before 
any of the desired long-term leases would be realized, and despite the fact that the concrete goals 
of the day had been achieved, doubts had been raised as to the capacity of the FRSN and 
NULICO to work together. The events at the Ministry and the preparations in the weeks prior 
had thrown into stark contrast the differences between the approaches of these two organizations. 
These differences, their origins, and their impacts, are what motivate this dissertation.   
1.1.1 Policy as a Medium of Refraction 
In the following chapters, I examine the case of the Baan Mankong program. My 
investigation does not take the form of a typical policy analysis, though, which would look at 
policy in terms of how it works relative to its intended outcomes. Instead, I take a step back, 
asking first how Baan Mankong was produced by tracing the many influences that led to its 
creation. To do this, I begin with the primary unit of Baan Mankong interventions—the 
community. Starting with the coinage of the Thai word for community—chumchon—I track how 
the Baan Mankong policy has been shaped by social movements, governmental trends, and 
intellectual currents that seek to create forms of community. This construction of community 
occurs both materially and discursively; thus, a major theme of this dissertation is the ways in 
which the narrative influences practice.  
Once created, I argue that Baan Mankong acts a point of refraction for the various 
elements that comprise it. In the physical sense, refraction means the changing of direction of a 
wave when it passes from one medium to another. In the case of Baan Mankong, social 
movements, government agencies, and especially communities and the individuals that comprise 
them, change direction as a result of being involved in the policy. The redirection of these 
different actors has produced a slew of results, only some of them intended by those advocated 
for the creation of the program. Fifteen years after its inception, Baan Mankong has led to a 
specific, recognizable new kind of urban form, new legal and financial categories, new ways of 
holding land, and re-configured relationships between state entities and poor urban residents. All 
of these changes have led to the emergence of a distinct, instrumentalizable form of community. 
Not all of these communities are instrumentalized toward the same goals, however. As I 
demonstrate, the different movements and political currents that helped to create the policy have 
continued to work in different ways within it, shaping communities toward their own ends. These 
differences are related to how actors conceive of concepts such as rights, democracy, and justice, 
and they are most visible in the divergent political strategies, structures, and practices of the 
community networks that guide residents through the Baan Mankong process.  
1.1.2 Research Questions 
 In examining the origins and impact of Baan Mankong, this dissertation is motivated by 
three primary research questions: (1) What local and international discourses surrounding the 
concept of community have shaped the way it has been institutionalized in the Baan Mankong 
policy? (2) How do the different community networks involved in Baan Mankong differ in terms 
of their political philosophies, organizational structures, and practices? (3) How do the 
communities that go through the Baan Mankong process differ depending on their network 
affiliation?  
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In addressing these core questions, I also discuss an additional, unexpected theme that 
arose over the course of research that is crucial to understanding the current context of the policy 
and its potential future impacts. This is the importance of scale. Over the past fifteen years, Baan 
Mankong has grown exponentially, driven by reports of its “success” on multiple fronts. In the 
latter half of the dissertation, I discuss how the growth of the program has been made possible 
because of the distinct roles of the FRSN and NULICO and how the experiences of communities 
going through the program in its present form differ based on the network they belong to. These 
differences point to the importance of this type of in-depth, ethnographic and institutional 
analysis of policy, as structures and forms that looks similar on the surface can vary significantly 
upon closer investigation. 
1.2 The Basics of Baan Mankong 
The primary function of Baan Mankong is to alleviate poor housing conditions and 
insecurity of land tenure in urban areas. As of 2014 it was estimated that up to 25 percent of 
Thailand’s urban residents live in areas that are considered slums according to the United 
Nations’ definition (UN Statistics Division 2014). In Thailand, most slums are fairly small, and 
they are dispersed throughout the city. Residents living in these small settlements often inhabit 
their land via a long-established custom of land-sharing and informal rental from private owners 
or temples. In other cases, the settlements are built on land belonging to the State Railway of 
Thailand or the Crown Properties Bureau (Angel and Pornchokchai 1989). Residents living 
under these conditions are often at risk of eviction, either because a private landowner wishes to 
sell to a developer or because a government entity plans to beautify the land or put it to other 
use.  
Started in 2003 through the Community Organizations Development Institute (CODI) of 
Thailand, a public agency sponsored by the Ministry of Social Welfare and Human Security, 
Baan Mankong aims to mitigate the problem of eviction by acting as both a source of loans for 
physical upgrading and a process of intervention between residents and landowners seeking to 
evict. The end result of a Baan Mankong project may be some form of on-site upgrading with 
formalization of land tenure, or it may be relocation and rebuilding. What all projects have in 
common, though, is that they operate by establishing formal, documented communities, or 
chumchon. To participate, the chumchon must save money collectively as a form of collateral 
with which to borrow money together from CODI for physical upgrading. They then eventually 
sign communal purchase or lease agreements to whatever land they occupy (Somsook 2009). 
Forming discrete communities, establishing legal land tenure, learning to manage 
finances collectively, and constructing or upgrading homes is a long and messy process. When 
residents undertake a Baan Mankong project, they are aided and advised by networks of other 
communities. The use of these community networks in the policy is key to many claims of the 
policy’s empowering impacts. However, as I will demonstrate, the community networks 
involved in Baan Mankong play very different roles with respect to both individual communities 
and the policy more broadly.   
It should be noted that Baan Mankong is a nationwide policy, and most of the actors and 
organizations I discuss operate throughout the nation’s urban areas. I made multiple trips to 
provinces around the country over the course of fieldwork to track their work. However, in this 
dissertation, I focus on Bangkok for several reasons. First, it is the nation’s primate city, and 
because of its population, a plurality of Baan Mankong projects have occurred in the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Region (BMR). Second, as the seat of national government, it is a primary location 
for political mobilizations and policy negotiations. Third, the BMR, because of its administrative 
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complexity and overlaps between municipal and national government jurisdiction, is a unique 
urban context compared to other urban areas in the country. Multiple collaborators have pointed 
out to me that doing Baan Mankong projects in other provinces is often easier, particularly in the 
case of city-wide initiatives, and looking outside Bangkok would provide a different view of the 
program. I believe this is true; however, it is precisely because of the difficulties, complexities, 
and overlaps with high-level state agencies that I believe Bangkok deserves its own treatment 
and can speak to larger trends in urban governance and state motives.  
1.3 Literature Review 
1.3.1 The Role of Community Networks in Community-Based Planning 
The story of the FRSN and NULICO is of interest on its face for scholars of participatory 
planning because these two cases present contrasting approaches to community participation in 
the context of a single housing policy. Baan Mankong has been held up as a model of 
community-driven development, and the praise for the model is in no small part due to the 
prominent role of community networks in driving its large-scale implementation (e.g. Das 2018; 
Herrle, Ley, and Fokdal 2015; Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2004a; Sotomayor and Daniere 2018). 
However, in the policy and planning literature related to Baan Mankong, “community networks” 
are frequently painted as a monolith, and if specific networks are mentioned, NULICO is 
typically held up as the example. Only Thai-language articles (Boonlert 2007, 2008) and 
anthropological studies of Baan Mankong communities (Elinoff 2013) have pointed to the 
differences that exist across the networks associated with the policy. As I will demonstrate, these 
differences are consequential both at the level of individual Baan Mankong communities and at 
the level of the policy itself. Such insights should be of interest to researchers and practitioners 
looking to learn from Baan Mankong in order to implement similar housing policies elsewhere 
and understand the potential of community networks in urban governance. 
“Community network” has become something of a buzz word across many fields in the 
social sciences, urban planning, and development. The term itself inspires hope for the 
possibility of bridging micro and macro scales of activism, connecting local struggles in order to 
form national or even global movements. Such networks have been posited as representing new 
forms of “deep democracy” (Appadurai 2002), “insurgent planning” (Miraftab 2009), or 
“people-driven poverty reduction” (Satterthwaite 2001). However, others have cautioned that the 
existence of such connections and social resources do not necessarily always result in pro-poor 
urban governance. Quite the contrary, government or private actors can “capitalize” on the social 
capital of the poor to move urban development projects forward (Beall 2001). The Baan 
Mankong networks provide points of comparison to test these different observations about the 
possibilities of community networks and begin to tease out how and why different community 
networks might have different impacts on urban politics and governance. In the case of Baan 
Mankong, these differences manifest themselves most concretely around the access to and 
management of land through collective forms of tenure.  
1.3.2.Collective Land Tenure as a Solution to Affordable Housing 
Beyond the celebration of its participatory processes and community networks, another 
reason that Baan Mankong has received attention from international researchers and practitioners 
is that it represents a large-scale implementation of collective land tenure. Whether through 
purchase, rental, or a special designation called a community land title deed, when Baan 
Mankong communities gain legal rights to occupy their land, they do so not as individuals, but as 
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a community. Most often, the rights are held by a housing cooperative, the legal form that 
represents the community. This type of collective tenure has long been of interest to urban 
scholars for a number of reasons. The first is for its practical potential as a means of preserving 
the affordability of housing and preventing displacement. However, beyond this pragmatic 
concern for affordable housing, for many, collective land tenure represents a concrete and legal 
way of pursuing the political project of creating urban commons.  
On the level of housing security and affordability, the claim that collective land tenure 
can preserve affordability and prevent displacement rests on two related lines of logic. The first 
logic applies equally to the global North and the global South. It is based on the fact that, by 
placing land and housing in the hands of a collective entity—often in the form of a cooperative 
or a non-profit land trust—that property is essentially removed from the private property market. 
Any value that accrues to the property due to market mechanisms goes to the collective entity, 
not the individual owners. The individual owners, were they to transfer to the units, would do so 
only at the cost of the unit, not the underlying land. The intention is that this will both maintain 
the affordability of the units in the case of transfer and prevent frequent turnover for profit 
(Lauria and Comstock 2007).  
The second logic applies primarily to cities of the global South, where settlements with 
various forms of what is called “informal” land tenure are more common (Payne 2004). In such 
cases, de Soto (2000) has famously advocated for individual land titling not only as a way of 
providing more secure land tenure, but also as a way of bringing the property of the poor into the 
formal market, allowing them to capitalize on these assets that had previously been “dead 
capital” due to their informal status. The arguments of de Soto have been widely critiqued (e.g. 
Gilbert 2002; Payne 2001; Payne, Durand-Lasserve, and Rakodi 2009). However, collective land 
tenure serves as an answer to one prominent criticism of individual titling in particular—that 
titling can actually decrease tenure security because it clears the way for market-driven 
displacement (Payne, Durand-Lasserve, and Rakodi 2009). Housing policies that work through 
communal land tenure, often in the form of slum upgrading programs, seek to get around this 
problem by putting land and housing in the hands of a community rather than individuals. 
Through this collective mechanism, the first logic discussed above then works to prevent 
displacement by market mechanisms. However, in slum upgrading programs, the argument for 
collective land tenure’s capacity to prevent displacement follows an additional logic, which is 
that the strengthening of community itself also serves as mechanism to keep people in place. 
Arguments along these lines in the policy literature typically assert that the coming together of a 
community, typically through programs designed around the concept of “participation,” allows 
poor residents to help one another, strengthening their connections to each other and collective 
social resources, or “social capital.”6 In increasing social capital, residents also gain skills, 
knowledge, and external social ties that can translate social capital into financial or political 
capital, for example, through the ability to negotiate favorable terms for financing and service 
provision (e.g. Somsook 2005; Satterthwaite 2001; Mitlin 2011). All of this, in theory, 
contributes to residents’ ability to resist displacement. This model of increasing social capital 
through community-based participation is central to many of the claims of “empowerment” 
surrounding collective housing policies (e.g. Archer 2012; A. K. Das 2008; Mitlin and 
Satterthwaite 2004a). 
                                                
6 See Coleman (1988) and Putnam (2000) for full and elaboration of the concept of social capital. Beall (2001), Das 
(2008), and Archer (2010) have reviewed the literature connecting social capital and community-based urban 
development programs.  
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Not everyone agrees that such forms of tenure are necessarily empowering. As Huron 
(2012, 2018) has discussed, a prominent debate even among advocates of housing cooperatives 
is whether or not limiting residents’ ability to capitalize on the increased market value of their 
homes actually represents progress in terms of social equity. It may preserve affordability for 
lower income people, but it also deprives them of a key benefit of homeownership—the 
accumulation of wealth. Elinoff (2013) has gone so far as to claim that models like Baan 
Mankong highlight forms of what Holston  (2008) calls “differentiated citizenship” because poor 
people only have collective access to rights that middle and upper class people can access as 
individuals. The collective nature of these rights not only limits the financial benefits to 
participation in such schemes; it also requires labor of participants. The work entailed in 
organizing a community to begin a collective housing project can have significant negative 
impacts’ on residents capacity to carry out their normal livelihoods, especially for community 
leaders (Endo 2014). This community-building work is a political process that can lead to 
divisions and conflict just as much as it creates a sense of empowerment (Endo 2014; Elinoff 
2013). The underappreciation of the labor and hardship involved in collective housing leads 
Huron (2012) to call for a reassessment not only of these housing schemes, but also of 
“romantic” notions of the urban commons more broadly. 
1.3.3 Collective Housing and the Urban Commons 
Beyond their practical potential for providing affordable housing, collective forms of 
housing have a theoretical and ethical appeal for scholars and activists because they represent 
concrete instantiations of “the commons.” A great deal of contemporary literature on the 
commons cites as motivation a desire to refute the fifty-year-old claims of economist Garrett 
Hardin (1968), who assertions regarding the “tragedy of the commons” have served as 
justification for the supremacy of private property the world over. The most famous and 
comprehensive effort to dispel the myth of this supposed tragedy has common from fellow 
economist Elinor Ostrom (1990), who has employed a “new institutionalist” framework to study 
and schematize many examples of actually existing commons throughout the world. However, as 
Harvey (2012b) as pointed out, these studies of the institutions that govern the commons mostly 
concern fairly small-scale examples collective management of common-pool resources, often in 
rural and agricultural settings. Less work has been done regarding how the commons might be 
applied to urban land and resources, where populations are large and institutional environments 
complex.  
“The urban commons” is a phrase frequently invoked by scholars of the left, usually in an 
effort to conceptualize rights to housing, land, and space that prioritize their social value as 
opposed to their economic value (e.g. Harvey 2012; Blomley 2008). This line of thinking is what 
connects conversations on the urban commons to LeFebvrian notions of “the right to the city” 
that argue for producing the city as a space of use value instead of exchange value (Lefebvre 
1996; Purcell 2002; Marcuse 2009; Harvey 2012a). Like the right to the city, the urban commons 
is a concept that has evoked much discussion because of its slippery nature. In the broadest 
possible sense, Negri and Hardt (2012) have suggested that the city itself is a space for the 
production of a political imaginary they call “the common.” Such wide-ranging political 
conceptualizations would likely frustrate more institutionalist scholars, who criticize those who 
confuse “the commons” with categories such “open access” and “public space” (Bromley 1992; 
Swaney 1990). However, still others argue that particularly in urban settings, a, institutionalist 
perspective that views urban commons only as bounded, recognized spaces will miss the many 
undocumented forms of the commons that are created through the collective appropriation of 
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space, or “commoning” (Blomley 2004, 2008). What most of these varied descriptions of the 
commons share, however, is that conceive of the commons as resources or spaces that are 
produced and managed collectively by a group and that they are distinct from both the state and 
the market.  
While imagining the urban commons as something “beyond state and market” 
(Dellenbaugh et al. 2015) is certainly appealing, as Huron (2015, 2018) has pointed out, what 
distinguishes the urban commons from the most of the classic examples of Ostrom is that urban 
spaces are “saturated” with state regulations, financial institutions, and markets of various kinds. 
While it may be true that examples of the urban commons have existed just as long or longer 
than state and market rules have governed cities (Brinkley 2019), in the contemporary moment, 
urban commons must be “carved out” from spaces governed by state and market institutions 
(Huron 2018). Or, as Harvey (2012b) puts it, creating the urban commons involves, ironically, a 
form of “enclosure.” Even when such enclosure is achieved, the practices of urban commoning 
involve negotiating with these other institutions that shape urban space and exiting in tension 
with them (Huron 2015). 
In order to survive amidst these other institutional forms, the commons must be 
maintained by a committed collective of “commoners.” Such collectives can go by many names, 
but frequently they are simply called a community. This is the case in Baan Mankong. Scholars 
have long posited that the reciprocal norms of community are often essential to maintaining the 
commons (Swaney 1990). The word community comes laden with assumptions, often revolving 
around ideas of traditionality, insularity, and stasis. However, in the case of the urban spaces, the 
communities that come together to the create the commons may be strangers at the start (Huron 
2015). Even in cases where a community already exists, “the making or unmaking of the 
commons involves the making or unmaking of communities and vice versa” (Sundaresan 2011). 
Community is never a given, and for this reason, the concept, practices, and the word itself must 
be critically examined with respect to their use in programs that use community as a basis for 
collective tenure like Baan Mankong.  
1.3.4 The Possibilities of the Urban Community  
Community has been a central concept of the Western social sciences since their 
inception. In early Marxian thought, Friedrich Engels (2010 [1884]), in The Origin of Family, 
Private Property, and the State, offers a detailed account of community life based on shared 
property and labor in various European countries prior to the advent of the capitalist mode of 
production. However, perhaps the most well-known formulation of the community comes from 
Ferdinand Tönnies  (Tönnies [1887] 2001) in his description of the small-scale, rural 
Gemeinschaft (“community”), which he poses in opposition to modern Gesellschaft (“society”). 
The contrast between traditional community and modern society emerged as a way to describe 
the changes in lifestyles and social relations that were taking place as a result of industrialization 
and urbanization.  A similar transition was described by Durkheim’s (1997 [1893]) during this 
same period as a shift in forms of human solidarity from the “mechanical” form based primarily 
on kinship and similarity to a more complex “organic” solidarity deriving from the division of 
labor in society. 
In the twentieth century, conceptions of community traveled to the city. Members of the 
Chicago School of Urban Sociology set as their task the understanding of what they often termed 
“The Urban Community.” In the preface to an edited volume of that title, Burgess (1926, vii–ix) 
introduces the works of the collection as a counterpart to the research of rural sociologists, who 
had so fully considered the issues of rural communities. He goes on to describe how this new 
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field of urban sociology set out “the think of the city as living, growing; as an organism” (x) 
through an approach that would come to be known as “human…ecology” (Park 1969, 91–92). 
The Chicago School scholars sometimes agree with Tönnies and Durkheim that the competition 
of the city alters the traditional solidarities of rural life, instead creating it “a solidarity based, not 
on sentiment and habit, but on community of interests” (Park 1969, 104). In addition, as opposed 
to the geographically confined rural community, Wirth (1969, 163) declares that “the city as a 
community resolves itself into a series of tenuous segmental relationships superimposed upon a 
territorial base with a definite center but without a definite periphery, and upon a division of 
labor which far transcends the immediate locality and is world-wide in scope.” However, amidst 
this amorphous geography of segmented relationships, the urban community as an organism 
“naturally” produces new forms of local identification, because “So complete is the segregation 
of vocational classes that it is possible within the limits of the city to live in an isolation almost 
as complete as that of some remote rural community.” (Park 1969, 113).   
This segregation within cities and neighborhoods led other urban sociologists, 
anthropologists, and activists to take a narrower view of community in urban space. Researchers 
like Gans (1962) and Stack (1975) applied the ethnographic method that had been developed in 
the studies of remote communities to segregated “urban villages.” In the process, they describe 
the urban community not as the city itself, but as a highly local social form, something more 
closely resembling the kinship-based solidarities of Tönnies’ community. While these urban 
community ethnographies sometimes portrayed social relationships in similar ways as the 
ethnographies of remote communities, making them appear as “natural,” they did so in a way 
that also recognized that the communities themselves were created through the societal changes 
that were driving migration, urbanization, segregation, and structural inequalities.  
At the same time that urban ethnographers were describing social relationships resulting 
from urban processes and inequalities, activists and policymakers were actively trying to shape 
urban communities to address injustices. Saul Alinsky (1989 [1971]) famously developed a 
school of thought guiding the practices of what came to known as community organizing. 
Alinsky’s methods included encouraging organizers to integrate themselves into communities, 
gain members’ trust, and learn about their needs and desires. Once this trust and understanding is 
established, organizers can guide communities through the pursuit of their collective goals, 
starting with things that are small and achievable and gradually building solidarity through 
tackling larger objectives together. Alinsky’s methods emerged as part of a wave of activism in 
the 1960s and 1970s that sought to change how cities were seen and governed, often 
emphasizing the need for community participation in urban planning, as opposed to the top-down 
methods that had dominated the early part of the century. This vision was most clearly 
articulated in Jane Jacobs’ seminal work, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961). 
In response to these demands, many municipal governments began to adopt practices calling for 
citizen participation in aspects of planning. However, Arnstein (1969) warns that while 
participation can take the form of citizen control over development projects, it can just as easily 
become a rote exercise or even result in manipulation of less powerful communities on by city 
officials and politicians.  
Community-based efforts of government were by no means unique to the United States. 
As Roy, Stuart, and Shaw (2015) have argued, many of the community-based interventions on 
the part of the U.S. and local governments in the 1960s relied on techniques and forms of expert 
knowledge being developed as part of counter-insurgency measures in Southeast Asia. The 
practices of governing at the local level were thus being formed as part of global discourses on 
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the management of unruly populations. During this period, “community development” began to 
take shape as a traveling practice throughout much of the world. It gained steam over the course 
of the following decades. However, most community development programs were not directly 
related to counter-insurgency, but rather to broader aims around international development.  
In the latter part of the twentieth century, community came to define an alternative 
development approach to programs that sought an elusive “modernization” of poor countries. By 
the 1990s,  development practitioners and scholars alike were recognizing that decades of 
development policies aimed at increasing industrialization and trade had proven ineffective at 
lifting vast portions of the population of many countries out of poverty and had only increased 
environmental problems, especially for rural dwellers (Chambers 1986; Cooke and Kothari 
2001). Community-based participatory development, most famously articulated in by Robert 
Chambers’ (1994) approach of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), sought to “put the last 
first,” recognizing that the poor themselves may understand their own needs and conditions 
better than so-called “experts” from powerful development institutions like the World Bank. The 
premise of PRA is that poor communities possess a wealth of knowledge and capabilities that 
can enable them to address issues better than outsiders could. However, these knowledges and 
collective capabilities often have not yet been identified or developed to an extent that they can 
be used most effectively for the betterment of the community. This is why there is still a role for 
the professional in development—to guide communities through the process of recognizing their 
assets, identifying challenges, and creating strategies to address them.  
This type of community work gained traction in the 1990s through a new development 
approach called “good governance.” First articulated in a report called “Sub-Saharan Africa: 
From Crisis to Sustainable Development” from the World Bank (1989), good governance 
emphasizes that governments are not the only entities that govern. In this conceptualization, 
“governance” is enacted not only by state entities, but through actors in civil society. While 
different agencies of the international development scene interpreted good governance through 
lenses that veered toward more political versus more administrative (Leftwich 1994), they shared 
an increasing interest in distributing money in new ways. This entailed moving away from 
central governments and toward direct funding of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), many of 
which focused on community development and local participatory approaches (Charoensinolan 
2000; Missingham 2003)  
While the increasing funding and interest in community-based development was 
celebrated by many as a welcome turn away from top-down development, it soon drew concern 
and consternation from those involved in its implementation. Many of the criticisms of echo the 
issues raised by Arnstein (1969) about participatory approaches used in U.S. cities—namely, that 
the processes often did not overcome existing power relations, and that the exercises of 
participation often became more about educating the participants than truly creating space for 
them to be in the drivers’ seat (Cooke and Kothari 2001). Others took issue with the 
presuppositions that a pre-existing, egalitarian community was there to be developed in this first 
place, calling such assumptions a myth (Guijt and Shah 1998).  
While community has been declared a myth by some, to others it presents a paradox 
(Rose 1999; Li 2007). The thrust of this paradox is that in community-based interventions, 
community is considered “natural” and pre-existing, yet at the same time it is in need of 
intervention in order to be properly formed. These tensions make the construction of community 
a site of politics.  Many scholars of Southeast Asia have explored how portrayals of communities 
by states, corporations, international development agencies, and local people have been integral 
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to contestations over land in the case of community-based forest management (e.g. Li 1996; 
Peluso 2005; Peluso and Vandergeest 2001; Tsing 2005). These accounts reveal the centrality of 
land and community to the conceptualization of the relationship between individuals and states.  
1.3.5 Community, Government, and Politics 
The role of community with respect to the modern nation state has been theorized in 
conflicting ways by many thinkers in the past several decades. However, two scholars offer 
contrasting theorizations of community that are particularly interesting in light of the 
contestations over land and collective identity that are so central to many of the participatory 
development programs instituted in since the late twentieth century: Nikolas Rose and Partha 
Chatterjee. Both relying on the Foucaultian concept of governmentality,7 these two writers offer 
nearly opposite visions of the role of community with respect to state power.  
In Powers of Freedom, Rose (1999) identifies community as a key site of the exercise of 
governmentality in the age of advanced liberalism. What he means by this is that community has 
been envisioned as a sort of “third space” of governing, an alternative to both the state and the 
market. In its function as non-market, community does not bear the markers of a-morality 
associated with impersonal exchanges. Being outside the state, thought, it is seen as a-political. 
Put together, these characteristics, make community appear as a moral, a-political, and “natural” 
realm of human interaction. However, this appearance is only part of the story, for “On the one 
hand...this ‘natural-ness’ is not merely an ontological claim but implies affirmation, a positive 
evaluation. On the other, this zone is identified as a crucial element in particular styles of 
political government, for it is on its properties and on activities within it that the success of such 
political aspirations and programmes depend. This third space must, thus, become the object and 
target for the exercise of political power whilst remaining, somehow, external to politics and a 
counter-weight to it” (Rose 1999, 168). These “styles of government” include, on one level, 
classic administrative techniques of counting, calculation, categorization associated with 
governmental management of populations. However, in what Rose terms the “advanced diagram 
of community,” there is another, moral, dimension, in which “individual conduct no longer 
appears to be ‘socially determined’: individual choices are shaped by values which themselves 
arise from ties of community identification. Community thus emerges as the ideal territory for 
the administration of individual and collective existence, the plane or surface upon which micro-
moral relations amongst persons are conceptualized and administered” (136). In this 
conceptualization, community is an ideal form through which government, in the Foucaultian 
sense of “the conduct of conduct,” can work, often through the work of NGOs and other 
voluntary associations, rather than the state alone. This is what Rose refers to as “government 
through community.” 
Chatterjee sees governmentality and community interacting quite differently. In the 
collection of essays The Politics of the Governed, Chatterjee (2004) explores how oppressed 
populations can make political claims through the creation of a sense of moral community 
beyond the community of the nation state. Chatterjee frames his argument as a challenge to the 
classic idea of the “imaged community” that Benedict Anderson (2006 [1983]) posited as so 
                                                
7	Governmentality is broad term conceptualized in varying ways by many scholars, including Foucault himself. In 
this discussion, I rely on a description of governmentality that emphasizes its reliance on decentralized and multi-
faceted modes of rule, its capacity to create certain types of self-governing citizens and subjects, and its dependence 
on enumeration, documentation, and statistics as a means to manage populations (Foucault et al. 2009).	
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central to the emergence of modern nations. Within this vision, the imagined community of the 
nation is key to overcoming the conflict between the ideal of universal citizenship and reality of 
difference. Chatterjee explains that in the eyes of the liberal state, the nation is the only 
recognized form of community. In the ideal vision of the liberal nation state, the members of this 
community interact through a “civil society.” However, as Chatterjee points out, the reality in 
most of the world is that the demographic makeup of this quite limited, restricted to a stratum of 
elites. “The rest of the world” engages with the state not as rights-bearing citizens acting within 
civil society, but as populations that are governed by the state. Governmentality, in this view, 
creates not communities but population groups to be administered, managed, and cared for. 
Community and its moral implications are quite different for Chatterjee than they are for Rose. 
Using an example of a group of poor urban residents at risk of eviction, Chatterjee demonstrates 
how they used a welfare association that had been established in order to administer services to 
them as a population group as a basis for organizing to negotiate with officials and resist 
eviction. In the process, their ways of identifying with each other changed. They used the word 
“family” to describe their relationships, and carried on with shared cause. Chatterjee interprets 
this as key factor in allowing this population group to engage politically with the state, even 
though they are excluded from civil society. Instead, they must function in what Chatterjee calls 
political society. Engaging in this way involves a critical manipulation of the governmental 
categories. In his description of the residents struggling against eviction, he says, “Although the 
crucial move here was for out squatters to seek and find recognition as a population group, which 
from the standpoint of governmentality is only a usable empirical category that defines the 
targets of policy, they themselves have had to find ways of investing their collective identity with 
moral content. This is an equally crucial part of the politics of the governed: to give to the 
empirical form of population group the moral attributes of a community” (emphasis in original) 
(Chatterjee 2004, 57). For Chatterjee, then, elites can engage with the state through civil society, 
which entails belonging to the “universal” community of the nation as rights-bearing citizens. 
Those excluded from civil society—“the governed”—who exist in the eyes of the state only as 
population groups, can engage in political society by investing their population group with “the 
moral attributes of a community.” 
For Rose, government is exercised through community. For Chatterjee, community is a 
political form that can manipulate or resist government. The dilemma of this dissertation is 
whether or when such seemingly divergent visions of community can be true. Might the two 
descriptions apply to different types communities? To the same community at different times? 
And are the two even necessarily opposed? In the case of Baan Mankong, just as with many 
instances of community-based forest management and participatory development programs, 
“community” eventually comes to have a definite, even legal form. Over time, this form can be 
taken for granted, and it is easy to begin debating the merits community-based programs based 
only on outcome with respect to their stated goals. However, I choose a different path. Instead, I 
take heed of Tsing’s (2005, 247) cautionary note, that “Before we follow either advocates of 
critics into naturalizing the object of their debates, it seems useful to ask how this object has, in 
various times and places, come into being.” To do this, I perform an extended case study of Baan 
Mankong.  
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1.4 Methods 
1.4.1 An Extended Case Study of a Policy 
In this dissertation, I examine the Baan Mankong policy on multiple scales using the 
logic of the extended case study (Burawoy 1998). I begin from its global and historical origins 
and trace these through its creation by and through the Thai state. Then, I examine how the 
policy operates at the scale of the city, the network, and the community. For each scale, I rely on 
research techniques rooted in ethnography, with participant observation as the core technique 
and interviews and historical research adding context and depth. In telling the story of Baan 
Mankong through this multi-scalar approach, I rely on the Tsing’s (2005) metaphor of friction to 
describe the interactions of awkwardly allied groups as the they struggle to enact “engaged 
universals.” 
The initial research for this project began through an attempt to understand how the 
policy actually functions on the ground, inspired my own confusion about complex existing 
descriptions in the literature and ubiquitous but ambiguous references to “community networks.” 
After two summers of preliminary fieldwork with one of these networks, the FRSN, in which I 
observed their interactions with officials from the government agency that administers Baan 
Mankong, the Community Organizations Development Institute (CODI), I came to several 
important understandings about the policy. The first is that the word chumchon was central to 
both organizations, but that they used it in different ways, with different moral and political 
implications. The communities that worked with these two organizations were told by both that it 
was important to be a “strong community” (chumchon khem khaeng). However, the messages 
sent by these two organizations about what constitutes a “strong community” and the ultimate 
goals of becoming such an entity differed substantially. The second important preliminary 
finding was that the chumchon that emerged from Baan Mankong projects often bore little or no 
resemblance to the collection of residents that undertook the policy in the first place. Sometimes 
small collections of willing residents from many different locations were grouped together in 
order to have the necessary number to do a project on new land. Sometimes large existing 
settlements were administratively split into two communities for ease of management. Almost 
always, residents were lost and gained, and relationships were reconfigured as part of the Baan 
Mankong process. These reconfigurations occurred under the influence of the often-tense 
alliance between the FRSN and CODI. To understand the why these organizations worked in 
different ways and what effects they were having on the communities they were creating, I 
needed a fuller understanding of where this word and concept that was so central to the policy 
had come from.  
1.4.2 The Extended Case Study 
To place Baan Mankong in a global and historical context, I build an extended case 
study. The core techniques of this are ethnographic, emphasizing participant observation. To 
build an extended case of Baan Mankong, I relied on multiple dialogues. After doing preliminary 
fieldwork with the FRSN, I shifted my focus to the central organization of the policy itself, 
CODI. There I worked as an intern for three months, attending meetings, going on community 
visits, and carrying out projects in conjunction with staff and community leaders. Through this 
work with CODI, I became acquainted with the leaders of NULICO and also came to understand 
the many global influences on Baan Mankong. I even traveled with a group of community 
leaders and CODI staff to the United Nations’ World Urban Forum in Kuala Lumpur, acting as a 
translator between our Thai contingent and community representatives and NGO leaders from 
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around the world. Finally, throughout my period of fieldwork from June 2017 to September 
2018, I began to piece together the history of community/chumchon in Thailand with respect to 
Baan Mankong through interviews and archival research. I continued this work after returning 
from the field by putting these primary sources in conversation with existing secondary sources 
on the history of Thai government policy, the communist insurgency, and social movements. 
Ultimately, I put these findings in dialogue with the literature on community, the commons, and 
participatory policies outlined in the previous section. 
1.4.3 Embedded Case Studies 
The extended case of Baan Mankong is achieved by placing the case of the policy in 
these larger global and intellectual conversations. However, to understand how the policy and the 
concept of community are being applied on the ground, I look at units smaller than the policy, 
assessing how they relate to the larger case. To do this, I apply an embedded case study logic 
(Yin 2009). An embedded case logic allows the researcher to compare smaller units within a 
larger case, assessing differences, similarities, and changes over time. In this case, I apply the 
logic of embedded cases at two levels. The first embedded cases I look at are the two community 
networks, the FRSN and NULICO. I compare how they came to be, the rhetorics they deploy, 
the larger political goals they pursue, and their roles with respect to the larger policy. The 
primary research techniques employed at this level of analysis were participant observation at 
network events and interviews with network leaders and members. However, the balance of 
these techniques across the two networks was uneven. I had originally intended to intern with 
NULICO for a period of months in the same way I had with CODI and the FRSN. However, 
over the course of several months of attempting to establish this type of regular participant 
observation, it became clear that the organization of the network did not have sufficient 
regularly-occurring activities outside of CODI for such an arrangement. Thus, I continued to 
engage with NULICO leaders by continuing my work with CODI, attending meetings the 
NULICO members recommended and performing interviews to help me understand how the 
network worked that might not be readily visible to my observations. In this case, a failure of 
fieldwork turned out to be a finding in and of itself and pointed to a key difference between the 
two cases.  
The second level of embedded cases in the project are individual communities within 
each network. For both NULICO and the FRSN, I selected two communities in which to perform 
more in-depth case studies. The selection of these cases based on several considerations. The 
consideration was achieving some level of comparability between the two networks. To do this, I 
selected one case of an established community that had completed Baan Mankong and was well 
into the process of loan repayment and one community that was early in the process and just 
beginning their initial savings and housing cooperative formation. Through this criteria, I was 
able to assess two things: first, how the process may have changed across time within each 
network, and second, how communities who had started the process at similar times with 
different networks compared to each other.  
Beyond this consideration for some level of similarity across networks, cases were also 
selected for their diversity. One of the touted strengths of Baan Mankong is that it is flexible, 
accommodating communities of various sizes, locations, and land tenure situations. 
Communities may start on private, government, or religious land; they may have some sort of 
existing formal rental arrangement, or they might be squatters; they may seek to stay on a piece 
of original land with most of the original residents, or they may combine residents from multiple 
locations onto a new plot; they may reconstruct housing entirely, or they may merely upgrade in 
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place; finally, they may establish long-term land rights through purchase, rental, or a community 
land title deed. These numerous sources of difference became apparent through the many months 
of participant observation with the networks, CODI, and other informants, during which I made 
visits to approximately 40 different communities at various stages of the Baan Mankong process. 
Through these visits and the opinions of informants, I determined that the key elements of 
diversity that must be included within the four case studies were (1) government rental versus 
private purchase, and (2) in-place upgrading versus relocation. Within each network, one 
community represents upgrading in place through a rental agreement with a government agency, 
while the other represents relocation of combined settlements onto purchased land. Figure X  
shows how the differences and similarities are distributed across the cases.  
 
 Four Regions Slum 
Network 
(FRSN) 
National Union of Low-
Income Community 
Organizations 
(NULICO) 
Well established (At 
least ten years old; houses 
are nearly all fully 
constructed) 
  
FRSN A 
Renting government land 
in original location 
NULICO A 
Combining multiple 
original settlements to 
new, purchased land 
New (Baan Mankong was 
begun less than two years 
prior to fieldwork, and no 
housing construction had 
begun prior to the end of 
fieldwork) 
FRSN B 
Combining multiple 
original settlements to 
new, purchased land 
NULCIO B 
Renting government land 
in original location  
Figure 3: Distribution of Characteristics across Community Case Studies 
My engagement with these different communities was necessarily uneven, as communities in 
different networks and at different stages of the process had different levels of activity. However, 
I did establish a basic minimum protocol so as to have comparable data on each. This protocol 
included: 
• At least one interview with a community leader to discuss the community’s history, how 
it came to do Baan Mankong, its progress thus far, and its relationship with CODI and 
either NULICO or the FRSN (in the case of the newer community in the process of 
combining four settlements, this meant interviewing all four settlement leaders) 
• At least one visit to the community during a weekend evening (when residents were 
likely to be home and able to socialize) in order to speak with a large number of residents 
and observe their casual interactions 
• Attending at least one formal community meeting. 
• Collecting available documents on the community’s history and plans 
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1.4.4 Analysis 
At the level of technique, analysis of the data collected for this project took many forms 
and occurred through an iterative process. After each of the two preliminary visits to the field, 
notes, photos, and interviews were reviewed. Preliminary analysis was written up and presented 
for conferences. This preliminary analysis helped to clarify the research questions and formulate 
the plan for the eventual fifteen-months of fieldwork. Over the course of this fieldwork, field 
notes and photos would be reviewed after each phase of research was completed to make 
adjustments based on hunches or new questions that arose. After the completion of fieldwork, 
notes, interviews and some documents were analyzed through an iterative coding process in 
using qualitative data analysis software, Atlas.ti. First attempts a coding used an open system. 
However, it should be noted that the formal analysis through establishing quotes and excerpts 
with software constitutes just one way in which I examined the numerous forms of data gathered. 
In a project where context is so key, the kind of disembodied excerpts that can arise through 
software-based analysis often prove inadequate. Just as often as I relied on software, I reviewed 
the audio or transcripts of entire conversations next to each other, compared photos and notes 
from different events, and wrote and rewrote summaries of the different sub-cases in an effort to 
configure the many pieces into something meaningful.  
Through these phases and piecemeal strategies, I was guided by a general framework 
inspired by Tsing’s (2005) concepts of “friction” and “engaged universals.” Tsing posits friction 
as a response to discourses around globalization that conceive of the transfer of ideas and 
knowledge as seamless flows. Against this, she emphasizes that things only move forward 
through the friction that occurs when “the rubber meets the road” (6). It is through the heat and 
motion that occurs when different forces meet that ideas, policies, and practices are propelled 
onward, often in new configurations. This friction occurs in “zones of awkward engagement” 
(xi), where alliances are created between actors whose interests overlap but do not fully align. In 
Tsing’s own work, these zones occur through efforts to create community-based forest 
management. When these efforts are undertaken, the programs are the tangible subjects of 
debate, but in the process, so are ostensibly universal concepts like rights or the environment. 
However, despite assumptions of the universality of these concepts, the parties involved bring 
different interpretations to bear on their implementation. This process of implementation turns 
these ideals into “engaged universals” (1; 6-11). Tsing’s conceptualization of engaged universals 
that are reshaped through the frictions produced in particular sites encourages the researcher to 
dig deeply into specificities while not abandoning the possibility of speaking to the global. In this 
project, the primary engaged universal under investigation is the concept of community. 
However, in the process, community intersects with many other universal ideals, including 
“citizenship,” “participation,” “property,” “rights,” and “empowerment.” My purpose in this 
project is not to define any of these terms, but rather to analyze how they are understood, 
deployed, and transformed through the interactions of the many people and organizations 
involved in Baan Mankong.  
1.5 Organization of the Dissertation 
In the follow chapters, I trace the trajectories of these community networks by looking 
not just at their immediate creation, but by stepping back to examine how they have formed as a 
result of and alongside evolutions in the concept of community itself. To do this, I begin with the 
Thai word for community—chumchon.  
Thailand presents a unique case for studying community. To start, in both popular 
understanding and certain intellectual traditions, “community” has been posited as an essential 
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element of Thainess, the traditional social unit of a collectivist culture (Chatthip 1999). However, 
despite this belief in the primordial nature of community in the Thai context, the Thai word 
chumchon not coined until the middle of the twentieth century (C. J. Reynolds 2009). In the 
Chapter 2, I look to this era, when rural villages became the focus of both the mobilizations of 
the Communist Party of the Thailand and the counterinsurgency efforts of the Thai government 
and western powers, to understand how chumchon made its way into the lexicons, imaginations, 
and practices of opposing political movements. In Chapter 3, I then demonstrate how, over the 
course of the latter half of the twentieth century, chumchon came to be applied not only to rural 
villages, but also to a particularly type of urban settlement, what are often called “slums.” Just as 
was the case in the era of the insurgency, in the urban context chumchon became the focus of 
both government programs and popular mobilizations against the state. These efforts to manage 
and utilize chumchon to serve different political interests were carried out in part by members of 
chumchon themselves, but they were also organized by a growing number of professionals, from 
government employees to organizers employed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Influenced by the global spread of practices of community development and community 
organizing, as well as lessons from the time of the insurgency, these professionals forged a 
number of common practices, though often in service of very different ideologies and political 
goals. It was out of this complex field of ideas, practices, and new professions, that slum-based 
community networks and community-based urban housing policies emerged. The most well-
known among these is the Baan Mankong policy and the community networks associated with it.  
In the second half of the dissertation, I turn to the present era, looking at these networks 
and their work on two different scales. First, In Chapter 4 I examine the networks themselves, 
describing their organizational structures, rhetorics, and ways of operating on the ground.  In 
doing so, I look at the networks from both a comparative and a relational perspective. This 
means that I first analyze the similarities and differences of the individual organizations before 
pulling back to look at how those similarities and differences function in the larger contexts of 
the Baan Mankong policy and urban politics more broadly. This wider focus shows how the two 
approaches have both, in their own way, been integral to sustaining Baan Mankong over the past 
15 years.  
Following this examination of the networks themselves, in Chapter 5 I zoom in to the 
level of the community, looking at how the networks affect the social, political, and material 
formations of chumchon. Through a discussion of four individual cases studies of chumchon, I 
analyze how their relationships with other organizations and larger political movements 
influence how they manage their collective ownership of land and resources. This small-scale 
examination of chumchon brings to light the everyday, human impacts of the Baan Mankong 
policy. It also highlights the lived reality of holding land and debt in common, both the benefits 
and the hardships.  It also Furthermore, because the case studies represent communities that 
belong to different networks and began their projects at different points in time, I am able to 
trace how the process of doing Baan Mankong has changed as the program has “gone to scale” 
and various government entities have recognized the potential benefits to the state of having poor 
populations self-manage and take responsibility for urban development. I conclude that the 
process of creating the collective land and resources entailed in many newer Baan Mankong 
projects, far from being a political project of “commoning,” are more accurately described as 
“being commoned.”   
In Chapter 6, I conclude by reflecting on what it means for a policy to be a success and 
the many unintended consequences of success. Baan Mankong’s declared success has resulted in 
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its growth and expansion across Thailand. As the program model is replicated across the urban 
landscape, it reproduces particular physical forms, lifestyles, and modes of being a community. 
This replication carries with it a risk of producing de-politicized forms of community that 
function primarily as a means of managing poor populations. However, within the increasingly 
rigid structures of the established policy, as one network demonstrates, the prospect of using 
community as a base of political mobilization still exists. These dual possibilities of 
community—management versus mobilization—serve as both inspiration and caution for 
planners seeking to learn from best practices and replicate programs deemed successful.
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Chapter 2: Unsettling Traditions 
2.1 Introduction 
 On an April afternoon in 2018, I sit across from a professor who has led the social and 
intellectual movement called sitthi chumchon, or “community rights,” in his office in Northern 
Thailand. Sitthi chumchon has sought to organize rural Northern communities to increase their 
power to negotiate with the state. Despite these controversial political leanings, the professor is 
mild-mannered and humble. As we talk, he says “I don’t know” frequently for a man with a 
wealth of knowledge and 50 years of experience in his field. I have come to interview him about 
the history of the word chumchon and his involvement in discussions about the role of 
community Thai society. I am specifically interested in the debates between his own community 
rights school and a competing movement, wathanatham chumchon, or “community culture,” 
whose focus was more on developing communities’ “local wisdom” in order to build self 
reliance and distance themselves from the state. But if I came expecting the professor to expound 
upon the stark differences between his own thought and those of his intellectual adversaries, I am 
sorely disappointed.  Describing his approach to community culture, he’s says,  
 
I was not happy with the community culture school from the very beginning already. 
But I think that at the beginning, we should be friends, we should form an alliance 
rather than, what do you call, criticize them outright, you know… because I don’t 
understand them completely, either. So I just try to work with them…We should not 
have only one approach. We should have more than just one, something like that. But I 
do not just completely dismiss them…We should form an alliance or work together. 
But we criticize them a little bit to show the difference. To distinguish ourselves from 
that kind of approach. We think that that approach alone might not be enough. 
 
It turns out that this history, like so many other strands of influence that have shaped 
contemporary practices around chumchon, is more a tale of uneasy and shifting alliances than of 
fierce rivalries.  
 Also like so many other currents, the origins of the community rights movement, and 
even the professor’s own thoughts, are difficult to pinpoint, as they span multiple scales and 
geographies. In the 1970s, when many of his contemporaries who were associated with the 
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) had fled to the forests to escape government 
counterinsurgency efforts, he was in the United States, studying Marxist social theory under 
famous western anthropologists. However, he is loath to credit this training with the 
development of his ideas with respect to community rights. That, he says, has always been more 
grounded and practical than theoretical: “it really comes from my strong engagement with the 
people in the field. I mean, doing research, and then trying to come up with certain ideas that are 
more, that can gain more impact. That’s what we are thinking, during our work, we never think 
about theory or anything like that. Even though that is in the back of your head, but you don’t 
know how it comes into your work, you see. It’s like a more natural, we do not adopt it 
consciously, let’s say.”  
 But despite this insistence that his ideas come from the field, he readily tosses about the 
many different theories of community he has read and thought about over the years, from 
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comparative studies of open and closed corporate communities to Thailand-specific debates on 
the nature of the village in traditional society. On all of these fronts, he refuses to take sides or 
stake out a clear position with respect to other scholars. His views, he says, are always evolving. 
At his age, he recounts, he cannot even remember what opinions he held in different periods of 
life. As the interview comes to a close, I begin to appreciate that the absence of fixity may 
perhaps be his greatest conviction, for in one of my final questions, he responds with absolute 
certainty.  
 A fundamental and common assumption among Thai scholars and lay people alike is that 
the chumchon, this small, collective social unit, represents the traditional Thai way of life. 
Despite the fact that the word chumchon was only coined in the middle of the 20th century, it is 
believed that the term is merely a new appellation for a very old social structure, the village. So 
before leaving, I ask the professor, are the chumchon that he works with today in some way the 
same as villages of the past? Without hesitation, he laughs: “No, no, no…community is not 
settled. It’s dynamic. It’s fluid.”  
2.2 Following a Fluid Object 
 In this chapter, I track the emergence and transformations of the word chumchon and its 
associated meanings, focusing specifically on how this term, which originally applied to rural 
society, has become a key element of urban governance and social mobilizations of the urban 
poor. My purpose is to articulate an evolution of tensions around the use of this complex and 
contested word. In doing so, I draw inspiration from Tsing’s (2011) metaphor of friction to think 
through how new ideas and social constructs are produced in “zones of awkward engagement” 
(xi), where opposing forces meet. I trace how global currents have interacted with local 
movements to create new forms of knowledge, meaning, and social organization. Often 
contradictory versions of these forms coexist simultaneously. Thus, the “object” of my study is 
not so much an object as a study site that is, as the professor of community rights astutely 
describes, “fluid” and “dynamic.” 
 To do this, I draw from historical texts, secondary literature, and interviews with 
academics, activists, and community development workers. I begin in the era immediately 
following World War II, when chumchon is believed to have been coined. I then describe how it 
has been taken up by various intellectual traditions in the ensuing decades, acquiring 
assumptions of a much longer history in the process. These assumptions and narratives of 
chumchon have concrete impacts. As I will demonstrate in this and subsequent chapters, the 
stories told about chumchon influence the practices of social movements, state entities, and 
chumchon themselves. While these narratives frequently posit chumchon as “primordial” or 
“natural” to the Thai way of life, I argue that this most local of social units has, in fact, always 
been a global construction. Through this unsettling of this term, I set the stage to analyze its 
contemporary manifestations in the Baan Mankong policy.  
2.3 The Pre-history and Coinage of Chumchon 
“For decades, scholarship on the Thai peasantry has proceeded as if the history of the 
peasantry were known” ( Bowie 1997, 797). 
  
 Long before the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and the Royal Thai Government 
(RTG) began their efforts to shape the rural populace into their own images of ideal chumchon, 
Thai elites and foreigners have believed that the Thai peasantry lived in peaceful, egalitarian, and 
self-sufficient plenty. Katherine Bowie (1992, 798) refers to the spread of this “history” of rural 
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Thailand as “Fabrication through Repetition,” and she dates its origins at least to King 
Ramkhamheang, who, with the simple and oft-repeated statement, “There is fish in the water and 
rice in the fields,” painted an idyllic picture of the life of the Thai peasant that endured for 
centuries (Bowie 1992, 797).  Since history as an academic subject or intellectual pursuit did not 
exist as such in Thailand until well into the twentieth century (Bowie 1992; Reynolds 2006), 
these romantic notions were perpetuated through the de facto histories of the nation, though, as 
Bowie (1992, 799-801) notes, many of them were written by urban elites relying, at best, on 
short visits and second-hand knowledge.  
 Later descriptions of the peasantry tended to perpetuate these earlier characterizations, 
though with some differences according to their ideological leanings, which Bowie (1992) 
classifies as either “romanticist” or “Marxist.” Accounts of peasant self-sufficiency gained a new 
air legitimacy in post-World War II era, as foreign anthropologists took an interest in studying 
rural Thailand. There was a great deal of scholarship by Americans during the 1950s to the 
1970s, much of it relying on the "romanticism" of early Thai work, imagining the Thai peasant 
as peaceful, self-contained, and static due to the abundance of resources and land (Kemp 1988; 
Bowie 1992)(Kemp 1988. 989; Bowie 1992).  Anthropologists often painted these pictures 
despite mentioning evidence of markets, trade, and conflict that belied their romantic claims 
(Bowie 1992, 801-802). Marxist literature of the time perpetuated many similar themes, though 
differing in certain respects. For example, they emphasized the change wrought by the Bowring 
Treaty in 1855 and employed the language of “feudalism” to describe the reasons why peasants 
did not trade or have many external relations (Bowie 1992, 802-803). Nonetheless, both the 
romanticists and the Marxists painted pictures of self-reliance and isolation when describing the 
state of social relations in rural Thailand throughout much of history. As Bowie (1992, 804) 
explains, “ironically, Thailand's Marxist scholars have perpetuated aspects of the view held by 
the royalist elite." Perhaps it should not be surprising, then, that both the CPT and the Thai 
government sought to create similar types of social structures as they fought to win over the 
populace.  
 While chumchon tends to connote a traditional, harmonious, collective rural existence, 
the word itself arose out of a global ideological and geopolitical conflict. In the wake of the end 
of World War II, the spread of communism throughout the eastern hemisphere was the driving 
concern of many foreign policy makers in the so-called “Free World.” By the 1950s, the 
influence of communist China in Southeast Asia was on the rise, and the forces of Pathet Lao 
and the Viet Minh were gathering steam. While the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) was 
well established by this time, its presence was small compared to the parties of neighboring 
countries. This, combined with a historically friendly—if, at times, non-committal— disposition 
towards the United States, made Thailand an ideal base from base from which to operate regional 
counterinsurgency efforts (Randolph 1986). While these efforts certainly took the form of 
military interventions, they also focused on social and economic strategies for countering the 
influence of the Communist guerilla fighters, often in the form of “community development” 
(Nairn 1966; Scoville and Dalton 1974; Randolph 1986). Over the course of the 1950s through 
the 1970s, as the CPT grew in size and influence in villages throughout the provinces, the Thai 
government and foreign funders intensified efforts to win the allegiance of the country’s rural 
populations through the promotion of community-based resources. In the crucible of this 
domestic and global battle for the loyalty of rural Thais, chumchon was forged as a way to 
translate concepts serving both sides of the ideological divide.  
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2.3.2 Chumchon: The Early Written Word 
 Despite the association of the word chumchon with the traditional, collectivist, Thai way 
of living, it is likely the word did not exist, or at least was not in common usage, prior to the mid-
twentieth century (C. J. Reynolds 2009). As recently as the 1940s, the Macfarland Thai-English 
dictionary contains no entry for the word chumchon. However, the words chum (“to come 
together”) and chon (“people”) are listed in separate entries. Half a century earlier, the 1890 
Macfarland English-Siamese dictionary did not list chumchon  under its “community” entry, 
instead interpreting the word as muu rathsadon nai tambon neung,8 an awkward bureaucratic 
translation meaning roughly “a group of subjects in a district.” This description of community as 
a unit of governance is quite telling and foreshadows later developments in its usage. However, 
what is perhaps most curious about this early translation is that it does not equate community 
with “village,” which is translated as [waiting for book, probably ban or muban]. The assertion 
that community is simply a new word for a village lies at the heart of arguments for its ancient 
roots (Nartsupha 1991). However, as of 1890, in the minds of English speakers in Thailand, 
“village” and “community” were not equivalents. And while the English meanings of these 
words may seem poor evidence for their respective significance in Thai, as this section 
demonstrates, translation has been integral to the constructions of chumchon from the beginning. 
 As Reynolds (2009) has adeptly documented, there were multiple impetuses for the 
creation of a word like chumchon in the Thai language in the middle of the twentieth century. 
The most specific claim to its coinage comes from the diplomat known as Prince Wan (C. J. 
Reynolds 2009). The grandson of King Mongkut (Rama IV), the monarch who began the project 
of making then-Siam legible to the Western powers in the late nineteenth century (Thongchai 
1994), Prince Wan was ambassador to both the United States and the United Nations in the era 
immediately following World War II. He has been credited with translating terms for numerous 
Western institutions into Thai, including those as grand as “democracy” (prachathibotai) and as 
mundane as “bank” (thanakhan). It is possible he coined chumchon as early as 1934 (C. J. 
Reynolds 2009), and the Community Development Department points to 1940 as being the year 
in which the “community development line of thinking”9 originated within the Ministry of the 
Interior (Community Development Department n.d.). However, the word was almost certainly 
not yet used in common parlance. 
 At the other end of the ideological spectrum, Marxists of the era were in search of a term 
for “primitive commune” and the sort of communal land holdings believed to be the basis of the 
Asiatic Mode of Production.  As of the 1950s, writers in this vein were using chumchon for this 
purpose, though no one person claims to have coined the term. At the time, some writers were 
also using other words, including chumnum (C. J. Reynolds 2009), defined as an “assembly” or 
“congregation” in the 1944 MacFarland dictionary.  In contemporary times, chumnum is still an 
important word for leftist activists; however, it implies a temporary gathering of people, such as 
a rally or direct action. The word chumchon would ultimately win out to describe more 
permanent communal settlements in this intellectual tradition.  
2.4 Chumchon on the Ground: 1950-1970 
 These early efforts to translate to chumchon were not merely bureaucratic or intellectual 
exercises. They reflected movements on the ground to claim and reshape rural society. On the 
                                                
8	หมู่ราษฎรในตําบลหนึ+ ง	
9	แนวคิดการพัฒนาชุมชน	
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part of the Thai government, this new word chumchon served as a vehicle for policies initiated to 
achieve two related aims. The first was to improve the economic lot and quality of life of the 
country’s rural population. This would ultimately serve the second--and, in many respects, more 
important—goal, which was to tamp down a growing communist insurgency. The spread of the 
communist movement in Thailand occurred alongside concomitant anti-communist interventions 
on the part of both the Thai government and the United States. However, the direction of 
causality between the two phenomena was more complex than one might assume. 
2.4.1 International Aid and the Community Development Efforts of the Thai Government: 
Cooperation and Tension 
 The Thai government initially undertook efforts at “rural development” 10 in 1940, under 
the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior. The Community Development Department, in its 
own history, claims that this was the origin of “the community development line of thinking” 
(naew kit kan pathana chumchon) (Community Development Department n.d.), though it is 
unclear to what extent the word chumchon was actually used at the time. However, in 1956 a 
national plan for community development was drawn up (Nairn 1966). The stated goals of this 
early effort were twofold: 1) “to build up the hearts and minds of the rural people so as to be 
good citizens;”11 and 2) “to promote the improvement of livelihoods for rural people”12 
(Community Development Department n.d.). The order of these two goals is quite telling with 
respect to the political aims of the plan, with improved livelihoods coming after the creation of 
“good citizens.” The results of this early rural development plan were quite modest; however, a 
much larger effort was still to come, both through the initiatives of the Thai government and 
through international aid. All of these programs aimed, in some way, to shape a citizenry while 
simultaneously improving the material conditions life for the country’s rural population. 
However, Thai and foreign interpretations often differed in terms of exactly what constituted a 
good Thai citizen and what type of national government such a citizen should desire. Despite 
tensions in terms of the broader visions of what type of Thai society should emerge from these 
efforts, there was general agreement that a major aim of community development was to increase 
capacity for local self-government.  
 By the 1950s and early 1960s, a significant amount of international aid was flowing into 
Thailand for rural development. During that period, the United States invested some $300 
million in grants and loans for agricultural, educational, and community development efforts in 
rural areas in Thailand through the United States Operations Mission (USOM, later USAID) 
(Scoville and Dalton 1974). Other major funders of the era included the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), as well as multinational 
corporations, such as the Shell Corporation (Nairn 1966). Much of this aid was targeted toward 
“community development,” which a UNESCO documents describes as “‘the processes by which 
a local community can raise its own standard of living.’13 This sort of “self-help” approach to 
local development would appear over and over again through the many efforts to develop 
communities in Thailand in the ensuing decades, and later intellectual movements would even 
posit the self-sufficiency of local communities as an inherent quality of traditional life. However, 
                                                
10	การบุรณะชนบทพัฒนา	
11	สร้างสรรค์ชีวิตจิตใจของประชาชนในชนบทให้เหมาะสมที+ จะเป็นพลเมืองดี	
12	ส่งเสริมให้ประชาชนมีการครองชีพที+ ดีขึSน	
13 [internal quote Minutes of the second General Meeting of the Regional Education Officers Conference, Ubol, July 
14, 1955 (from the files, UNESCO Regional Office, Bangkok), p.2)], cited in Nairn 1966 
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in these early community development efforts, foreign aid agencies hardly viewed villages as 
autonomous.  In fact, an early UNESCO document on the prevailing conditions reported that 
rural Thailand was ripe for "social change" because of a willingness to follow authority (Nairn 
1966). The programs, thus, sought “a combination of assistance from outside the community 
with local self-help and effort.'’” (Nairn 1966, 48).14 Much of this outside assistance came in the 
form of what was known as “fundamental education,” defined as “that  kind of minimum and 
general education which aims to help children and adults who do not have the advantages of 
formal education to understand the problems of their immediate environment and their rights and 
duties as citizens and individuals and to participate more effectively in the economic and social 
progress of the community.”15 This emphasis on personal development as a means to creating a 
particular type of citizen reflected a common Western perception of the goals of community 
development—the promotion of liberal democracy. Citing prominent American aid administrator 
Sheldon Turner, Nairn (1966) says that, “A view expressed by the USOM Community 
Development Office was that the only objective of a community development program was to 
promote the growth of autonomous and self-governing institutions at the village level as 
precursors of the general development of democracy with a peasant base.” However, this high-
minded aim toward creating a democratic populace existed alongside another, more pragmatic, 
political aim, which was “to build a bridge between people and government,' composed of 
building blocks linking popular demand for and government supply of services" (Randolph 1986, 
96).16 This “bridge building” between the government and rural dwellers was believed to be the 
key to preventing the spread of insurgency.  
 Foreign interventions in community development—and certainly the money that came 
with them—were welcomed by the Thai government, led in the early days by Prime Minister 
Phibun Songkhram, who was eager to consolidate his support in rural areas. The construction of 
these proverbial bridges was entrusted to Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat, a military officer in 
charge of rural development who would stage a coup in 1957 and become Prime Minister in 
1958. While these officials were concerned with improving the material conditions of life for the 
country’s rural dwellers, this concern had more to do with simply preventing unrest than 
achieving the progressive social change envisioned by foreign donors. As Nairn (1966) puts it,  
 
While the politically minded Westerner may see in rural development schemes 
generally a means of promoting democracy, it seems certain that the Thai elite saw 
something quite different. Amelioration of peasant problems was a means of 
preserving the status quo. After all, what better way was there of preserving the 
ancient Thai order of things than to have a happy contented peasantry, with good 
health, an improved agriculture through application of science and technology, a 
developing school system, and a slow but steady rise in per capita income? If at the 
same time, Thai values regarding religions and monarchy and concepts of social status 
could be preserved, what better way could there be to avoid the stresses and general 
disruptions of more radical courses? (Nairn 1966, 101–2).  
 
                                                
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid 
16 (citing footnote 35 USOM, "The Strategy of the Thai/Aid Program," undated (circa 1965) (mimeo)). 
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These differences in goals, along with failures of communication and administrative 
coordination, ultimately led to the discontinuation of most of the foreign-led community 
development efforts of the 1950s and early 1960s (Nairn 1966; Scoville and Dalton 1974). 
However, by the mid-1960s any differences in motivation between the United States and the 
Thai governments were overshadowed by a perceived growing communist threat.  
 The floundering and uncoordinated community development efforts of both the Thai 
government and aid agencies in the 1950s and early 1960s took on a new air of importance by 
mid-1960s. As Nairn (1966) puts it, “The reasons for this community development boom are not 
hard to find”17 (104-5). After 1965, the membership of the CPT was indeed growing. Between 
1965 and 1968 some sources estimated that the number of insurgents approximately quadrupled, 
from 500 to 2,000 (Randolph 1986). However, these numbers were still quite small compared to 
movements elsewhere. And in reality, it was events elsewhere—namely, the seizure of Laos by 
communist forces—that spurred the sudden urgency placed on community development more 
than the actual uptick in Thai insurgents’ numbers (Nairn 1966). While the Community 
Development Department had been created within the Ministry of the Interior, it was largely 
inactive in its first few years. However, in 1964 it was integrated into a larger, multi-agency 
civilian and military effort to intervene in rural areas known as the Accelerated Rural 
Development (ARD) Program (Nairn 1966; Scoville and Dalton 1974; Randolph 1986). Official 
literature on the department describes its goals in terms of creating communities that are better 
prepared to enact the development plans of the nation, including “preparing communities to be a 
base of support for development projects of all agencies working in rural areas,” 18and “seeking 
cooperation and support for projects of the government and private organizations”.19 This 
preparation to contribute to larger development efforts involved creating communities that could 
self-govern and manage themselves, as the goal of the Community Development Department as 
of 1962 was to “improve rural people’s quality of life through the cooperation of the people 
developing themselves, which is to say that development workers must work with the people 
rather than do things for them”20 (Community Development Department n.d.).  
2.4.1 The Co-Evolution of the Rural Mission of the Communist Party of Thailand and Thai 
Government-U.S. Countermeasures 
 Marxist thought began to percolate among intellectuals in Thailand in the early 20th 
century. The spread of Marxism was fueled mostly through intellectuals studying in China, 
which marks a difference between the dissemination of Marxist thought in Thailand compared to 
most other Southeast Asian countries, whose primary influences came from exchanges with 
Europe (Baker 2003; Morell and Chai-anan Samutwanit 1981, 78). Through this eastern 
influence, what would be eventually become the Communist Party of Thailand would adopt 
strategies quite similar those professed by Mao Zedong. Vietnam also played a significant role in 
the establishment of a Marxist movement Thailand, with Ho Chi Minh assisting in the 
establishment of the original Community Party of Siam in 1930 (Baker 2003), and in 1932 there 
                                                
	
18	การเตรียมชุมชนเพื+ อเป็นฐานรองรับโครงการพัฒนาของทุกหน่วยงานที+ ลงสู่ชนบท	
19	แสวงหาความร่วมมือช่วยเหลือสนับสนุนโครงการของรัฐบาลและองค์กรเอกชน (From the index of Community Development 
Department, national archives, บัญชีสํารวจเอกสารกระทรวงมหาดไทย กรมการพัฒนาชุมชน, (8) มท 5.4.1.35-5.4.149)	
20	ปรับปรุงคุณภาพชีวิตของประชาชนในชนบทโดยการมีส่วนร่วมของประชาชนและการพัฒนา ตนเอง ซึ+ งอาจกล่าวได้ว่าพัฒนากรต้องทํางานกับ
ประชาชน มิใช่ทําให้ประชาชน	
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was an uncharacteristic “flurry of open propaganda” by the party (Morell and Chai-anan 
Samutwanit 1981, 79). The Thai government wasted no time in combatting the then-minimal 
movement, enacting the Anticommunist Act of 1933 (Morell and Chai-anan Samutwanit 1981). 
This was ten years before the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) would even hold its First 
Congress (Baker 2003). The stringent response to communism is believed by many to have 
fueled communist sympathies rural areas (K. A. Bowie 1997), and was by no means an approach 
that was initiated by the Thai government alone. 
 The great irony of American anti-communist interventions in Thailand is that the military 
was continually trying to combat an insurgency that was fueled by American military 
intervention. The CPT itself made this connection explicit in explaining its major motivations in 
a 1974 internal history of the party: "At present the major imperialist which dominates our 
country is America. The landlord class and bureaucratic capitalists who hold power have 
followed the policy of selling the nation, and becoming lackeys of American imperialism" 
(Baker 2003, 516). On the ground, the presence of U.S. troops in the Thai countryside and the 
resentment they engendered played no small part in the rising sympathies of rural dwellers for 
the insurgency (K. A. Bowie 1997; Nitirat 2007). These sympathies would play into the eventual 
strategy of the CPT to build a largely Mao-inspired peasant insurgency. 
 While shaping chumchon eventually became a goal of both the left and the right, it is not 
clear when or to what extent chumchon was a pertinent concept for the CPT. Despite the fact that 
Marxist intellectuals were using chumchon by the 1950s (C. J. Reynolds 2009), there is little 
evidence that the CPT itself was using the term, at least in the early days. An internal account of 
the party’s history makes no mention of the word (Baker 2003, need to email him for the original 
Thai version), nor is there any mention of “community” in English accounts of the party during 
the time it was active and immediately after (de Beer 1978; Chantima Ongsuragz 1982). 
However, it is certain that the party’s primary targets and bases of operations were rural areas. At 
the Third Congress of the CPT in 1961, it was decided that theirs would be a rural movement 
based on the principles of Mao Zedong. The necessity for this type of rural insurgency was based 
on the party’s assessment that Thailand was “semi-feudal” and “semi-colonial” (Chantima 
Ongsuragz 1982, 365; Thomas 1986, 23; Baker 2003, 514) Based on this assessment, they 
determined that, “Among the revolutionary forces, the working class is the leader, while the 
peasant class is the great army and the main force. ” (Baker 2003, 516). It stands to reason, then, 
that their work in this era may have focused more on constructing an armed fighting force than 
on establishing what might be called communities.  From the 1961 Third Congress until 1965, 
the party developed camps and trained insurgents in forests and mountains. After 1965, the 
party's military arm, the Thai People's Liberation Army, conducted guerrilla warfare, primary in 
the Northeast (Thomas 1986). 
 By international standards, the size of this fighting force was still quite small in 1965, at 
just 500 or so (Randolph 1986). Nonetheless, the belief in the importance of Thailand to the fate 
of the region as a whole drew a sizable reaction, both foreign and domestic. Through foreign aid 
and the initiatives of the Thai government, Bowie (1997) has pointed out that the influence of 
communism in this era was perhaps not so much through the actual impacts of the CPT’s own 
insurgency, but rather through the ways in which the communist threat shaped the Thai state. 
Much attention has been paid to the enormous amounts of aid for military interventions, the 
Border Patrol Police (BPP), and a more comprehensive program designed to secure countryside 
in 1964 known as the Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) program (Scoville and Dalton 
1974; Randolph 1986). However, an early and important counterinsurgency measure that would 
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have enduring impacts on Thai society was the initiation of community development 
(kanphatthana chumchon).  
 This large rural development effort could not have been enacted without a corps of 
trained community development workers. These workers tended to be among the youngest 
civilian staff in the government (Scoville and Dalton 1974). As the next section will demonstrate, 
they were not the only young people working in the villages. As the 1970s progressed, the youth 
of the country, many of whom were raised in cities and towns, found themselves dispatched to 
the country’s remote areas. Some worked for the government, others were fervent members of 
the CPT, and still others nominally joined with the communists in order to escape threats and 
protest the actions of the government. What they all had in common was a mandate to reshape 
the collective life of the rural populace. 
2.4.3 The 1970s Student Movement: From the Campus to the Forest 
 The most well-known group of young people to work in rural areas in the 1970s is a 
group of former student activists that would eventually come to be known as the Octoberists 
(khon deuan tula) because of their involvement in two protest movements that took place in 
October of 1973 and 1976. While the former was heralded as a success of democratic 
mobilization, the latter would end in mass bloodshed and lead the Octoberists to flee to the 
forests to fight with the CPT. Over the course of this tumultuous decade, this generation of 
student activists would gain experience in communal living and local mobilization that would set 
them up to become leaders of community-based movements in the coming decades.  
 The number of students in higher education in Thailand had grown dramatically by the 
early 1970s, resulting in a new population of politically active young people with places and 
resources to organize. This was due to a number of factors, including the founding of new 
vocational schools and universities in Bangkok and the provincial capitals, as well as a growing 
middle class that could afford to send their children on to higher education (Baker and Pasuk 
Phongpaichit 2014). Universities proved to be a space for this new generation of students to 
interact with progressive professors and begin to organize along democratic ideals. One of the 
most prominent student organizations of the era was the National Student Council of Thailand 
(NSCT), founded in 1965 (Missingham 2003, 65). The NSCT was a leading organizer of a 
massive protest movement that started with students that eventually toppled the military 
government of Thanom Kitticharnon on October 14, 1973. At that point, the primary motivations 
of the student movement revolved around the creation of a genuine democracy and putting an 
end to the imperialist actions of the United States (Kanokrat 2016; Morell and Chai-anan 
Samutwanit 1981). While the most well-known actions of the student movement are their major 
protests of October 1973 and 1976, the movement also entailed efforts to organize in villages 
throughout the country. This training would prove pivotal for many of this generation, which 
would later be known as the Octoberists. 
 Beginning in 1973 (Morell and Chai-anan Samutwanit 1981) many members of the 
growing student movement took part in the Democracy Propagation Program under the support 
of Prime Minister Sanya Dharmasakti.  The program sent students out into all 580 districts in the 
country to educate the populace on liberal democracy and the principles of self-government. 
Most of them were wholly unsuccessful in this respect, as they spoke in grand theories that 
seemed detached from the actual concerns of poor farmers. However, some those who listened to 
the concerns of the villagers gained a tremendous education in the process. In the recounting of 
Morell and Chai-Anan, “Perhaps the most significant consequence of this program was to give 
the students a tremendous experience with rural life, a shock-treatment exposure to the farmers' 
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true living conditions. The students learned far more from the villagers than vice versa. Many 
were radicalized, becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the structure of government in 
Thailand and with the Bangkok establishment from which many of them came” (Morell and 
Chai-anan Samutwanit 1981, 152). This education not only formed the seeds of radicalization; 
for some, it also provided an opportunity to exercise new roles as organizers: “Some of the 
students did remarkable work. Those who were pragmatic, who listened, who exercised common 
sense, made a great impact on the areas they visited. Instead of teaching the farmers about the 
democratic system of government, they mobilized farmers to political action. They showed them 
what could be done, and how to take the first steps. Since there were no elected members of 
parliament during this period, the students were acting as the only brokers for the farmers' 
grievances" (Morell and Chai-anan Samutwanit 1981, 152). The protests of 1973 demonstrated 
the power of the student movement to mobilize the masses of the country. Up until that point, the 
CPT had been the primary group attempting to do so. Morell and Chai-anan (1981, 155) attribute 
their success in this respect to five major characteristics: “organizational capability, unity, 
manpower, information, and prestige.” As of 1973, this power was put to use in the service of 
toppling a military regime. However, between 1973 and 1976, the rhetoric of the NSCT and 
other student groups would begin to shift, setting the stage for a more radical stage of the 
movement.  
 In the three intervening years between the 1973 and 1976 October protests, factions of 
the student movement grew more radical. This was at least in part due to a shift in the CPT’s 
policy toward making an active effort to target propaganda toward the students, who they had 
previously considered to be “soft-minded intellectual bourgeois who were not truly committed to 
revolutionary struggle” (Morell and Chai-anan Samutwanit 1981, 287). However, after 1973, the 
CPT was persuaded to change course.  One of the leaders of NSCT during the 1973 protest, 
Seksan Preasertkun, broke off to form a more explicitly leftist group, the Federation of 
Independent Students of Thailand (FIST). This group also began sending students to rural areas 
and slums at the same time as the Democracy Propagation Program, but with a message that was 
closer to that of the CPT. Marxist terminology, such “capitalists,” “feudalists,” and “imperialists”  
also began to make its way into the language of the NSCT leadership and literature (Morell and 
Chai-anan Samutwanit 1981). However, at this point there was still no explicit alignment 
between the two movements.  
 The absence of an explicit connection between the CPT and the student movement did 
not prevent movements of the right from accusing student activists of being communists. At the 
same time as the NSCT and other progressive student groups were gaining influence on 
campuses, village and student groups from the right were also growing in numbers and 
momentum. The Red Gaurs and Village Scouts were on the rise in villages throughout the 
country (Morell and Chai-anan Samutwanit 1981; K. A. Bowie 1997). These movements also 
had student members that were particularly influential in provincial vocational schools, stoking 
acute political rivalries  on campuses (Nitirat 2007). In addition, the more conservative older 
generation in the general populace began to associate the student movement with the communists 
(Morell and Chai-anan Samutwanit 1981). Even though the majority of students did not align 
themselves with the CPT and never read any Marxist literature prior to 1976, the general 
backlash from conservatives to their progressive movement may have pushed many young 
people into sympathy with the party (de Beer 1978). This growing divide between political 
movements and generations set the stage for violence and a subsequent mass movement of 
student activists into the arms of the CPT. 
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 In the first days of October, 1976, tensions between the right and left reached a boiling 
point on the campus of Thammasat University. Incited by the return of two military field 
marshals who had been exiled after the 1973 overthrow, students of the left began to mobilize. 
The police and military responded, and they were backed by members of the Village Scouts and 
Red Gaurs. Over the course of two days, tensions grew until on October 6 violence erupted. 
Formal accounts of what is known as “the incident” or more pointedly, “the massacre,” of 
October 6, 1976 paint a harried and chaotic picture. Forty-six students were confirmed dead from 
the incident, though some reported having seen over 100 bodies carried away (K. A. Bowie 
1997, 28). What is clear is that over 3,000 students were arrested, though only 19 were charged 
(K. A. Bowie 1997, 28; Nitirat 2007, 24)(Bowie 1997, Suwit Committee 2007, 24). When the 
majority were released, they began a mass exodus to the forests to join the CPT. Ultimately, 
several thousand decided to or go into the forests (khao pa). Many who went into the forests had 
been convinced by the October 6 incident that fighting to change society by peaceful means was 
not yielding results, and therefore it was time to take up arms. Others were fleeing what was 
called the "white menace” (phai khao), which referred to the growing imposition of American 
force in Southeast Asia (Nitirat 2007, 24). It is estimated that around 3,000 students fled to the 
forests during this time (Chantima Ongsuragz 1982, 362). Only a minority had actually studied 
Marxist texts or had any knowledge of the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology of the CPT (Nitirat 
2007; Kanokrat 2016; Missingham 2003). 
2.4.4 Students in the Forests: Communalism amidst Conflict 
 The number of insurgents in the CPT ranks grew exponentially in the mid-1970s. Even 
before the October 6, 1976 incident, their ranks were increasing. Before the incident, it is 
estimated that the CPT may have had up to 7,000-10,000 armed cadres, backed by another 6-
7,000 unarmed civilians. These numbers led the government to declare 40 of the country’s 76 
provinces to be “sensitive areas.” When the students fled to the forest in late 1976 and 1977, they 
were joined by other leftist activists, including labor and famers’ organizers (Morell and Chai-
anan Samutwanit 1981, 295). By 1978, there were approximately 14,000 armed insurgents 
nationwide, with many thousand more unarmed militia members and tens of thousands of 
supporters (Thomas 1986, 17–18). Insurgents were located throughout the rural Northeast, 
North, and deep South in scattered settlements. However, the Party maintained major 
strongholds in the North-Central region encompassing the provinces of Phitsanulok, Loei, and 
Phetchabun (de Beer 1978; Thomas 1986) (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Region of the Major CPT Strongholds in the Provinces of Phitsanulok, Phetchabun, 
and Loei 
 Very few detailed first-hand accounts exist of life in the forests with the CPT. Existing 
accounts make it difficult to discern whether chumchon was a relevant word or concept used by 
the CPT during this time or whether the word entered the lexicon of the Octoberist before or 
after their work with the CPT. However, from the limited accounts that do exist, it appears that 
many of the cadres were doing work far beyond the armed combat that is emphasized in many of 
the histories of the party, and that their focus was often building self-sufficient communes. The 
actual practices in the different settlements and strongholds throughout the country likely varied, 
so it is impossible to know how much the piecemeal accounts that exist can applied broadly to 
the overall non-combat strategy of the CPT (de Beer 1978). However, they do offer a glimpse 
into the daily life that would later influence the professional trajectories of many of the activists 
who participated.  
 In the forests and villages, these cadres and their supporters did more than build an army. 
Upon arrival at the settlements, which are sometimes called “camps” (de Beer 1978) and 
sometimes “communes” (Kanokrat 2016) in the literature, they went through a Military and 
Political Training School, where they built relationships with the other new recruits, whom they 
began to call “comrade” (sahai). They also learned the teaching of Mao and other Marxist 
thinkers, though this education often took the form of attempted indoctrination, and ideological 
debate was not necessarily encouraged, a point of disappointment for many of the students 
(Kanokrat 2016, 69–70). At least in some of the camps up in the northern strongholds, when new 
recruits arrived, they were divided into four training groups, only one of which was for warfare. 
 
32 
The others were for agriculture, cultural, and political activities (de Beer 1978).  The roles and 
responsibilities of the new recruits largely reflected their professional and training prior to 
fleeing to the forests. Those with specialized skills in areas such as medicine or music were sent 
to Vietnam and China for specialized training (Kanokrat 2016, 70). With a diversity of skills and 
a commitment to each other, the CPT cadres and their village allies built a collective life in their 
rural strongholds. Letters from the camps describe at least some of them as being largely self-
sufficient in food production through practices of cooperative farming with villagers, albeit with 
the occasional need to ration or import provisions.  
This type of cooperative living with villagers was one of the many principles formally 
espoused by the party at the time. Quoting from a broadcast of the CPT’s radio station, Voice of 
Thailand, Morell and Chai-anan (1981, 88–89) outline ten disciplinary principles of the CPT. 
While these ten principles reflect a level of military discipline, they also demonstrate a holistic 
commitment to creating a new way of life:  
 
    1. Listen to and obey orders in performing your tasks 
    2. Extort no property which belongs to the people. 
    3. Respect and help the people--be polite to them. 
    4. Be honest in purchasing necessities from the people; return whatever you borrow 
from the people, and pay compensation for any people's property damaged by our 
armed forces. 
    5. Cause no damage to the people's crops and farms. 
    6. Drink no intoxicants while on duty. 
    7. Do not scold or beat anyone. 
    8. Do not intimidate or take liberties with women. 
    9. Do not torture prisoners of war. 
    10. Give all property captured to the public.  
 
 These principles of collective life of was certainly enacted to some extent in many of the 
camps. At least some had electricity, provided basic education to children, and had trained 
medical workers practicing acupuncture and traditional medicine. They also emphasized the 
promotion of what were considered traditional Thai values, such as respect for elders, marriage 
and other ceremonial customs, and practices of mutual aid. This was, for many participants, an 
explicit rebuke to the perceived influence of American culture on mainstream society. Despite 
this dedication to local customs and tradition, many of the practices of the camps undeniably 
relied somewhat on models adapted from Vietnam and other countries (de Beer 1978, 149–
50). In a contemporaneous description of the camps based on dispatches from the field, de Beer 
(1978, 150) summarizes life in the camps, stating that “This testimony gives an idea of life in 
'liberated areas', and of the type of society the CPT wants to build, which seems not very 
different from some aspects of today's Cambodia. The stress on independence, on self-
sufficiency and on refusing to rely mainly on foreign assistance--even when it is socialist--is 
interesting, as too is the emphasis put on political work before military activity.”  
 The life being created by the CPT in the camps, then, was one of complexities and 
contradictions derived from necessity. The cadres and their supporters were building a distinct 
culture based on local traditions, but many of them were obviously borrowed from neighboring 
countries who had influenced the thinking of the party’s leaders. Furthermore, this impulse to 
create or preserve a local culture was itself a response to international influences. They were 
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trying to build a cooperative, self-sufficient way of life. However, this was not always possible, 
and as the 1970s drew to a close it would become more and more obvious the extent to which the 
support from outside, particularly from China, was keeping the party afloat.  
What comes across most strongly from accounts of these camps is that, despite the fact 
that the vast majority of literature on the CPT’s strategy emphasizes its focus on building an 
armed peasant insurgency, in practice the building up of the movement involved building 
political will through the construction of a communal form of life beyond the reach of the state. 
When the students were in the forests, “They learned how to work independently in listening to 
problems, building friendships, settling and living in communities, and persuading and 
organizing people to fight the Thai state” (Kanokrat 2016, 70). Thus, propaganda, providing for 
basic needs, and building relationships was just as important as warfare. Citing a letter from a 
student who had visited a camp in 1977, de Beers (1978, 149) says that his impression was “ that 
the CPT could easily liberate much larger areas of Thailand militarily but that its concern was 
first to win the hearts of the people."   
2.4.5 The Community Development Department and the Phatthanakon in the Villages 
 They not the only ones trying to do just that in the villages during this time. As the 
insurgency grew in the 1970s, so did the government’s non-military approaches to counter-
insurgency. These civilian counter-insurgency efforts built on previous attempts to promote 
economic development in rural areas and self-government on the part of villagers. However, by 
this point previous efforts at rural development in the form of the ARD, which emphasized the 
construction of roads and other infrastructure, were having negative if any effects on the morale 
of the rural populace. It had become obvious that large scale construction projects often served 
the interests of the military more than the people, and investments were not being distributed 
evenly among the populace. This, on top of the often-negative interactions between employees of 
the central government and villagers, meant that rural development efforts were breeding 
resentment in at least equal measure to loyalty (cite Bowie? How else?). In contrast to these 
large-scale investments, the government began also invested in another arm of its civilian 
counterinsurgency measures. This effort was less about infrastructure and more about “build[ing] 
strong communities.” Through the Community Development Department, efforts were made to 
put people on the ground who would live in the villages, understand the villagers’ wants and 
needs, and gradually build the types of “bridges” that had been the focus of U.S. interventions 
for the past two decades. The people who would do this work were largely a class of new recruits 
to the civil service, much younger than most other staff. These young community development 
workers, known as phatthanakon (literally “developers”), that the government put out in the field 
were the perfect counterparts to the students who had fled to join the CPT. While it likely was 
not the intent of the government to provide such counterparts, since the program began before 
the events of 1976, the presence of these two groups in the villages at the same time meant that 
two important phenomena were happening simultaneously: (1) villagers were being encouraged 
to live in self-reliant and self-governing communities by outsiders representing two ideologically 
opposed views; (2) a generation of young people representing these two sides were developing 
skill sets for doing this type of organizing work that they would employ in careers long after the 
acute conflict in the forests and villagers had subsided.  
 Like the Octoberist generation who had fled to the forests, the phatthanakon received 
practical and ideological training before they began work in the field. Also like the student 
activists, this training focused on the promotion of local culture and capacity but was strongly 
influenced by knowledges and practices from other places. The training of these workers was an 
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organized and international effort. According to Khun Anurak, a former community development 
worker in the 1970s who went on to a career in agricultural research and consulting for Thai 
government and international agencies, many of the Thai directors of the community 
development training programs were initially trained in the U.S. or by USOM staff ( 2017). 
These high-level interactions resulted in a training regimen for younger Thai community 
development workers (phatthanakon) that would eventually be dispersed to work in villages 
throughout the country. These steps bear the hallmarks of many participatory approaches being 
used in international development efforts throughout the world at the time, which were “designed 
to mobilize the populace in the identification of local priorities and the pursuit of economic and 
social goals through government-aided self-help” (Scoville and Dalton 1974, 53). The work 
required of the phatthanakon served multiple goals. The first was build up a sense of collectivity 
among the villagers. The second, building off this, was to connect this collectivity to the 
government through concrete investments funneled through the community. Finally, the 
phatthanakon were to relay information about the villages to the government, providing a 
foundation of data and making the villages more legible.  
 The meaning of “community development” at this time, as opposed to other efforts at 
“rural development” was very explicitly about developing a particular type of social unit, not just 
providing improvements in the material conditions of the rural population. Through the 
phatthanakon, chumchon became an social object with a collective psyche to be molded by 
professionals. As Khun Anurak describes, “In those days, Thai people were individuals. They 
don’t’ work together in groups. The government tried to get them to understand group 
function…We have a motto: Community development workers, are supposed to create 
community power and use community power to develop their own community.” Creating this 
“community power” and “group function” could not be done without intensive engagement on 
the ground, as well as core operating principles and training in “community psychology” and 
‘the philosophy of how to organize the community.”  
 Beyond initial training in these philosophies, the government, like the CPT, had strict 
rules about how the phatthanakon were to act in the villages, as well as what their goals were. 
They must be in the villages at least 20 days during the month. They must plant rice with the 
villagers, stay with families, become one of them. Their work was then assessed by higher 
ranking officials who would drop by without warning. One of the ways in which the officers 
would determine how well the phatthanakon was performing his duties was to go around the 
village and simply ask villagers if they knew the phatthanakon and what their opinion was of 
him. This aspect of being well-known and well liked was explicitly about countering the negative 
narratives the communists were spreading about the government: “We were trained how to be a 
good government officials and how to create a good image. This was our strength to get away the 
communists.” In place of the communists’ narrative, the phatthanakon were to spread the idea of 
democracy and freedom and explain why this was different from what would happen to them if 
the communists took over. This was part of a larger anti-communist propaganda campaign at the 
time (see figure 1, propaganda image).  
 When the phatthanakon were in the villages, they were aware of that the communists 
were also at work in the same areas. According to Khun Anurak, they always assumed that 
someone around them was probably a communist spy. However, he emphasizes that the 
phatthanakon had a clear advantage over the communists, which was that they could organize 
out in the open, whereas the communists had to work in secret when they were outside the 
communes. Despite the necessary furtiveness of those supporting the communists, both sides’ 
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awareness of each other’s work was, at least on occasion, more than abstract. Khun Anurak 
describes at one point in his tenure actually meeting and speaking to a communist organizer 
when he was in the field. Even though the two were on opposite sides of an intense and violent 
conflict, in this particular moment, the two shared a mutual respect. The communist reported that 
he knew he could never say anything against Khun Anurak in the village because Khun Anurak 
was so well liked that to do so would mean losing the respect of the villagers. Thus, the work in 
the villages was always about building relationships, trust, and respect first.  
 If the phatthanakon were successful in their work, they and the community were 
rewarded with funding for projects. Communities were evaluated based on their strength, and for 
the successful phatthanakon, the villagers would understand that they “need to be the strong 
community because if they are not strong the government will not support them.” Teams of 
evaluators from Bangkok would make visits to the different villages and rank them in order to 
determine funding priorities, “So the first priority for support for infrastructure will go to the 
strong communities. So, communities know if you are stronger you will get more support.” In 
this way, communities that were deemed to have the most strength and capacity for self-reliance 
were then provided with the most outside support.  
 A final key function of the phatthanakon was the collection of information. This began 
early in the service of the phatthanakon and served the dual function of providing a set of 
activities to aid in community integration, as well as to add to the state’s knowledge. A training 
manual from 1972 details the procedures the young phatthanakon were to undertake in the 
villages. Such techniques included a three-month period in which the phatthanakon were to 
collect a variety of household-level data, perform community mapping exercises, and interview 
informants.  The purpose of doing this initial data collection was to better understand the needs, 
wants, lifestyles, and attitudes of the local people. This understanding would, in turn, lead to a 
level of community integration on the part of the phatthankon. However, the data collected 
would also serve another objective of these phatthanakon, which was “to be a center of 
preliminary information and statistics”21 about community development in the nation 
(Community Development Department 1972). Through the data, then, communities were 
amendable to study and categorization at an aggregate level. This type of data collection was just 
one effort at accumulating research and creating knowledge about communities in this era, as 
will be discussed in the final section of the chapter.  
 The ultimate goal of these combined efforts of the phatthanakon and the increasingly 
sophisticated community development apparatus at the national level was, as Khun Anurak puts 
it, to come out victorious in the competition with the communists to “win over the people” 
(yaeng ching prachachon). The reasons for the eventual fall of the CPT are complex and hotly 
debated, as will be outlined in the next section. However, the ability of the government to “win 
over” the general populace no doubt played at least some part. In the view of Khun Anurak, the 
phatthanakon played a crucial role in this. 
 
…the Thai government was able to suppress the communist threat because of the work of 
community development. It was only the community development worker that stayed 
very close to the community…We are the only department to stay in the village. The 
[cultural officers] stay at the district level. You don’t stay in the village. You go and come 
back. But the community development worker was the only one staying in the 
                                                
21	เป็นศูนย์สถิติข้อมูลเบืSองต้น	
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community as part of the family. This is very crucial. But not many people know that. 
Most people thought we fought the communists by using military power. But that was not 
true… we convinced people about the good things about democracy. So we don’t have to 
use weapons.  
 
2.4.6 The Fall of the CPT 
 Most analyses agree with Khun Anurak that it was not the military’s counter-insurgency 
efforts that defeated the communists in the end. However, just how much can be attributed to the 
efforts of the Community Development Department in particular is debatable. Most accounts of 
that time do not mention the role of community development in the final months and years of the 
CPT at all. Instead, the primary reasons given for the party’s decline include shifting geopolitical 
alliances, internal conflicts, and a softening of state policy toward the communists themselves.  
 By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the relationships between the communist factions 
throughout Asia were tense. Thailand had long aligned itself with China but also received aid and 
training from Vietnam. However, Vietnam maintained closer ties to the Soviet Union. The 
invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam further intensified tensions in the region. Finally, China 
reached an agreement with the Thai government, establish greater trade and diplomatic relations, 
but under conditions that China halt its support for the CPT. A major aspect of this agreement 
was the defunding of the the Voice of People of Thailand (VPT), the CPT’s radio station and 
primary mode of spreading news and propaganda (Kanokrat 2016, 73; Thomas 1986, 19–20). 
Without external support for training, weapons, and other operations, the CPT’s capacity to 
mobilize its cadres and spread its influence dwindled. The decline in support from outside meant 
leaner times in the field, creating dissatisfaction among the younger recruits, in particular. It was 
just one of many conflicts that began to arise between the established CPT leadership and the 
student activists. 
 This hardship heightened already existing tensions between the old guard and the many 
new recruits that had joined them after October 6 incident. The new cadres were dissatisfied on 
multiple fronts. One of the chief complaints revolved around the party’s principle of governing 
according to a doctrine of “democratic centralism.” This phrase and the principles underlying its 
practice were meant to achieve a unity within the movement while still adhering to democratic 
principles. Under the doctrine, “individuals must submit themselves to the organization; public 
interests must take precedence over private interests; the minority must conform to the majority 
will'. The minority has the right to express and uphold opinions, but it must comply with the 
majority's decision until the next round of voting. Elections are periodically held to fill high-level 
positions” (Chantima Ongsuragz 1982, 374) quoting statements released by the Party). This 
structure was, at least for a time, responsible for the success of the CPT over government efforts, 
despite the CPT’s much smaller numbers: “The most important aspect of its strength lies in its 
ability to control its own members and cadres. As a tightly knit, highly disciplined organization, 
it is essentially a closed structure; recruitment is strictly and carefully controlled. The party uses 
a tight hierarchical structure in which the lower unit is directly under the control of, and 
responsible to, the upper echelon; at the top is the Central Committee. The party's advantages 
over the government's similar hierarchical structure emanate from its more careful selection of 
members, and their training, motivation, and discipline" (Morell and Chai-anan Samutwanit 
1981, 87). 
 Under the democratic centralist doctrine, in principle democracy was practiced through 
the freedom to express one’s opinions and through elections of high-ranking officials. However, 
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in practice, appointments by high-ranking members were also used to fill a number of important 
positions, discussions regarding important policy decisions were orchestrated and controlled by 
the top brass, and even when there was the opportunity for ‘the masses’ to express themselves, 
the old guard was less than enthusiastic about considering the opinions of their newer members 
(Chantima Ongsuragz 1982, 374). Even if the Party had followed these principles, though, it may 
not have been able to resolve the vast differences of opinion that now existed in the expanded 
coalition that was out fighting and organizing in the forests by 1979.  
 The backgrounds and ideologies of the people considered “communist insurgents” in fact 
expanded far beyond those who were, strictly speaking, members of the CPT. Many of the leftist 
intellectuals, organizers, and villagers working with the CPT were not full party members. A 
large number were part of a new organization that was started in 1977 called the Co-ordinating 
Committee of Patriotic and Democratic Forces (CCPDF). The CCPDF was comprised of allies of 
the CPT, but it operated independently (Thomas 1986; Chantima Ongsuragz 1982). As for the 
student activists, even those who wanted to be full members were often denied full inclusion. 
Instead, they were given the title of “young communist” (sanibat yaowachon) (Chantima 
Ongsuragz 1982, 362; Nitirat 2007, 27). Even the most dedicated young activists were made to 
retain this title, even after years of service. By not allowing the students to become full members 
of the party, they could not hold office and make decisions about the movement’s strategy 
(Nitirat 2007).  
 If they had had control of the party’s strategy, many of the students who were most 
committed to the communist principles would have gone in a different direction, a direction that 
would have taken them out of the forests. By 1979, many of the students were questioning the 
old guard’s assessment that Thailand was “semi-feudal,” the chief justification for pursuing a 
peasant-based insurgency. Instead, many of the younger generation that was more dedicated to 
the cause believed that Thailand had developed a sufficient industrial base so as to justify direct 
work in urban centers, as opposed to the CPT’s Maoist strategy of encircling the cities with a 
rural base(Thomas 1986, 22–23; Chantima Ongsuragz 1982, 364; Kanokrat 2016, 75). 
 Additional stress came from the recruits whose true commitments leaned more liberal-
democratic than truly communist. Many of the Octoberists were familiar with Marxist thought on 
a cursory level, but their reasons for joining the insurgency had little to do with wanting a true 
communist revolution. Instead, they were more motivated by the desire to overthrow the 
American imperialist influence and create a genuine and lasting democracy in place of the older 
generations’ veneration of traditional hierarchies and acceptance of military rule (Morell and 
Chai-anan 1981; Kanokrat 2016; Suwit committee 2007). When they joined up with the 
insurgency, many were quickly disillusioned when faced with the realities of CPT discipline and 
the rigid Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideologies of the member. In addition, many in the old guard 
treated them as though they must “atone for their sins of bourgeois materialism, middle-class 
consciousness, and liberal individualism” (Kanokrat 2016, 71-72).   
 The combination of the reduction in external aid the presence of internal divisions laid 
the groundwork for the wave of defections that began in 1979 and continued through 1981.  The 
exodus was aided by the policy changes of the Thai government, now led by Prime Minister 
Prem Tinsulanonda, who in 1980 and 1982 issued Orders No. 66/2523 and 65/2525which shifted 
counter-insurgency strategy from military intervention to political, social, and economic 
development. This included the promise of regular elections and the right to peaceful political 
protest (Chatima 1982, 364). These basic assurances of democratic process went a long way to 
“winning over the people,” especially the Octoberists whose primary commitment was to 
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democracy (Chantima 1982; 354; Kanokrat 2016). This was followed up in 1981 with Order No. 
66/23, which provided amnesty for insurgents who wished to defect, allowing them to return to 
mainstream society as “participants in Thai national development” (phu ruam phatthana prathet 
thai) (Chantima 1982 354; Suwit Committee 2007; 26-27). With both the motivation to defect 
and the assurance that they could return to society unpunished, the student activists left the 
forests en masse. While a small number of cadres would remain in the forests for several years, 
by 1981 the CPT-led insurgency had been hobbled to an extent that it would not be able to 
overcome. By the mid-1980s, even the most dedicated insurgents had either left the country or 
were attempting to re-integrate themselves into mainstream Thai society (Thomas 1986 23; 
Suwit committee 2007 28-30; Kanokrat 2016, 75-79).  
2.5 Chumchon in the era of the Community Development Department and the CPT: 
Similarities and Differences 
 By the mid-1980s, the major conflict that had led to the first efforts to construct 
chumchon on the ground had ended. However, the legacy of that time would live on, both in the 
villages that had been the focus of the work, as well as through the generation of professionals on 
both sides that had honed their skills in community-level work in the field. While the student 
activists who joined up with the CPT and the phatthanakon were attempting to shape chumchon 
to serve opposite sides in a national and ideological conflict, the actual methods, skills, and even 
the rhetoric they used to do this may not have been so different. In particular, the goals of self-
reliance, self-governance, and democracy were important to both sides, though these goals 
ultimately served opposing aims in the broader national political context.  
 In the end, the duties of the Octoberists and the phattanakon both involved living with 
villagers, understanding their wants and needs, and organizing them into units that conceived of 
themselves as discrete, collective entities that could provide for their members through mutual 
support. Though in different ways and to different desired ends, both groups of young people 
professed ideals of democracy that could only be achieved through local self-governance. The 
main difference between these democratic visions was that one aimed to construct a system that 
could take down the existing Thai state, while the other worked to create a local system that 
could prop it up. Through the work of these two groups of young people, the concept and 
practices of chumchon penetrated the lexicon and lives of villagers throughout the country. In 
just a few short decades, this new term had proven to be useful and malleable, able to serve the 
political objectives of opposing sides. In the ensuing years, “chumchon” would only gain in 
popularity, making its way into policy and activism far beyond its rural roots. This future, 
though, would be built on an acquired history, constructed through a series of intellectual 
movements. Like the ideologies and practices of both the CPT and the Thai government, these 
intellectual movements would aim to create something uniquely Thai but would never escape 
global influence. 
2.6 The Intellectual Currents of Community in Thailand 
 
 Why would both the CPT and the Thai government have been trying to form self-reliant, 
self-governing collectives in the rural areas of Thailand? The most likely answer may be that 
both sides believed that such entities already existed and were, in fact, the “natural” social state 
of peasants in the Thai countryside. This idea had existed among elites, both Thai and foreign, 
long before the mid-twentieth century. However, during the period of the conflict in the forests 
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and the decade or so after, significant bodies of scholarship emerged to formalize this image of 
the Thai peasantry, this time formulated around the concept of community and the new Thai 
word for it, chumchon. Thus, at the same time that community was being shaped by opposing 
forces in the countryside, it was also acquiring a longer and seemingly “natural” history. 
 In this section, I discuss three strands of scholarship related to the conception of 
community as the traditional social form of rural Thailand. The first, following Kemp (1988), I 
call community studies. This refers to the body of anthropological research led by western 
scholars in the middle of the twentieth century that tended to use community as a geographically 
contained unit of analysis. The second is the community culture school of thought, led by 
Chatthip Nartsupha. This school, by relying on empirical historical and economic research, has 
provided the grounding for much of the activism and policies around community in Thai context 
from the 1980s to the present. The third school of thought is community rights. While less 
discussed than community culture in English literature on community in Thailand, community 
rights has been an influential body of work that splintered off from community culture. Its 
scholars and activists have put forth distinct arguments about the role of community with respect 
to the state and the have argued against the view that community is a traditional and static form. 
In what follows, I outline the history of each current, its most prominent scholars, and its impact 
on broader understandings of community mainstream Thai society. I conclude by reviewing the 
evidence against community as a native or traditional social structure, making the argument that 
community itself, like the word chumchon, has been a relative recent construction, created to 
serve multiple opposing interests.  
2.6.1 Community Studies 
 
“The literature on "peasants", "peasantry", and the "peasant village community" is huge and 
frequently contradictory, but within it certain themes emerge…However, further reflection 
suggests that at least some of these themes and their ordering of the subject are not what they 
purport to be, that is, fairly objective observations on a set of distinct phenomena. Instead, they 
have far more to do with the development of Western culture and society than with the empirical 
realities, often of the so-called Third World, which they supposedly describe and explain” (Kemp 
1989, 6) 
  
 The community studies school in Thailand arose out of a joint project of western 
universities, led by Cornell University, to study the effects of modernization on pre-modern 
communities in various parts of the world. In Thailand, community studies is significant for 
several reasons. First, it demonstrates the influence of the counter-insurgency desires of western 
powers on the production of knowledge about Thailand in the mid-twentieth century. Second, as 
part of this knowledge production, the category of “community” was imposed on a peoples and 
geographies despite evidence by the researchers themselves that the category was far from apt. 
Third, because of the strong role of Cornell University, a prominent trainer of Southeast Asian 
scholars, in the community studies project, Thai researchers who would be influential in policy 
in the ensuing decades were trained in this tradition. The most notable is Akin Rabhibhadana, 
discussed in Chapter 3, who would articulate Thai slumdwellers as urban “villagers” and explain 
many of the social phenomena that take place within them as a result of poor rural dwellers re-
creating their village communities in city. He would provide input on Baan Mankong and 
publish reports in Thai on communities’ outcomes.  
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 In Thailand, the most famous community study focuses roughly on the geographic region 
of the tambon (“commune” or “subdistrict”) of Bang Chan. Bang Chan is located in an area of 
central Thailand that was, in the 1940s and 1950s, still outside of Bangkok but being affected by 
the changing landscape of the rapidly urbanizing region. The lead investigator of the Bang Chan 
community study was Lauriston Sharp, an anthropologist from Cornell University. Sharp first 
wrote about Bang Chan in 1950 in an article in Far Eastern Survey. The article illustrates the 
changing social structures and material wants and needs of the residents of Bang Chan. Most 
importantly, though, it explains how these factors impacted the political attitudes of the residents. 
In a clear and concise manner, Sharp clearly articulates why it is of utmost importance for 
western powers to understand the social, economic, and political dynamics of the Asian societies 
that were increasingly threatened by popular unrest, leading to a rising tide of communism 
(Sharp 1950). As a result of this article, Thailand would become a hub for using social science 
methods to enhance counterinsurgency (Randolph 1986, 110). These efforts to use research for 
counterinsurgency would be institutionalized as the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA) under the Department of Defense. In 1961, a field office was established in Thailand 
through a joint Thai-U.S. Military Research and Development Center (Randolph 1986 110). 
Most of the ARPA personnel were civilians of both American and Thai origin, and many were 
employed by various agencies, which included the RAND Corporation, American Institutes for 
Research, and research institutes from Cornell and Stanford Universities (Randolph 1986 111-
112). Some of the key outputs of the ARPA effort were to produce maps of villages, trail 
networks, and other geographic elements of rural areas. They also collected village-level on the 
size, location, population, economic characteristics, and leadership of villages for a project called 
the "Village Information System" (VIST), a computerized data set that the Thai government 
could use. This project was defunded before its completion, but the data was later transferred to 
the Ministry of the Interior. Much of what was produced was probably not of much use to the 
RTG as it was too technical to be easily translated into action. "U.S. research input was most 
often accepted passively, as a concession to the peculiar American proclivity for data 
accumulation. Subsequent application was rare" (Randolph 1986 113).  
 While most of the efforts of this massive investment in village-level research would not 
be put to direct use by the government, its legacy has lived on in academic circles in Thailand, 
most notably through the original Bang Chan project, which through the support of numerous 
American and Thai institutional funders, Sharp would be able to continue across over a decade 
with the help of numerous research collaborators, both Thai and western. The culmination of the 
Bang Chan work would be a book, co-authored with Lucien Hanks, provides a wide-ranging 
portrait of an area under transition (Sharp and Hanks 1978). However, this book was hardly the 
only influential output of the community studies era. In the preface of Bang Chan: Social History 
of a Rural Community in Thailand (1978), Sharp and Hanks list over 25 published articles and 
monographs dealing Bang Chan and other areas of Thailand that were produced during the same 
period. The authors are mostly western, though a couple of Thai academics appear, including 
Akin Rabibhadana, who would later become a leading voice on the conceptualization of urban 
communities as villages of the city. Professor Akin produced numerous studies of urban 
communities in general and has published multiple books and reports on the outcomes of Baan 
Mankong in particular.  
 The Bang Chan study is significant on a couple of levels. First, it portrays a compelling 
case of rural area in transition. Second, though, it presents a contradictory account of an area that 
the authors stubbornly refer to as a “community” despite providing ample evidence that neither 
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the geography nor the populace form such a coherent unit. The Bang Chan study, then, 
represents a clear case of Western concepts of community being applied to the Thai case.  
 In Bang Chan, Sharp and Hanks explain the history of the region, the system of land 
holdings and how it has changed across time, and mostly importantly, the economic and social 
relations of villagers. In particular, Sharp and Hanks illustrate the nature of collective life in what 
they call the Bang Chan “community”—or, more importantly, its absence. While they never 
cease to identify Bang Chan as a “community,” they never fully justify the usage of the term. In 
fact, quite to the contrary, they undermine the use of the word on geographic, economic, and 
governmental grounds. In describing how they determined the study site, they explain that “the 
research group established geographical boundaries for its work, somewhat less arbitrarily than 
the government's administrative boundaries" (Sharp and Hanks 1978, 23). In the very first line of 
the description of “The Community,” they declare, "This is Bang Chan, whose households and 
fields merge with neighboring communities as do the turgid waters of the canals" (Sharp and 
Hanks 1978, 22). Illustrations of the social and economic interactions in Bang Chan provide even 
less evidence for the presence of a distinct sense of community among the residents. In 
describing how residents obtain necessary labor for farming when that which is available in the 
family is not enough, they find not a cooperative system of mutual aid but a market: “Here are no 
ethnological mysteries. The system has the familiar shape of Adam Smith's free enterprise: each 
person bargains in the open market for the best arrangement he can make, and if this is not 
satisfactory, he may move elsewhere...A principal feature of Thai society is the ubiquity of this 
kind of transaction, and the ease with which relationships can be broken off" (Sharp and Hanks, 
1978, 46). On the issue of governance, they again find no evidence of a coherent collective: 
"Though mutual help was commonplace within a household, no contract bound together the 
households of the hamlet. The fisherman from each household sculled his own catch home in his 
own boat, dried the fish on leaves provided by his own helpers, sold these wares to a merchant of 
his own choosing, and spent the earnings on his own wants. Such arrangements certainly sufficed 
for these three households, but even larger hamlets with fifty households may develop no 
corporate arrangements. The concept of the common-weal, which expeditiously organized 
hundred of communities in North America and Australia and furnished a basis for enforceable 
authority, rarely took root in this moist tropical heat.” (Sharp and Hanks 1978, 61). While the 
Bang Chan studies no doubt provided important findings on the changes and social issues 
occurring in the Thai countryside in the mid-twentieth century, what they did not find was the 
very object they purported to study. As Sharp himself summarized in an early version of the 
Bang Chan report, "When our team of anthropologists from Cornell University entered bang 
Chan in Thailand, we expected to find an 'organized village'. We searched many a month for its 
center, for its integrating structure--without success. Bang Chan had a name, but not even the 
glimmering of a community. Individualism seemed to reign supreme" (Hanks 1968, 30 as quoted 
in Kemp 1988, 7). 
 The Bang Chan team remained wedded to the study of a “community” despite evidence 
of its absence for reasons beyond mere intellectual stubbornness. There were structural and 
institutional incentives for framing the project around community. It was conducted as part of a 
larger effort led by Cornell to study cultural change in pre-industrial countries, including 
Thailand, India, Peru, and the American Southwest. The stated goal of this comparative effort 
was to “provide discrete descriptions of the cultural life of local communities in the context of 
their differently developing regions” and to investigate how “the ramifying influences of the 
present, most of them stemming ultimately from the Atlantic civilization, affect the future of the 
 
42 
peasant communities and of the agrarian societies of which they are a neglected part" Sharp and 
Hanks 1978, 26). Baked into the very premise of the work was that peasants in various parts of 
the world traditionally live in communities, and it is only the impact of “Atlantic civilization” 
that is causing this cultural mode to change. However, as the findings of the Bang Chan study 
suggest, this may not be the case, though the researchers themselves were loath to admit it.  
2.6.2 Community Culture 
 The community culture school of thought came into prominence in the 1980s through its 
most well-known advocate, Chatthip Nartsupha. An economic historian, Chatthip has become 
one of the most well-known and most controversial scholars in both the English and Thai 
literature on Thai history. Through his presentation of empirical evidence of the historical 
presence of self-sufficient communities in Thailand and his articulation of a theory of native 
political structure around such entities, Chatthip influenced numerous scholars and NGO 
workers. While community culture is, indeed, a school of thought with a variety of writers and 
activists constructing and adhering to it, Chatthip is the towering figure at its helm. However, his 
scholarship has not been without its detractors.  
 According to Chatthip, before community culture was a coherent school of thought, it 
was a practice performed by missionaries and NGO workers in rural areas. In the  article, “The 
Community Culture School of Thought,” Chatthip (1991)offers his most concise articulation of 
what the community culture school stands for, as well as the story of its forebears. He credits 
four people, in particular, with originating the ideas and practices, including Niphot Thianwihan, 
a Gramscian and liberation theologist who was strongly influenced by Catholic missionaries and 
the Catholic Council of Thailand for Development to promote cooperation in rural areas where 
farmers frequently experienced infighting. Another, Bamrung Bumbanya, believed that the 
middle class, working through NGOs, had a role to play in promoting the preservation of 
traditional modes of cooperative production in order to resist capitalist development. Aphichat 
Thongyu advocated for promoting traditional culture and resisting policies of national 
development that were leading villagers to succumb to the allure of the conveniences of the 
modern world. Finally, Prawet Wasi, the most adamantly anti-state of the group, promoted the 
development of small group identity, believing village communities needed to be 
“reconditioned” to maintain their original communal and independent character. He also based 
his thought strongly on Buddhist teachings. In Chatthip’s (Nartsupha 1991, 125) words, Prawet 
“re-interprets Buddhism, which was the state’s culture, and gives to it the task of being the 
guardian of community harmony.” While all of these forebears emphasized the development of a 
local village culture and community, they were also influenced by international institutions and 
intellectual currents. Most prominent among these were the Second Vatican Council, which 
greatly influenced Father Niphot. For the other three, their philosophies were shaped, in part, by 
the increasing presence of international NGOs and a development philosophy that emphasized 
self-sufficiency and empowerment.  
 Chatthip himself was influenced by global intellectual currents indirectly through these 
four Thai thinkers, as well as directly through his own education. Though he would become 
advocate of traditional modes of production and life of rural peasants, Chatthip himself came 
from a relatively prosperous background, attended private schools, and earned graduate degrees 
from Tufts and Northeastern University in international law and finance (C. Reynolds 2013). 
This initial academic training created familiarity with studying large-scale issues of state 
economic policy and production, and he wrote a doctoral dissertation on these issues in Thailand 
in 1968. However, upon returning to Thailand shortly before the events of 1973, his intellectual 
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trajectory would take a very different turn. He joined in debates with Marxist Thai intellectuals 
and began reading the work of Kropotkin on mutual aid (C. Reynolds 2013, 12). He became a 
prominent member of what came to be known as the Political Economy group of Marxist 
intellectuals (Thongchai 2008, 577). Through this engagement, he retrained himself, becoming 
an economic historian “by dint of his own effort as he began to question the applicability of the 
new knowledge he had acquired abroad to Thailand’s specific conditions as a developing 
economy.” (Reynolds 2013, 4).  
 Out of these various intellectual engagements, as well as fieldwork collecting oral 
histories in Thai villages, Chatthip constructed his own theory of an inherently Thai political 
economy. In The Thai Village Economy of the Past (setthagit muban thai nai adit), originally 
published in Thai in 1984 and translated into English in 1999, Chatthip lays out his theory of the 
village community and its relation to the state and capitalism. In this theory, the history of the 
village community can be divided into two distinct historical periods. The first period is that of 
the “primordial community,” which existed prior to the existence of a state. The second period is 
that of the village community under the sakdina system, which many Marxists describe as a 
feudal system (Chatthip 1999). Contrary to other Marxists of his day, Chatthip did not believe 
that the village community underwent significant change under the sakdina system (Thongchai 
2008 578). Instead, he insisted that the village community remained intact due to three main 
factors. The first was the abundance of land and resources relative to the population compared to 
many other nations in the region. The second was the fact that, under the sakdina system, the 
state extracted surplus from the villager only by force, not though economic relations of trade. 
This prevented the emergence of classes among the villagers. The third factor was the strength 
and security of the village community itself (Chatthip 1999, 74-75). These combined elements, 
Chatthip asserted, produced a particular type of system that allowed communities to exist as a 
social and economic structure that was resistant to the intrusions of the state and capitalism. He 
called this system sangkhomniyom baep anathipat, alternately translated as “anarchic socialism” 
(Chatthip 1999, 42), and “libertarian socialism” (C. Reynolds 2013, 14).  
 What did this form of community-based anarchism consist of? The first element was 
collective ownership of all land by the community, which would then distribute it according to 
need and mutual agreement (Chatthip 1999, 10). Through this commonly-held property emerged 
the second element, a self-sufficient, subsistence-based mode of production: “Village production 
under the sakdina system was subsistence production, meaning production for own use and not 
for sale or exchange" (Chatthip 1999 16). This form of self-sufficient production was related to 
the internal social relations of communities: “Mutual cooperation between members of the 
village was a very clear expression of the relations of production of the Thai village community. 
This cooperation was another factor binding individuals to the community." (Chatthip 1999 
28). Part of this mutual cooperation entailed a self-government through a council of elders 
(Chatthip 1999, 10). The ultimate result of these many elements of communal living was a 
distinct “community culture” (watthanatham chumchon) that endured even throughout the era of 
the sakdina system: “Beliefs were held in common, namely belief in the spirits of the common 
ancestors of the village. Kinship links were maintained. People cooperated in social activities 
and there was no class division, except for the existence of slaves who were accepted as part of 
the family. There was no class conflict within the village. Production relations were similar to 
those of the primordial socialist community--a small community in which people help one 
another in a spirit of common humanity" (Chatthip 1999, 73). 
 
44 
 Out of this analysis of traditional social relations of the village community Chatthip 
constructed a political project. The solution to the supposed underdevelopment in Thailand was 
not capitalist development, but a return to the original nature of the Thai people, which had 
successfully resisted the intrusions of the Thai state and Western imperialism until relatively 
recently. To justify the “naturalness” of this social state, later in his career Chatthip began to 
study the social organization of ethnic Tai peoples outside the boundaries of Thailand, arguing 
that such groups demonstrated the same communal characteristics as traditional Thai villages 
(Chatthip 2005). The way forward for Thai development, then, was “to preserve the old-style 
production relations, but improve the form and increase the productive power by developing the 
technology in the village. This will enable the villagers to retain their uniqueness and 
commitment, to develop their organisational strength to increase their bargaining power, and to 
provide the poor with some institutional support they can rely on” (Chatthip 1999, 77).  This is 
the message that would be taken up by a generation of young NGO leaders, many of whom were 
emerging from forests in the 1980s in search of a new way forward after the fall of the CPT.  
 Chatthip’s work has been widely adopted in intellectual, policy, and activist circles in the 
past three decades. However, it has also been met with criticism. On empirical grounds, Bowie 
(1992) through an analysis of textile production northern Thailand, provides evidence that 
political economy of the countryside was marked by trade, a relatively sophisticated division of 
labor resulting in class divisions, poverty, conflict, and continual change. Anan (2001) and Kemp 
(1988; 1989) have also challenged the idea of a self-sufficient, self-governing social groups 
based on their own research and historical studies. Perhaps the fiercest critic of all, though, has 
been Thongchai Winichikul, who charges Chatthip with a form of conservative ethnic 
nationalism that paints over the diversity and divisions that have always existed in the territory of 
now-Thailand in favor of “an essentialised, even orientalised” village community (Thongchai 
2008, 579).  
 Despite these various criticisms, the legacy of the community culture school of thought 
has continued to hold influence, though perhaps not always in the ways envisioned. Despite the 
decidedly anti-state and monarchy stance of community culture, the influences of the thought are 
undeniable in King Bhumibhol’s concept of Sufficiency Economy (discussed in Chapters 3 and 
4). That such a viewpoint should make its way into royal rhetoric is not surprising to many 
critics, who have challenged the backward-looking nature of Chatthip’s views. As Thongchai 
explains: “Chatthip’s romanticism about ‘the people’ is different from that of the leftist radicals. 
Unlike the latter’s ‘people’, whose potential has yet to be realised, the utopian essence of the 
people in Chatthip’s view is primordial and transhistorical. Originating and posited in the past, 
this people can still be found in the present, although it needs be revived and revitalised now. 
Such a romantic view of ‘the people’ is akin to that of the radicals and other conservatives. 
Royal-nationalism also sees ‘the people’ as loyal subjects who, in their transcendental Thai-ness, 
are loyal to the unique nation and the monarchy" (Thongchai 2008 587).  
2.6.3 Community Rights 
 The community rights school evolved over a similar period of time as community culture, 
and certainly some of the early forbears of community culture also influenced scholars and 
activists of the community rights movement. In fact, even though community culture and 
community rights are often spoken of as separate intellectual strains (Anusorn 2017), many of 
the key figures of community rights do not consider the schools of thought to be competing with 
one another. Rather, they describe them as two strands of thought that critique and enrich each 
other. However, community rights is distinguished by several key features: (1) an emphasis on 
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environmental management; (2) engagement with discourses of human rights; (3) the promotion 
of community engagement with the state through the principle of participation; and (4) a view of 
community as dynamic and ever-evolving. 
 Perhaps because community rights overlaps in some ways with community culture, 
community rights have scarcely been written about in the English language Thai studies 
literature. While a few scholars have researched the progression of community forest 
management rights (Vandergeest 1991, 1996; Johnson and Forsyth 2002), these projects have not 
discussed “community rights” (sitthi chumchon) as a body of thought extending beyond 
community forestry in the way in which the term is used in Thai scholarship and activism. 
Because of this, the sources used in this section are quite different from the previous two, 
incorporating almost entirely Thai scholarship, as well as interviews with academics and 
conversations with activists during fieldwork.   
 Unlike community culture, community rights has no single figure that stands for the 
movement. Most of the early work of the movement was based in the north of the country, and 
many of the key figures are based out of Chiang Mai University, such Anan Kanchanaphan and 
Yot Santasombat. Saneh Jamarik of Thammsat University was one of the original scholars of the 
movement and is responsible for bringing a human rights perspective to community-based 
activism. He later extended the work to urban areas through his research in the Ban Khrua 
Muslim community in Bangkok (Chonthira and Saneh 2000). Meanwhile, Anusorn Unno of 
Thammasat University has researched community rights in the South. Through the work of these 
scholars and others, community rights has extended from its origin in the north to cover the 
entire country.   
 Community rights shares certain commonalities with community culture. The first shared 
feature comes from the backgrounds of the scholars themselves. Like Chatthip, most of the 
community rights academics were educated abroad. Saneh, who is of the same generation as 
Chatthip, earned a degree business management from the U.K. In the late 1950s and was in 
Thailand for the events of 1973 and 1976. The younger generation were studying abroad, mostly 
in the United State, during the 1976 incident or just after. Like Chatthip, the community rights 
scholars were engaged in Marxist thought to some extent, though they eventually departed from 
this tradition over time and see their theories as deriving more from their own research than pre-
existing social theories. Beyond the backgrounds of the individuals involved, community rights 
shares some common beliefs with community culture. The first is that collective management of 
land and resources has a historical precedent in Thailand. Evidence of such collective 
management exists in institutions such as the meuang fai system of collective irrigation 
management, which existed for 700 years.  The second is the commitment to community as a 
social and political unit that is both more appropriate to the Thai people than western forms of 
social organization. Attached to this commitment is a belief in community as a form of resistance 
to western imperialism. 
 Aside from these basic commonalities, the community culture and community rights 
differ in some important respects. The first is that community rights derives its primary 
influences not from historical studies, but from active environmental movements. The first 
academics to articulate community rights were doing so through their engagement with 
communities and NGOs working in forests and rural areas. Many of these movements were 
against state appropriation of lands for forest preserves and dams (Missingham 2003). In this 
way, community rights emphasizes material access to land and resources over the issues of 
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culture. Though culture and traditional institutions of collective resource management enter their 
discourse, it does so in a secondary way. 
 The second distinct aspect of community rights is in the name itself. The movement 
embraces a rights-based approach, relying particularly on theories of human rights to justify 
claims when legal rights do not exist. This aspect of the work sometimes sits in awkward tension 
with the desire to resist the imposition of western concepts on eastern ways of life. However, 
community rights scholars have, at times, sought to work productively with international 
institutions to extend notions of human rights beyond the concept of the individual to include the 
collective (Chonthira and Saneh 2000). At the same time, activists and academics have relied on 
the concept of international institutions like the United Nations and the concept of human rights 
to pressure the government to create new forms of rights for groups who have been dispossessed 
of their lands. 
 This use of rights discourses and engagement with both international and national forms 
of government represent another distinction between the community culture and community 
rights schools of thought. While community culture envisions a sort of anarchism in which 
community sits apart from the state, community rights articulates community as a unit through 
which the poor can collectively engage with the state. One prominent community rights scholar 
describes this collective engagement with the state “participating for negotiating for power.” He 
describes how his views and those of his fellow academics evolved from a cultural framework 
through work with communities and activists of the Octoberist generation in the field:  
 
I worked with the…the younger generation. They used to be students here. They went 
to the jungle and then came out, and they set up an NGO here, and they asked me to 
help them… They have stronger Marxist influences in their work. They’re not talking 
about culture, but more about power, how we can we mix the power and culture 
together?…And so we are more trying to…as we said, empower people…Because the 
[community] culture school, they would like people to recognize their culture. And 
because of that, then they go into the area of wisdom, so culture goes into wisdom. But 
we start with culture…[and] we go into power.  
 
 A young community rights activist, in describing what members of the older generation 
had told him about the evolution from culture to rights, explained that many activists had initially 
gone out into the villages thinking that the answer to development lay in working with the 
people, developing the communities. Then, after several years, they realized that while they had 
been out in the villages, the government in Bangkok had been creating policies that were 
damaging the very communities they were working with. So, they switched their focus to 
organizing communities to change policies. Through this type of practical and evolving 
engagement in the field, community rights as both a political and intellectual movement became 
centered around power through participation. 
 A final core difference between the community culture and community rights schools is 
that community rights does not regard community as a static concept fixed on a particular, 
traditional model. This difference in outlook may reflect a difference in discipline and 
methodology. Many of the scholars associated with community rights have been anthropologists 
by training. Reynolds (2013) has pointed out the potential importance of these disciplinary 
differences in discussing the work of Anan, who has put forth one of the most robust and detailed 
criticism of Chatthip’s work. Reynolds (2013, 2) muses that the basis of much of the criticism 
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makes sense when viewed through a disciplinary lens: “Anan is an economics-minded 
anthropologist with historical sense, while Chatthip is an anthropologically-minded economic 
historian. It is natural that they should spar with each other.” While Chatthip’s work looks to the 
past to find an essence that might endure in the present, the work of Anan and the others in the 
community rights school has always been firmly rooted in the present, looking to the past only 
for context. This, combined with the geographic diversity of the scholars engaged, has resulted 
not in a particular model of community based on an essential culture, but rather a flexible 
principle around which to organize and advocate for change. Community rights is, as one scholar 
described in interview, “a new social principle,” elaborating that “A lot of people in [the 
community rights] school simply glorify the past. But I think they’re less concerned with the 
future… Sitthi chumchon not only offered a new social principle, but it also implies the next 
level is alternative policies. That’s why we have common land rights, common title deeds.”  
 The ability to access rights through collective bodies represents a path to political 
inclusion for many people. For community rights advocates, this represents a way forward in for 
polity that has long modeled itself after western governmental forms but without with de facto 
unequal access to political representation. As the scholar in the previous passage describes, “we 
don’t have a concept of citizenship the way the West has. We have always been loyal subjects. 
But chumchon has been a counterforce of that, of that domination..[It is] self-determination for 
the whole unit…Once you want to claim the rights of citizenship, what happens? They say no, 
Bangkok citizens are more important than you! That’s what they get when they apply the 
citizenship without community. I think the sitthi chumchon approach is trying to bring the people 
back to rebuild their sense of community wherever they are.” However, community rights is not 
without its contradictions, especially as discourses of rights move toward issues of citizenship 
among the younger generation. The professor explains “Once you stress the community rights, 
you sort of become nobody as an individual subject. You are subservient to the collective 
identity. But once you apply the citizenship approach it means that you become the subject in 
and of yourself, and the community takes a back seat. Maybe that’s a trend that’s evolving.” This 
conflict between the desire for equal rights of citizenship across classes and construction of 
community as a form of mediation between poor individuals and the state forms the heart of 
what Elinoff (2013) has described as a system of differentiated citizenship in Thailand.  
2.7 Conclusion 
 The intellectual schools that arose around community in the twentieth century brought up 
important debates that continue to this day. The first is whether or not the village community 
ever existed as a “primordial” social unit in Thai culture. The second is what the function of 
political function of community should be in relation to the larger state. 
 Through the community culture school of thought, chumchon became enshrined as the 
traditional Thai way of life, part of the essence of Thai-ness. This belief in a self-sufficient 
peasantry has longer roots than the community culture itself (Bowie 1992; Reynolds 2006). 
However, such beliefs have also been hotly debated. In community studies, evidence of 
individualism and the presence of markets argued against mutual aid and cooperation, even if the 
authors themselves never abandoned community as an organizing concept of their work. Other 
studies not related directly to community coming out during similar time periods suggested 
similar ideas about individualism as a prevailing element of Thai culture. After describing the 
various forces and institutions that have shaped Thai society, including Buddhism, the 
Monarchy, the Government Bureaucracy, and the natural environment, Morell and Chai-anan 
(1981, 22) conclude that “An amalgam of these forces has led to a combination of individualism 
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and reluctance to organize on the one hand, and yet acceptance of hierarchical subordination on 
the other. Aspects of family socialization practices and Buddhism produce a loosely structured 
society, a kind of individualism by which every person pursues his own interests and resists 
community organization.” Others have argued that even if villages existed, they were never self-
contained and separate from larger aspects of government in the ways described by Chatthip: 
"The Thai society was predominantly a village society, in the sense that nearly all the people 
lived in villages and practiced a relatively simple and stable kind of agriculture. But the culture 
was not a village culture…Even in the village a man was consciously a member of a larger 
society. Its governmental aspect involved down-ward efforts at control and exploitation within 
the framework of a grand rationale, and the concomitant upward flow of some of the fruits of 
production” (Siffin 1966, 9). The evidence against the village community has been most 
forcefully organized and argued by Kemp (1988), who called the idea nothing but a “seductive 
mirage.” 
 Whether or not the village community was truly a native social form in rural Thailand 
may never be settled. Perhaps cooperative, self-sufficient villages existed in some times and 
places but were simply not as ubiquitous as is commonly assumed. Perhaps some types of 
cooperative institutions, such as the meuang fai irrigation system, existed alongside markets, 
hierarchies, and individualistic practices. What is certain is that stories of the prehistory of 
chumchon have influenced its present discursive formations. This discursive production has, in 
turn, impacted how it has been actively created on the ground. The CPT and student activists, as 
well the Thai government, both held beliefs about the traditional social structures of Thai 
peasants. As Bowie (1992) has pointed out, the beliefs of Thai Marxists, rooted in the concept of 
the Asiatic Mode of Production, bore some striking similarities to the romantic beliefs about the 
countryside held by royals and elites. These similarities in the perception of history resulted in 
similarities in the types of self-reliant, self-governing collectivities they attempted to develop in 
the field, albeit for political aims that opposed each other on a larger scale.  
 The larger political purpose of community is what remains at stake in debates over 
chumchon. Should chumchon seek to be, as Chatthip would argue, a self-sufficient entity that can 
remain the same across time, resisting the encroachment of the state with all its western 
influences? From the vantage point of the twenty-first century, such a result seems unlikely. 
Moreover, as Thongchai (2008, 586) has argued, this type of social formation can easily slide 
into the service of a neoliberal state: “Whatever the original intellectual impulses behind 
Chatthip’s and his colleagues’ work, the various themes which they wove together in their 
discourse about Thai-ness have resonated because they fulfill critical ideological needs of 
neoliberal times...The antistatism is, of course, particularly useful in neoliberal times: the poor 
Thai peasant can conveniently be portrayed as too upstanding to need state handouts (and those 
who do need them can conveniently be portrayed as not authentically Thai).” Another possibility 
for chumchon, as the community rights scholars and activists have argued, is that chumchon 
might be a unit that can unite the power of the disenfranchised in order to negotiate with the 
state. However, as some of its own advocates acknowledges and Elinoff (2013) has argued, 
relying on collectives to ensure the rights of the poor can negate the individual, creating a 
bifurcated system of citizenship in which the upper classes can access rights as individuals but 
the poor can do so only as members of chumchon.  
 This debate over the purpose and potential of chumchon formed out of beliefs and 
movements in rural areas. Toward the end of the twentieth century and in to the twenty-first, the 
discursive formations of chumchon and the movements creating them on the ground would 
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migrate to cities, along with a massive flow of people from the countryside to urban areas. Along 
with this, new policies and institutions would be created around chumchon. Like the initial 
formations on chumchon, many of these, many of these new movements and policies would have 
global influences. Some of these policies have instituted by the government to categorize and 
manage poor urban dwellers. In other instances, they have been the result of political organizing 
to gain access to land and resources in the city. In some cases, the same policies have served both 
purposes, as is the case in the Baan Mankong program. In the following chapter I will review the 
movement of chumchon from the countryside to the city and the various policies, practices, and 
discourses that have resulted in the creation of Baan Mankong and its supporting institutions.  
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Chapter 3: Chumchon in the City 
3.1 Introduction 
In 2003, the Baan Mankong collective housing program was created under the auspices 
of new government agency called the Community Organizations Development Institute (CODI) 
of Thailand. Numerous academic articles and books have discussed the origins of the policy in 
terms of the new government institutional arrangements and funding sources that enabled it (e.g. 
Herrle, Ley, and Fokdal 2015; Somsook 2004; Yap and De Wandeler 2010). In these accounts, 
the history of community-based activism that preceded the creation of the policy is afforded a 
few sentences, if it is mentioned at all. However, understanding this activism that preceded the 
policy is crucial to comprehending how Baan Manong functions in the present. 
In the decades prior to Baan Mankong, numerous actors and global influences 
contributed to a national movement of community-based organizing for rights to land and 
resources. This movement, which encompassed both urban and rural issues, established many of 
the practices of protest and negotiation with state authorities that would provide the blueprint for 
the Baan Mankong model. While this movement has been discussed in Thai literature on the 
subject (Boonlert 2003, 2008; Ekkaphonat 2016), a detailed accounting of the this history as a 
point of origin for the policy is missing from the English literature on Baan Mankong, much of 
which seeks to identify how the policy works and how elements of it might be replicated 
elsewhere. The first aim of this chapter is to offer a more enriched account of the origins of the 
Baan Mankong policy by focusing on the importance of grassroots movements in its creation. 
The second aim is to take a step back from the policy itself to illustrate how it is situated amidst 
larger trends discussed in the prior chapter related to the establishment of chumchon as a unit of 
both political organization and governance in the urban context. In the process, I also situate the 
creation of Baan Mankong in the broader contexts of Thai urban development and global trends 
in development practice. 
While chumchon, as articulated by the well-known community culture school of thought, 
describes these social units as essential forms Thai social organization in a rural context, 
chumchon has also come to apply to urban settlements. This history of chumchon in the urban 
context overlaps with and derives from the word's application to rural settlements in important 
ways. However, a number of local and global forces have also influenced the way in which it has 
emerged as a key social unit in the city. In this chapter, I weave together multiple histories of 
population movements, policy changes, and international development trends to demonstrate the 
many strains of influence that have shaped the emergence of urban chumchon.  I begin by 
describing the population movements within Thailand that led to the growth what are commonly 
called “slums” in Bangkok. I then address the different phases of housing policy that sought to 
solve the problem of slums and how these policies were influenced by international institutions 
such as the World Bank. In response to the inadequacies of government responses to shelter 
needs in the city, a grassroots movement emerged, enabled by the return of members of the 
Octoberist generation to mainstream society and the availability of new sources of funding for 
NGOs through the efforts of international donors to establish “good governance” in the Third 
World. These same discourses around good governance would manifest themselves in a new 
willingness on the part of the government to create community-based programs to address urban 
poverty. Ultimately, government and grassroots movements would lead to a series of 
collaborations between a slum-based organizations and progressive government workers that 
formed the model on which Baan Mankong is based.  
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Competing visions of urban chumchon emerged at the interstices of these multiple 
histories. On one hand, the slum movement, supported by NGOs, envisioned community as a 
unit of organization in what they called phak prachachon, or the people’s sector. In the people’s 
sector, citizens’ organizations maintain independence from government in order to hold the 
government accountable and make demands of it from the outside. However, the government 
was seeking to create chumchon as an integral part of prachasangkom, or “civil society,” a term 
that had gained prominence through the rise of discourses around good governance. In the civil 
society view, chumchon occupies a different space with respect to the government. It is a liaison, 
an entity that can provide services in association with the government, even act as a unit of 
government. Through the lenses of the people’s sector and civil society, chumchon came to be 
shaped by institutions and discourses, as well as by individuals who now earned a living by 
working with community members. Through the histories of chumchon, the emergence of civil 
society and the people’s sector, and ultimately the creation of Baan Mankong, community 
became a concrete and tangible object. In conjunction, the formation of chumchon came to be a 
realm of professional practice for a range of actors.  
3.2 Stages of Bangkok’s Development and Early Housing Policies 
 The government initiatives and social movements that led to Baan Mankong were greatly 
influenced by the people and practices developed in rural areas in the era of the insurgency. 
However, the policy has taken form in the context of Thailand’s overall urbanization and the 
evolution of urban policy. In this section, I review the population trends, government structures, 
and policies that resulted in a housing crisis for many poor urban dwellers and the growth of 
slums. I also discuss how the word chumchon came to apply to these early settlements and the 
interventions that targeted them.  
3.2.1 Early Bangkok Settlement Patterns and Land Control 
Before Bangkok became the complex primate city that it is today, many of its areas, even 
within the city walls, did not look entirely different from the countryside. As Askew (Askew 
2002, 23; 41) has described, Bangkok’s early urban form was comprised of villages (ban) and 
water hamlets (bang), along with the royal citadel and numerous neighborhoods that specialized 
in producing goods for trade. These villages and neighborhoods were connected by numerous 
canals that were constructed for both transportation and irrigation over the course of the early 
Bangkok era (Ingram 1971; Tanabe 1977). When the city was first being settled, like much of the 
rest of the country, there was ample land for settlement and cultivation.   
The history of landholdings in early Bangkok and how they evolved is notoriously 
difficult to construct (Sharp and Hanks 1978, 75; Footnote 1 p. 261). The difficulty derives from 
both the complexity of the matter and its political nature. Part of the difficulty arises from the 
fact that, in principle, all land belongs to the King, as he is the phra jao phaen din (Lord of all 
the Earth) (Askew 2002, 31; Sharp and Hanks 1978). This means that decisions with respect to 
land have been—and still are, to an extent—a monarchical affair. By definition, this makes land 
an especially politically sensitive topic. Detailed documentation of early landholdings is often 
not readily available, either because such files do not exist or because they are considered “secret 
documents.”22  
                                                
22 The researcher came across difficulties in accessing early land surveys from the National Archives of Thailand 
because at least one important set of survey documents from the early 20th century was labeled “secret.” 
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From what is known about the evolution of landholdings, it is clear that in early 
Bangkok, up through the around the mid-18th century, nearly all those who settled within the city 
walls had the explicit permission of the King or one of his high-ranking subordinates (Sharp and 
Hanks 1978, 75–79). Despite the fact that land technically belonged to the King, property rights 
of the various high-ranking people who occupied and managed the land were informally 
respected, and by the late 19th century a de facto market for the sale and rental of land had 
emerged (Askew 2002, 31–33). Throughout the country, the formal titling of land took place in 
fits and starts, and Larsson (2012) has argued that the Thai government and monarchy have, at 
times, strategically used opacity in land ownership for the sake of national security to prevent 
foreign powers from being able to acquire land.  
Over the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the care of the much of the lands of 
Bangkok, while still ultimately under the purview of King, would be devolved to various 
government agencies. During this period, the Thai government, following international advice 
and pressure, developed an intricate and multi-tiered bureaucracy (Riggs 1966; Siffin 1966). 
Some of these primary government landowners include the Crown Property Bureau (CPB), 
which maintains land that is still directly controlled by the monarchy; the State Railways of 
Thailand23 (SRT); the Treasury Department, which controls much of the land along the canals in 
Bangkok, among other holdings; the Irrigation Department, which controls another portion of 
canal lands, and the Port Authority of Thailand, which controls what would become Bangkok’s 
biggest slum, Khlong Toei (Angel and Sopon 1989; Askew 2002; Endo 2014).  
In Bangkok, the fact that much of the land is owned by agencies of the national 
government makes planning at the municipal level particularly difficult. Bangkok as an 
administrative unit and the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration would not be created until 
1971 and 1972, respectively (Angel and Sopon 1989, 6; Askew 2002, 61–63). The rather late 
implementation of an agency that is specifically charged with the management of the city has led 
to difficulties with planning and land allocation, especially considering much of the land under 
its auspices has higher management. Askew (2002, 83) describes the Thai state as a “congeries 
of competing agencies charged with devising and implementing policy and projects” which in 
Bangkok  has resulted in “ill-coordinated activities and legal impotence in enforcing land-use 
controls.” It was into this “congeries” of land controlling agencies and frequent opacity with 
respect to private ownership that millions of new residents to Bangkok and its surrounding 
provinces arrived in the mid- to late-twentieth century.  
3.2.2 “Development” and The Growth of the Primate City 
In the post-war period Thailand adopted kan patthana (“development”) as a national 
mission, even an identity (Chairait 2017 [1999] ; Ekkaphonat 2016). While some of this 
development effort was focused on rural areas, primarily to tamp down the growing communist 
insurgency, as discussed in the previous chapter, a much larger effort was focused on 
constructing an industrial economic base. Following the guidance of the United States and the 
World Bank, the Thai government emphasized the growth of urban areas over agricultural areas, 
which in turn led to the impoverishment of many farmers, an important push factor in rural-urban 
migration. In addition, starting in the 1960s there was the pull factor of jobs created due to an 
initial emphasis on import substitution policies that emphasized the promotion of domestic 
industries. In the 1980s the country’s economic strategy changed to emphasizing exports, which 
resulted in the lowering of the basic commodity prices received by farmers. This pushed even 
                                                
23 For a detailed discussion of the history of the SRT and its landholdings, see Elinoff (2013). 
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more people to the city (Ekkaphonat 2016, 1–5). Between 1960 and 1986 the area of Bangkok 
and the provinces immediately surrounding it gained 4.9 million people (Baker and Pasuk 
Phongpaichit 2014, 328). This larger area, which includes Bangkok proper, Nonthaburi, Pathum 
Thani, Samut Prakan, Samut Sakhon and Nakhon Pathom, came to be known as the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Region (BMR) in the 1980s. The BMR is often used as a planning term and for 
demographic descriptions of the area, which functionally operates as a coherent region in many 
respects. However, the different provinces retain separate administrative powers (Sopon 2003, 3–
4), adding yet another layer of complexity to the governance of the metropolis, which showed no 
signs of slowing its growth as it moved into the twenty-first century. By 2005 this region’s 
population passed 10 million, accounting for about half of the country’s total urban population 
(Kioe Sheng Yap and De Wandeler 2010, 332). This, along with its role as a center of both 
national government and global trade, arguably made Bangkok “the most primate city in the 
world” (Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit 2014, 199). 
This growth that took place in the second half of the twentieth century was diverse and 
uneven. As Askew (2002, 49) has described, “many 'Bangkoks' emerged from the transformative 
processes of the post-war period, defined variously in terms of state representation and policy, 
urban functions, settlement patterns, ecologies and ways of life. Bangkok's existing functions as 
centre of government and prestige were considerable enhanced, but new dimensions also 
emerged as economic change articulated with space and society—Bangkok became 
simultaneously a key industrial city, a city of the poor, a city of the middle classes and a tourist 
city." Within this diverse urban space, lower income people, many of them new migrants, would 
have to contend with a shortage of affordable housing and a complex system of land 
management that was constantly shifting.  
3.2.3 The Rise of Slums 
Housing in the capital city could not keep up with the boom in the urban population that 
began in the 1960s. People at lower income levels were especially likely to have no other way to 
house themselves than by constructing their own homes. By 2003, 1,763,872 people lived in 
slums in Thailand, or 3% of the population. Of these, 62 percent of these were in BKK proper 
and another 22 percent were located in the other provinces of the BMR (Sopon 2003, 7). It is 
commonly believed, particularly by elites, that the growth of slums stems from poor migrants 
from rural areas squatting on land. While this is true in some cases, the actual phenomenon of 
slum formation and the demographics of the people who live in them are more complex.  
The 1960s and 1970s saw massive growth in self-built housing in Bangkok, resulting in 
settlements that meet many of the five criteria for being called a “slum” as set forth by the United 
Nations, including non-durable shelter materials, insecure land tenure, overcrowding, and lack of 
access to water or sanitation (UN-HABITAT 2003). However, the slums of Bangkok defy many 
stereotypes commonly held about such settlements. First, the actual settlement patterns of slums 
in Bangkok look quite different from the ‘megaslums’ in other parts of the world. Because of the 
complex system of landholdings, as well as other features of the urban landscape, such as the 
system of canals than ran through the remaining paddy land of the region, most of these 
settlements were relatively small, pockets of land throughout the city (Askew 2002). With the 
notable exception of the Khlong Toei slum, to this day slum settlements remain small compared 
to those of other countries, where slums have resulted from large-scale land invasions. Some 
have also attributed this small-scale settlement to Thai culture, which leads settlers themselves to 
try to meet their needs inconspicuously, without causing conflict. In this cultural explanation, 
land owners are incentives to allow settlement through a sense of duty those lower than them in 
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social status and the shame, or loss of face, that would result from turning people away (Kioe 
Sheng Yap and De Wandeler 2010, 333).  Because of this system of small-scale settlements, 
most slum dwellers in Bangkok do not live on the geographic periphery of the city, but rather are 
scattered throughout the urban region, including in the heart of the city (Endo 2014, 43).  
Perhaps the most common misperception of about slum dwellers among the Thai elite is 
that they are squatters. In fact, as of 2003, less than 20 percent of the slum settlements are 
actually squatter settlements (Sopon 2003, 9–10). In the vast majority of cases, residents have 
constructed housing on land with the permission of the legal owner, be that owner a government 
agency or private entity. They then pay that owner a modest rent for the land, though often these 
rental agreements do not specify a time period for the lease, carry little legal weight, and may 
even be verbal (Angel and Sopon 1989, 138; Boonlert 2008, 38). A 1984 survey, to the date the 
most comprehensive slum study the city,  revealed that the state agencies with slums on their 
lands included temples and mosques at the highest, followed by the CPB, the Irrigation 
Department, the Treasury Department, and SRT (Angel and Sopon 1989, 136–37). Therefore, 
the state in its many manifestations has long accommodated the growth of slums, calling into 
question just how ‘informal’ many of these settlements are. 
A third misconception about Bangkok slums and the people in them is that they are all 
poor people working in the “informal economy,” (setthagit nok rabob), a term that came into 
vogue under the administration of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in the early 2000s 
(Ekkaphonat 2016). What are considered slum settlements display a high degree of variation in 
terms of the income level of the people and the quality of the housing, both within and between 
settlements (Askew 2002; Endo 2014). This diversity in income levels stems from a diversity in 
occupations, even within the lifetime of a single person, which may include informal manual 
labor or selling street food, but could also include contract construction, driving taxis, or even 
government office work (Endo 2014). This variety of livelihoods also entails a variety of 
incomes, and while most slum dwellers might not be considered middle class, in fact the 
majority do not fall below the national poverty line (Askew 2002, 141). 
A final misconception about slums is that the people in them are originally from the 
countryside. This view is expressed by the well-known academic Akin Rabibhadana, who 
conducted his early research at Cornell with members of the community studies team that 
researched Bang Chan. Akin has long argued for seeing slums as the diverse settlements that 
they are (Askew 2002, 140). However, he has also propagated some of the more essentialist 
beliefs about them, stating in one of his most recent works that “When rural people move to the 
city to live, they still maintain the same behaviors as before. They call the places they live 
"villages" (muban), and they are still villagers, just as before, even though the environment has 
changed. The area around the village, instead of being a field or forest as before is now a 
concrete jungle (Akin 2009, 21–22).24 This belief in the inherent rurality of slum dwellers is 
contradicted by studies of the actual origins of slums.  It is true that many slums were settled by 
people coming from other provinces and gradually expanded, usually by individually households 
being invited to join through their personal networks or through the expansion of families over 
multiple generations (Endo 2014, 29–40). However, contrary to popular belief that slum dwellers 
are newly urban villagers, the people living in slums are not necessarily more likely to be of rural 
origin than other city dwellers. As Sopon (2003, 6) has pointed out, migration is not the primary 
                                                
24 เมื+ อชาวชนบทอพยพเข้ามาอยู่ใรเมือง พวกเขาก็ยังคงมีพฤติกรรมเช่นเดิม เรียกกลุ่มบ้านที+ พักอาศัยว่า "หมู่บ้าน" และตัวเขาก็ยังเป็นชาวบ้าน
เหมือนเดิม แม้ว่าสภาพแวดล้อมได้เปลี+ ยนไปแล้ว บริเวณโดยรอบหมู่บ้าน แทนที+ จะเป็นทุ่งนาป่าเขาเหมือนเดิม กลับกลายเป็นป่าคอนกรีต..." 
(Akin 2009 21-22). 
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reason for the growth of slums. Much of the rural-urban migration is temporary or not of low-
income people. In addition, many of the people living in slums were born in the city. Some of the 
more historic slums were, in fact settled early in the twentieth century of before (Herzfeld 2016; 
Shelby 2017) and even in those that are newer, current residents may be second or third 
generation Bangkokians (Endo 2014). In the past couple of decades, many of the newer slums, 
including those of people who were living under bridges, have been constructed by people who 
have been evicted from other places in the city (Suwit, Abhayut, and Nophaphan 2003).  
By the 1980s the slum population in Bangkok proper stood at around one million (Angel 
and Sopon 1989). This absolute population would remain stubbornly constant over the next few 
decades, despite decreasing as an overall percentage of the city’s population (Sopon 2003). As 
urban growth continued the threat of eviction grew ever-present for residents and became a 
source of mobilization for collective action.  
3.2.4 Eviction  
The problem of owners seeking to evict slum residents is nearly as old the slums 
themselves. At the same that slums were expanding, the growing population and increased 
economic activity was increasing land prices. This led to evictions so that both government and 
private owners could gain higher rents for their land than they could get from their current 
tenants (Ekkaphonat 2016, 7–9). Prior to the 1970s the government did pursue any kind of 
formal housing policies to deal with slums (Chiu 1984). Eviction was often quick and violent, 
with arson begin a popular means of forcibly removing residents when they refused to leave. 
This use of force quickly fell out of use, however, because of how public and visible it was. A 
violent eviction created a stir, and residents rallied against it, often using newly available media 
channels. The democratization at many levels of government made it politically dangerous for 
government agencies, and it was generally seen as socially unacceptable (Angel and Somsook 
1988, 12), so in the 1980s landowners came to rely on legal channels. They would file a legal 
case against residents who refused to vacate the land within 30 days of receiving notice. 
Residents, having few resources to fight these legal threats, would face steep penalties or 
imprisonment if they refused. Though this use of legal action for eviction was not fair to 
residents by any means, it was also a slower process than fire or violent eviction by the police. 
The time it took to file a case and follow through with it opened the door for residents to 
organize to negotiate, if not to resist the eviction entirely, then at least for more compensation or 
more time (Ekkaphonat 2016, 7–9). As I will discuss in later sections, these effort on the part of 
slum dwellers would grow more organized over time with the help of NGOs.   
The eviction of slums did little to decrease their numbers. With ongoing housing 
shortages, most slum dwellers resorted to reconstructing their homes in a similar manner 
elsewhere in the city. As the decades wore on and the amount of vacant urban land decreased, 
this resulted in two trends: the appearance of more slums on the outskirts of the city as land in 
the urban core has grown scarce, the densification of centrally located slums (Ekkaphonat 2016, 
43). In recognition that eviction alone was both politically unpopular and ineffective at solving 
the problem of slums, from the 1970s on the Thai government pursued a variety of strategies to 
deal with existing settlements.  
3.2.5 Early Housing Policies and their Treatment of Slums as Chumchon  
The Thai government approached slums in many different ways from the 1970s to the 
1980s, from the direct construction of apartment buildings to more pragmatic approaches that 
sought to provide infrastructure and semi-legal status to settlements. These different strategies 
 
56 
were carried out by a diverse set of agencies at different levels of government, often with 
overlapping or uncertain jurisdictions. What most of these different strategies had in commons, 
though, was that they began to treat slum settlements as chumchon, both by formal appellation 
and in the way they interacted with the settlement residents as discrete social and spatial units.  
The earliest attempts at building affordable housing in Bangkok took place at 
approximately the same time as chumchon was making its way into the lexicon as a term for the 
peasantry, and the use of “community” to describe slums was already apparent. The equivalence 
between rural villages and the urban poor would be set in formal government structures by the 
1970s, at the same time as the government was pursuing its most aggressive rural development 
efforts. However, at the time government policies in urban areas had less to do with pacifying 
members of chumchon than with relocating them.  
Prior to 1970, no single agency was charged the task of housing the urban poor. From 
1942 to 1970, the Housing Bureau, the Housing Division, the Housing Scheme Bank, and the 
Community Improvement Office were all in charge of different aspects of shelter provision 
(Chiu 1984, 31). The Community Improvement Office was the most local agency, operating 
under municipal authority. Despite what the name implies, it was not primarily charged with 
improving the conditions of settlements. Technically resettlement and constructing new 
residences were within its purview. However, in practice clearance was its main concern, and 
“By the mid-1960s, its only achievement had been the reduction of existing residential facilities 
through its clearance projects and this office stimulated the relocation rather than the elimination 
of slums” (Chiu 1984, 32).  
The 1970s saw both a more concerted effort to produce legal housing for poor urban 
dwellers and movements toward formalizing chumchon as a unit of governance. In 1972 the Thai 
government, following international trends at the time, condensed the various agencies in charge 
of housing into a National Housing Authority (NHA). The NHA was initially charged with an 
aggressive program of direct building, but it faced a number of financial difficulties, including 
higher than projected construction costs and payment delinquencies from tenants, and land 
acquisition difficulties. These challenges in terms of acquiring land stemmed from the fact the 
agency was reliant on acquiring land primarily from the many other public agencies that owned 
land in the city, and those agencies were increasing likely to want to lease out their lands for 
commercial purposes because of the promise of higher rents due to increasing land prices 
generally. The land they did end up purchasing was far from the city center, often in the outlying 
provinces of the BMR rather than Bangkok proper (Askew 2002; Chiu 1984).  This distant 
relocation meant that residents would incur much higher transportation costs if they worked in 
the city. In addition, to save money on construction costs and electricity, most of the NHA flats 
did not have elevators, even though some were up to give stories tall. This meant that households 
with elderly or disabled residents could not live in them. Finally, apartment-style living was not 
conducive to the livelihoods of many of the potential residents, who needed communal spaces to 
prepare goods for sale or to store equipment for construction. The mismatch in location and 
design between the needs of potential residents and the actual housing produced by the NHA 
meant that many people who were given rights to occupy the apartments sold those rights and 
continued to live in self-built housing in the closer to the city center (Boonlert 2008, 40–43; 
Ekkaphonat 2016, 18–19). 
By the late 1970s, the failure of the NHA flats led the government, under the advice of 
the World Bank, to pursue “second-best solutions.” These solutions, known as sites-and-services 
schemes, did not seek to fully construct new durable housing, but instead aimed at installing 
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basic infrastructure and providing access and providing formal access to services like municipal 
water and electricity (Boonlert 2008; Chiu 1984; K.S. Yap 2002). Such schemes, while only 
partially solving issues of inadequate shelter, were thought to be more feasible for governments 
because they were lower cost. The hope was that once these basic services were provided, they 
would enable and incentivize residents to upgrade their own housing over time. In Thailand, 
sites-and-services projects were carried out by the NHA with the help of a World Bank loan. The 
first of these projects was started in the Thung Song settlement in 1978, and the larges one 
completed was in Bang Phli, covering 19,070 units being covered. At the same time, the NHA 
also conducted some more comprehensive on-site upgrading in a handful of communities. 
However, the major downfall of these approaches was that did not engage in trying to ensure 
more secure, long-term land tenure for residents. The government attempted to get landowners to 
agree not to evict for ten years after the upgrading so as to ensure the investment would be 
worthwhile. However, most owners were reluctant to acquiesce to this condition, so few projects 
got off the ground (Boonlert 2008, 40–43).    
While these early sites-and-services schemes and on-site upgrading attempts were hardly 
widespread, they reflected a larger turn in urban governance. Instead of viewing slum settlements 
as areas to be cleared via the relocation of residents to high-rise apartments, slums were being 
viewed as a specific type of socio-spatial unit within the city called a chumchon. In the 1970s, 
slums were officially renamed chumchon eh at, or “congested communities,” a euphemism that 
reflected the views of some NGOs at the time who sought to avoid the term slum, which had 
made its way into Thai (“salum”) carrying at least some of its English stigma with it (Askew 
2002, 80; Endo 2014, 29–40).  Along with this new name came new governmental measures to 
address these communities. During the three-year period of parliamentary democracy from 1973-
76, the government made a concerted attempt to create a system of community committees that 
could act as intermediaries between residents and the local government. Some communities, 
including those in Khlong Toei, had instituted the practice on their own as a means of organizing 
and arguing their case to authorities. However, Askew (2002, 146) emphasizes that when the 
BMA took up the creation of committees they were primarily for the purpose of administration. 
The practice spread, and by 1982 the NHA and the BMA created a formalized system of 
community committee elections held by the local district officials. In the 1993, the BMA came 
out with a five-tier system of categorizing communities. Chumchon eh at is the poorest and least 
formalized of the five. Chumchon meuang (“urban communities”) and chumchon chanmeuang 
(“suburban communities”) refer to settlements that are less congested than chumchon eh at  but 
are still self-constructed. Chumchon kheha (“NHA apartment communities”) refers to specific 
groups of occupants of the NHA-built apartments. Finally, Chumchon banjadsan (“distributed 
communities”) refers to pre-planned developments of townhouses for upper lower- to middle-
income households (Endo 2014, 41). The categorization of chumchon, while encompassing a 
variety of different types of settlements, notably excludes higher income neighborhoods. While 
residents of condominium buildings or higher-income neighborhoods. Chumchon was thus 
formally established as an administrative category for lower income settlements, “reflecting the 
fact that Bangkok communities, in the eyes of government agencies of the time, mainly 
comprised slums" (Endo 2014, 40). 
The changes in government policies over the course of the 1970s and 1980s away from 
the direct building of high rises and towards community-based governance and on-site upgrading 
reflected many trends, both domestic and international. On the international side, organizations 
like the World Bank held significant sway over the policies of so-called “developing nations.” 
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On the domestic front, however, in the 1970s a broad-based grassroots movement of the 
country’s poor was growing, due to a number of factors, from the return of former communist 
insurgents to mainstream society to the availability of international funds to support NGOs, to 
new urban community organizing techniques that were making their way through Asia. In the 
subsequent sections I will review these trends and how they came to influence urban politics and 
housing policy. 
3.3 The Rise of the Slum Movement 
From the 1980s onwards, a growing slum-based movement began to grow in Thailand’s 
urban areas, especially in Bangkok. This movement was comprised, at first, of piecemeal 
attempts to resist violent eviction and to organize communities. These early efforts, which were 
conducted by a variety of different organizations, would coalesce by the end of the 1990s into 
nationwide network called the Four Regions Slum Network (FRSN). Along the way, it would 
establish ties to nationwide movements to unite the urban and rural poor to make demands of the 
government, as well as with international networks of urban community-based organizations. 
3.3.1 Early Slum-Based Organizations 
The predecessors of the community-based movement in Bangkok began in the 1970s, 
primarily through nascent NGOs and faith-based organizations seeking to provide charitable 
services for the urban poor. Much of this early work in slums was focused on Khlong Toei, as 
the largest and most conspicuous slum in the city. Prominent figures of the era that would endure 
in the ensuing decades include Father Joseph Maier, a Catholic Priest who arrived in Bangkok in 
late 1960s. He began working in the area of Khlong Toei known as rong mu (literally the pig 
factory, or as Father Joe calls it, “The Bangkok slaughterhouse (Maier and Hopkins 2005). After 
several years of ministering to the residents of rong mu, Father Joe moved in to Khlong Toei, 
where he still lives today as he continues to work with his organization, the Human Development 
Institute (check). The HDI remains primarily an educational and social service institution, a 
place for women and children in the slum to meet their basic needs and improve their chances for 
a better future. However, Father Joe himself comes from a more activist background, having 
been motivated to join the priesthood and take an active role in improving the lives of the poor 
doing the heady mobilizations in the United States in the 1960s and was influenced by the 
teachings of Paulo Freire and liberation theology from early in his career. At some points during 
his time in Khlong Toei he has been involved in political mobilizations to resist eviction. 
However, he has always put the welfare of the residents at the fore of his work, and as a 
foreigner there are limits to the extent to which he can engage in political activity. Nonetheless, 
his work and writing about the lived realities of those who inhabit the slums of Bangkok have 
gained international attention for their attention not only to the hardships and indignities of living 
under such conditions, but also the inner strength of the residents who endure them. The work of 
Father Joe also set a precedent for what it means to work in the slums. He lived among those he 
worked with, but not until they invited him to do so after he had demonstrated consistency and 
dedication to the cause (Maier and Hopkins 2005). 
Another person working in a similar vein during this ear was Prateep Ungsongtham, 
known as Kru Prateep. Kru Prateep, who has been called “The Slum Angel,” was born and raised 
in Khlong Toei. While still a teenager, she worked to put herself through higher education. While 
still a young woman, she opened schools in Khlong Toei and became a spokesperson for her 
neighbors during an eviction threat (Boonlert 2003, 71). She eventually founded the Duang 
Prateep foundation (The Duang Prateep Foundation n.d.). Duang Prateep, like the HDI, remains 
 
59 
a prominent organization in Khlong Teoi and elsewhere in Bangkok. Also like HDI, its focus is 
more charitable than political, a stark contrast to later organizations (Ekkaphonat 2016, 31). 
However, the foundation played a prominent role in fighting the eviction of the Seventy Rai 
community in Khlong Toei in the early era of slum mobilization (Boonlert 2008, 49). On top of 
this organizing work, some of the important actors in later mobilizations would get their start by 
working with Kru Prateep at the Foundation. One of these activists was Suwit Wattanoo.  
3.3.2 The CPT-inspired Strains of the Slum Movement 
Suwit Wattanoo represents one of the two key strains of political influence on what 
would eventually become the Four Regions Slum Network. Suwit had been a dedicated forest 
ranger in the southern province of Surat Thani during the communist insurgency in the 1970s 
and early 1980s. While he is considered an Octoberist (Kanokrat 2016), he was not a student 
during the October protests of 1973 and 1976. At the time, he was already an instructor at a 
vocational school, leading students in their organizing efforts. After the 1976 massacre, he fled 
to the forests, but unlike many of the students, he was not ambivalent about the communist 
cause. He had long been steeped in Marxist literature and became more so during his time in the 
forest, reading the origin texts of Marx, Lenin, and Mao religiously. In describing his 
engagement with these thinkers in book written in tribute to Suwit after his death in 2007, a 
friend notes that he knew these texts “to the extent that Antonio Gramsci has only surface 
knowledge”25 (Nitirat 2007). 
A genuine belief in Marxist ideology was not the only way in which Suwit differed from 
many of the Octoberists. He also stayed in the forests, working with rural communities much 
longer than many others, demonstrating a commitment to working in the field that would remain 
with him in his later career. In 1985, several years after most of his comrades had taken 
advantage of government amnesty to return to mainstream society, Suwit finally left the forest. 
However, his reason for leaving was not that he believed in CPT’s cause any less, merely that it 
had become apparent that the movement had been so diminished that there was no way forward, 
and they needed another way to fight. He left the forest, but he refused to register with 
authorities to receive amnesty. This initially made it difficult for him to find work. He made ends 
meet through odd jobs in Bangkok for a period of time and eventually friends invited him to 
come work at the Duang Prateep Foundation through recommendations from friends. There he 
wrote newsletters and worked alongside others who were thinking through the issues of slums. 
They called themselves the “slum problem study group,”26 and together they began to network 
with others in the city who were working on similar issues. Over this period of time, Suwit was 
growing increasingly dissatisfied with the  approach of Duang Prateep, which emphasized 
charity (Nitirat 2007, 33). However, others in the city were more aligned with his beliefs in 
popular mobilization. Many of these others were initially trained in different, but 
complementary, tradition of mobilization. 
3.3.3 The Community Organizing Strain of the Movement 
Besides Suwit and his background with the CPT, the other primary intellectual strain the 
influenced the urban slum movement was what is known as the community organizing strain, 
called “C.O.” (si oh) in Thai. This strain has decidedly global origins. According to organizers of 
the Human Settlement Foundation, the first person to practice C.O. in Asia was an American 
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Presbyterian Minister named Herbert White. White had been a student of Saul Alinsky in the 
1960s, and around 1968 he traveled to Korea to spread Alinsky’s method of organizing. He 
experienced little success in Korea initially, however, because of the difficult domestic political 
situation there. So, he left Korea and moved to the Philippines, where a small group of young 
organizers, including a woman who would later become his wife, took up the strategies and 
began an organization in the Tondo district of Manila.  After the Philippines, he continued to 
influence the training of community organizers throughout Asia, sometimes directly and 
sometimes through his students, who began traveling to other countries. For example, a student 
of his began an organization called PROUD (People's Responsible Organisation of United 
Dharavi) in Mumbai. In Thailand, organizers from the Philippines trained the original members 
of an organization called POP (People’s Organization for Participation). Multiple organizers 
from POP would later come to play a prominent role in different aspects of slum movement and 
government policy, including Abhayut Chantrabha and future high-ranking officials in the 
Community Organizations Development Institute (Nitirat 2007). 
3.3.4 The Coming Together of the Two Strains 
While POP was getting up and running, Suwit was joining with other NGO organizers 
that he had come to know through the Slum Problem Study Group. One of these organizations 
was the Community Relations Group (glum chumchon samphan), led by Jamnong Jitaranarat. 
The Community Relations Group had been working with communities for several years, and 
organizers within it had been mentors (phi liang) to a nascent group called itself the Community 
Development Center (sun ruam phatthana chumchon). The Community Development Center 
was not an NGO, but rather an organization that connected slum communities from different 
locations together to work on their problems, particularly the problem of eviction. It operated 
under the principles that that community members themselves were the main actors in the 
movement. The role of NGOs was to supplement and support them. Suwit was impressed with 
this approach because it wasn't charity (sangkhom songkhraoh). It approached people living in 
slums as though they could be the engine of a true people's movement (Nitirat 2007, 33).  
In 1988, Suwit joined up with the Community Relations Group, and in 1989 the group 
changed its name and formally registered as the Human Settlement Foundation (HSF). Over the 
next few years, the HSF and its associated community networks would attract members of POP, 
including Abhayut Chantrabha, who were skilled community organizers but had grown 
dissatisfied with the POP’s focus on individual communities. With that, the skills of C.O. 
organizers were joined with the networking and movement-building of Suwit and Jamnong.  
3.3.5 Early Community Networks and Activities 
While the HSF and the other NGO activists in the city were instrumental in helping to 
construct community networks and the movement they would become, the communities 
themselves and their leaders played the primary role when the rubber hit the road. From the 
beginning, community leaders disagreed on how best to proceed in pursuing their political 
objectives. The Community Development Center was eventually the first network to be 
mentored under the umbrella of the HSF. However, the 11 communities that eventually 
constituted the Community Development Center had originally been 13 communities called the 
Slum Center. Within the Slum Center, internal fighting emerged over whether or not they should 
work with NGOs. Some community leaders felt that the NGOs had undue influence, and the 
communities should remain independent, working directly with the government. The community 
leaders could not resolve these differences, and in 1986 they split, with the remaining 11 
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changing their name to the Community Development Center and maintaining a relationship with 
the organizers of the HSF (Ekkaphonat 2016, 89). 
Within the Community Development Center, individual leaders emerged to take charge 
of different aspects of the networks’ work. Women played a prominent role, and Nugaen 
Inthajan became a spokesperson for the network. She had been leading her own community since 
before the networks came together. The first organizing the women did took place during 
eviction threats when authorities were using violent methods. When the community members 
stood before the soldiers to protest the eviction, the women and children would be strategically 
placed in front because the soldiers would not dare to hurt them (Ekkaphonat 2016). 
Beyond fighting the immediate threat of eviction, the network started to organize to make 
small demands to improve their lives and environments. Based on collective decisions about 
their priorities, the communities, in conjunction with organizers, began to advocate for a variety 
of things. Some were able to get housing registrations that would allow them to send their 
children to school and access social services. Others were able to get authorities to extend formal 
municipal water and electricity into their settlements, which either providing them with the 
services for the first time or greatly decreased their monthly expenses because they no longer had 
to pay the prices demanded by neighbors to branch the services secondhand. From these early 
experiences, the communities and NGO organizers began to hone their methods of direct action. 
They figured out the most effective forms of rallies and demonstration (kan chumnum), which 
they used to open up negotiations with government officials (Ekkaphonat 2016, 49–51). 
Another key aspect of the work that emerged was the importance of creating collective 
resources. Women were again the leaders in this respect. Over time Nugaen came to lead the 
women’s homemaker group within the network (glum maeban). A small group of women 
traveled to India in 1988 to du ngan (literally, “watch work”) with women’s savings group. 
When they came back, they started a savings groups of their own, in which the members 
contributed one baht per day. The savings could then be used to make small loans to members in 
cases of emergency, so they would not have to borrow from loan sharks at interest rates of up to 
20 percent. Some communities also used tools like recycling cooperatives to raise internal money 
that could be used to pay for collective expenses (Ekkaphonat 2016, 22).  
3.3.6 The Next Generation of Networks and Organizers  
As the Community Development Center grew in its capacities, the HSF, in coordination 
with members of an organization that would eventually be called the Urban Poor People’s 
Working Group, began to expand its work to people living under bridge. In 1989, when the 
BMA announced an intention to clear the areas under 500 bridges, the HSF started to gather 
information about the people in these settlements. With very little base to start from, they began 
by driving motorcycles around the city to figure out which bridges had settlements and to collect 
some basic demographic information, which they initially withheld from the BMA for fear it 
would be used to speed up the eviction process (Suwit, Abhayut, and Nophaphan 2003, 17–21). 
Once they had a better idea of where the bridge settlements were located and the organizers had 
established a tenuous trust with the at least some of the residents, they set to work expanding 
both the quality and quantity of the movement.   
Expanding the movement of the network that would be called the People Under Bridges, 
(khon tai saphan) involved pursuing many lines of work simultaneously. Even though the 
residents were faced with possible eviction, one aspect of the work was improving some of the 
physical conditions in the settlements, like building better bathrooms and creating community 
signs. These tangible improvements created a sense that things were getting better because of 
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their collective work and helped to build feelings of solidarity. Then there was the administrative 
aspect. Having monthly meetings in each chumchon and of the leaders of network was of the 
utmost importance. To demonstrate how to conduct these meetings and their importance, the 
HSF arranged to send leaders to observe the meetings of the Community Development Center. 
The function of the meetings was to serve as a forum in which to establish common goals and 
strategies. However, even though the different communities held common goals, the work of the 
People Under Bridges was uneven. Some communities had greater capacity than others for a 
number of reasons. People living in those conditions have all kinds of obstacles. They may not 
have had anything to hope for a long time, so they may not be able to think about the future. 
They may have cognitive impairments. They may have drinking problems. Part of the work was 
to not necessarily get everyone working in the same way, but to get people to be able to do work 
according to their abilities (Suwit, Abhayut, and Nophaphan 2003, 29–32). 
During the early 1990s when the work under bridges was getting under way, the HSF was 
also getting help from a younger generation of student activists. At Ramkhamhaeng University, a 
group of students had started what was formally called the “Dilapidated Areas Study Club” 
(chomrom seukhsa laeng seuam som) (Suwit, Abhayut, and Nophaphan 2003, 17–20). However, 
the members called themselves “The Slum Study Club.” The reason for the different appellations 
was that “slum” had by that time been re-appropriated by progressive movements in the city to 
the extent that officials considered it to be a signal of leftist ideology and “dangerous.” While the 
Slum Study Club members appeased their university administration with politically correct 
terminology, they nonetheless joined with the efforts of the HSF, the Community Development 
Center, and the People Under Bridges, learning the core skills of community organizing that 
many would take with them to become the mentors of future networks after they finished at 
Ramkhamhaeng University—which in most cases meant dropping out. 
This coalition of communities, two generations of organizers, and academics and 
progressive bureaucrats in the NHA, gradually moved forward a proposal fairly house the People 
Under Bridges. They divided the participating communities in four zones for the purposes of 
savings and collective management. At the same time, they identified three tracts of land not far 
from the center of the city where the communities could rebuild. Since the communities could 
not afford to buy the land, they negotiated with the NHA to purchase the land first and let the 
communities rent it from them. The initial rental proposal from the NHA was 500 baht per 
households per month, but they were able to negotiate it down to one baht per square meter. The 
final proposal for this relocation was approved in 1995. However, took until 2001 for all of the 
zones to relocate and to get construction underway in earnest (Suwit, Abhayut, and Nophaphan 
2003, 6–7; 40–44). 
3.3.7 Lessons Learned, Organizing Principles, and the Emergence of a Community Organizing 
as a Professional Practice 
The delays experienced in during the process of the People Under Bridges negotiations 
and construction served as important lessons for the community members and the organizers 
alike. They would not necessarily be able to avoid these obstacles in the future, but they would 
be more prepared. The most important obstacle was that the demands they were making did not 
align with the normal ways of working of the NHA, the BMA, and a number of other 
government agencies. Getting the proposals through involved developing key allies inside who 
had the power to push their proposals forward and create bureaucratic workarounds. The second 
obstacle was the byzantine nature of governance in the BMR. Getting an approval through in one 
agency did not mean that it would be recognized by another. Even if the BMA or a national 
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agency approved a deal, district-level officials may not recognize a policy change, which would 
necessitate returning to the BMA to mediate between the community and the district to help 
district official understand how to proceed under new protocols (Suwit, Abhayut, and 
Nophaphan 2003, 40–44). What the community leaders and organizers learned through these 
many delays was the importance of patience and persistence. As the movement developed, these 
practical principles would come to define it, alongside a number of other consistent practices and 
beliefs. 
As these early community networks took shape, so did the chumchon themselves. 
Settlements were no were no longer a collection of neighbors. When organizers entered the 
settlements and began to work with residents, they emphasized the necessity of building a 
collective identity and of creating shared goals communal resources. Chumchon identities were 
strengthened through the establishment of community names, if they did not already exist, and 
the announcement of these names through signage. Shared goals were thought up and reinforced 
at regular meetings at the levels of both the individuals chumchon and the network. Finally, 
collective resources were built through savings groups and group enterprises. These practices 
were honed through trial and error, but they were influenced by other movements, both domestic 
and global. Some elements, including the necessity of connecting communities as elements of a 
larger movement, were taken from the lessons learned by Suwit Wattanoo during his days with 
the CPT. Others, such as the gradual pursuit of small victories in order to build community 
strength, were learned from organizers trained in the methods of Saul Alinsky. The use of 
collective savings was learned from trips abroad by community members themselves.  
This amalgam of replicable practices that were borrowed and localized were spread 
partially by members of chumchon themselves. However, much of the networking and training 
taking place was facilitated by another phenomenon on the 1980s and 1990s—the emergence of 
community organizing as a field of professional practice. Through the influences of the Suwit, 
the former CPT ranger-turned urban activist, and the Alinsky-inspired methods of the CO-trained 
organizers, a number of principled practices emerged among a small but significant group of 
professional organizers. 
The first of these principles was the importance of fieldwork. This meant spending 
significant time with communities, working alongside them, and developing close relationships 
in order to build trust between the organizer and community members. Suwit famously spent 
nearly every day out in the communities he was working with. This was the way he had worked 
when he was living out in the forests as a ranger for ten years. The first community he became 
close with made their livings primarily as trash pickers and collectors. So he would work 
alongside them, picking through trash in the midday sun. He enjoyed telling younger members of 
the movement the story of his wedding day, when he got married in the morning and went back 
to work out in a community in the evening (Suwit, Abhayut, and Nophaphan 2003, 34–35). 
Second, community members themselves were the primary actors in the movement. The 
community organizers of the HSF and POP held their methods in contrast to the charity work of 
organizations like Duang Prateep (Ekkaphonat 2016, 31; Nitirat 2007, 33). In principle, at least, 
the community members themselves were to develop their own goals and strategies, relying on 
their own capacities to carry out actions. The role of the NGO organizer was to mentor and assist 
according to the needs of the community.  
The third practice derives clearly from the principles espoused by Saul Alinsky. This 
involves a strategy for guiding community members to begin their work together by tackling 
small grievances in order to get easy wins and establish confidence in the organization (Alinsky 
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1989 [1971]). Following these principles, the slum movement started with NGOs and students 
and academics going in and working with communities, suggesting the first thing they should do 
is to  come together as a group. They started by asking for small attainable things, like housing 
registrations and formal connections to water and electricity. If they were being evicted from 
private land, they would ask for an extended period of time. If they were on government land, 
they would try to reach an agreement to improve the land and stay in place with a formal rental 
arrangement (Ekkaphonat 2016, Citing interview with Abhayut Chantrabha). In short, they 
focused on building up the organization, gradually taking on bigger and bigger challenges as it 
grew stronger.  
Finally, following Suwit’s background in movement-building, the organizers never 
worked in communities in isolation. Rather, they sought to connect chumchon in formal 
networks, creating committees at the level of the network so that the network could move 
forward in a coordinated fashion. In this way, the organizers were not only working to improve 
the lives of individual community members; they were working to make structural change at the 
level of policy. In order to this, they also joined together with larger movements in what was 
becoming known as the phak prachachon, or People’s Sector (Boonlert 2003, 73).  
3.4 The NGO Movement and the Rise of “Good Governance” 
The slum-based movement of chumchon that was gathering steam by the early 1990s was 
hardly happening in isolation. During the same time period, a nationwide community-based 
movement based on principles of participation and justice had been taking shape, primarily in 
rural areas. The slum movement would ultimately join up with these others in what became 
known as the Assembly of the Poor.  
3.4.1 The Assembly of the Poor and the Formation of the Four Regions Slum Network 
As the HSF was expanding its work to networks beyond the original Community 
Development Center in the mid-1980s, other networks of communities were forming throughout 
the country with the help of NGOs, primarily in rural areas. Some of these NGOs included Thai 
Development Support Committee, as well has the NGO Coordinating Committee on Rural 
Development (NGO-CORD). All of these larger organizations allowed for the establishment of 
national and even global networks that extended far beyond the local communities. In rural areas, 
a lot of the activism was around environmental issues (Missingham 2003, 31–32), and as 
communities worked in concert with NGOs and academics, they articulated what one community 
rights scholar described to me as  “new social principle” of the community rights movement 
along the way. This principle, inspired by many of the theories of “alternative” and “appropriate 
development” that were emerging in the 1980s, emphasized “villagers’ organizations” (ongkon 
chaoban) as the vehicle for promoting a different kind of development that recognized the rights 
of indigenous populations, including the rights to land, culture, and political participation 
(Missingham 2003, 31). In this sense, the movement combined different elements of both 
community culture and community rights their rhetoric, with different NGOs emphasizing 
espousing the beliefs of the two schools to different extents.  
The Octoberist generation played a primary role in driving the NGO movement forward. 
After the failure of the radical movement of the CPT, many Octoberists, just like Suwit 
Wattanoo, returned from the forests in search of a purpose and a livelihood. A great number 
found this through working with communities to pursue peaceful reform under the auspices of a 
growing number of NGOs working in rural development (Kanokrat 2016, 192; Missingham 
2003, 29). Under these organizations, their ideologies and practical approaches changed the 
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hard-line leftist principles of the CPT to include many of the more liberal ideologies that many 
Octoberists had held along, including those of direct and participatory grassroots democracy 
(Kanokrat 2016, 194). After several years of working in this new way, the NGO activists 
working in rural areas, like the slum-based movement they were connected to, had developed 
clear methods of working for political change at different levels. Missingham (2003, 34), 
describes this approach as “three-tiered”: “they continued their grassroots work with villagers' 
organizations and networks; they sought to build alliances with academics, the media, and other 
sections of middle class; and they campaigned for state policy reforms at a national level.” 
Because of his experiences and personal connections dating from the insurgency, as well 
as his status as an Octoberist, Suwit was especially adept at building connections between the 
slum movement and these other movement in the People’s Sector (Nitirat 2007, 37). By the mid-
1990s, the HSF, POP, and other slum-based movements in the north, northeast, and south of the 
country were connecting to these rural-based networks. In 1995, this nationwide movement of 
communities and NGOs coalesced under a name: The Assembly of the Poor.  
The Assembly of the Poor was kicked off in earnest on December 10, 1995, with meeting 
at Thammasat University entitled 'Assembly of the Poor: The consequences of large-scale 
development projects" (Samacha khon chon: an neuang ma chak phonkrathop khong khrongkan 
phatthana khanat yai). The meeting included representatives from rural and urban networks 
throughout not only Thailand, but other Asian countries, as well. Throughout the duration of the 
multi-day conference, delegates traveled to different locations to learn about the challenges of 
different communities and listened to panel discussions on a variety of topics, including 
"Democracy, Human Rights, and the Poor today" (Missingham 2003, 39). As the Assembly 
coalesced into a movement, it pursued the following stated goals, as expressed by member 
organizations: "the Assembly of the Poor is a 'platform (wethi) for mutual learning and exchange 
of knowledge about our problems by poor an disadvantaged people in society.' The Assembly 
aims to 'build the power and cooperation of the poor at the local, national, and international 
levels to convince the public that states must manage resources in ways that ensure equity and 
fairness for all people, free rights, and popular participation and self-determination'" 
(Missingham 2003, 39). 
The principles of human rights and democracy would remain important to the Assembly 
as it eventually mounted increasingly aggressive protest campaigns In early 1996 they enacted a 
demonstration with about 12,000 people at the Government house for five weeks, gaining 
concessions from then-Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. This created momentum for a 
much larger and protracted protest that included 25,000 people and lasted 99 days. They 
demanded compensation for the impacts of state development projects. By the end of the protest 
and subsequent negotiations, the Assembly of the Poor had won concessions totaling 652 million 
baht in compensation for thousands of families displaced and economically impacted by dams 
and other construction projects. Perhaps just as important as these tangible concessions, 
however, was the establishment of the establishment of a precedent for the inclusion of direct 
action and participatory democracy in public sphere (Missingham 2003, Chapter 6). In other 
words, the People’s Sector gained power legitimacy.  
Though the movement won unprecedented concessions from the government, these were 
quickly lost after the East Asian Financial Crisis hit and the Chavalit government fell apart. 
When Chuan Leekpai reneged on prior deals when he took office. However, the movement 
continued for the next several years, In 2000 they succeeded in gaining concessions for residents 
affected by the large Pak Mun Dam project (Missingham 2003, 4–5), and they were instrumental 
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in helping to forward negotiations for land acquisition for the People Under Bridges (Suwit, 
Abhayut, and Nophaphan 2003, 40–44). 
The Assembly of the Poor also served as a catalyst for the multiple semi-coordinated 
slum movements taking shape throughout the country to congeal under a single banner. At the 
time of the of Assembly, they participated as a network under the name The Slum Organization 
for Democracy (ongkon salum pheua prachathibotai) (Boonlert 2003, 70). However, this quickly 
changed, and within a year they took on a new name to reflect their nationwide reach, The Four 
Regions Slum Network (khreua khai salum si phak). As the FRSN, they worked under a two-
phrase motto (see Figure 5). The first, samakkhi khon salum (unity of people of the slum), 
reflects the specificity of their network. The second, ruam phalang khon jon (poor people join 
forces together), was a prominent slogan on signs during the protests of the Assembly of the 
Poor (Missingham 2003, 156), reflecting the FRSN’s connection to this larger popular 
movement. 
 
 
Figure 5: The Flag of the Four Regions Slum Network 
3.4.2 The Role of “Good Governance” in the Rise of NGOs in Thailand 
Numerous factors contributed to the size and success of the Assembly of the Poor. The 
same types of large infrastructure projects that had fed rural unrest in the era of the communist 
insurgency had continued unabated in the subsequent decades. This, on top of the trade policies 
that were leading many poor rural dwellers to pursue work in urban areas, created shared sense 
of disadvantage between the rural and urban poor that was ripe for mobilization (Missingham 
2003). Then there was the presence of the Octoberist generation, whose skills in working with 
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communities, education, political savvy, and social connections to the middle class perfectly 
positioned them to serve as intermediaries between villagers and state entities (Kanokrat 2016, 
172). But these factors alone likely would not have been enough to mount the sort of sustained 
resistance the Assembly of the Poor achieved. For that, financial resources were necessary.  
These resources were made available through a flow of money to NGOS that, by the late 
1980s, was flooding Thailand and many other “Third World” nations due to the growing 
influences of “good governance.” The Octoberists that were creating and working for NGOs in 
the late 1980s and 1990s were able to do so because they could sustain themselves on what some 
estimate to be 300 million baht of annual contributions from international donors (Missingham 
2003, 29, citing Rueng 1995). This money boosted the number of NGOs in the country from 20 
in the mid-70s to 200 in 1997 and 1,557 by 2001 (Kanokrat 2016, 171, citing Simplins 
2003). These donors took many forms from small faith-based agencies to national development 
funds to the World Bank Social Investment Fund (Ekkaphonat 2016; Elinoff 2013, 712). Donors 
of these funds sought specifically to bypass the national government under the beliefs that NGOs 
were better equipped to handle grassroots development and that such development of civil 
society actors was necessary for the state to govern effectively (Missingham 2003, 29). 
3.4.3 The Global Spread of Good Governance 
Ideas that an active civil society is necessary for a government to function have been 
around for some time, but in the 1980s a specific discourse began to arise that posited that 
governing itself was not only the purview of the state government. In this conceptualization, 
“governance” should replace “government” in the management of public resources and 
populations. As opposed to government, which only encompasses the actions of state entities, 
governance incorporates the actions and practices of many other types of organizations, all of 
which are necessary for material development and the promotion of democracy. Discourses 
around “good governance” began percolating in the early 1980s however, the notable first public 
expression of the principles appeared in 1989 in the World Bank’s The exact meaning of good 
governance can vary greatly depending on who is deploying it. However, the key principles were 
most clearly articulated in the 1989 World Bank report entitled: Africa: From Crisis to 
Sustainable Development (Chairait 2017, 85–97). Over the course of the next several years, 
numerous intergovernmental organizations, including the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
and the European Council would all publish reports dealing with good. These various documents 
would define the term in different ways, with some, like the World Bank, defining the term in 
administrative and managerial terms, meaning an appropriate and efficient use of state resources 
throughout the incorporation of entities outside the government in the process of governance. 
Others, including many western governments, used the term in more political ways to mean the 
practice of democratic politics as pivotal element of sound administration governance (Leftwich 
1994, 370–71). In any case, good governance generally incorporates four key principles: 
accountability, legitimacy, transparency, participation by an active civil society (Chairait 2017, 
85–87).  
In Thailand, the good governance was translated as thammarat, a s term which means 
roughly “just state” or “fair state.” The enactment of this “just state” could happen through the 
invigoration of another relatively new term that began gaining popularity in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, according to one of the organizers associated with the slum movement. This term 
was prachasangkhom, or “civil society.” In the view of thammarat, civil society was to be “used 
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as a bridge between the government and the people”27 (Chairait 2017, 87), language reminiscent 
of the early rural development interventions by the U.S. And the Thai government, which sought 
to use community organizations as a “bridge” between the people and the state (See Chapter 2). 
However, the idea of prachasangkhom as a bridge between the people did not necessarily align 
with all that was happening in the NGO movement.  
The NGO movement that resulted in the Assembly of the Poor did not use the language 
of prachasangkhon. Instead, they retained another term, phak prachachon—the people’s sector. 
Chairat (Chairait 2017, 126–27) describes the people’s sector as a distant element of that arose 
not only in Thailand, but in other social movements of the Third World that arose during the era 
of New Social Movements in the 1990s and early 2000s. What distinguishes the people’s sector 
from other conceptualizations of civil society or “the private sector” is that it does not 
incorporate the private market and even stands opposed to business interests.  
This is quite different from the function of civil society in good governance discourse. 
While attempting to correct the worst effects of earlier structural adjustment approaches to 
development that reduced the resources of state, good governance also aligned well with the neo-
conservative trends set forth in the era of Reagan and Thatcher. These policies still emphasized 
decreasing the role of government and increasing the power of private actors because under good 
governance, anything the state wasn't doing well could simply become the domain of other 
sectors. Providing for the public good was not solely the domain of the state; it could be 
accomplished by communities, the public sector or civil society, through 'participation’ (Chairait 
2017, 106–7). In this way, good governance was not as great a departure from structural 
adjustment as it is sometimes characterized. Rather, it is just a way of describing the type of 
politics and society necessary for markets to function in order to achieve “development.” This 
meaning of good governance amounts to what Chairat (2017, 91) calls the “instrumentalist” view 
of the politics of good governance and falls in line with what Leftwich (1994, 365–66) considers 
the “administrative and managerial” meanings of the term.  
Because of these different meanings, the rhetorical distinction between phak prachachon 
and prachasangkhon would remain in the ensuing decades for many involved in the NGO 
movements; however, the practical distinctions between the two would often be blurred, causing 
conflicts among communities and NGO organizers (Elinoff 2014b). The difficulty in maintaining 
a distinction between civil society and the people’s sector lies in the very ideas of good 
governance that made both possible. Good governance shares with new social movements the 
idea that citizens' groups should have a larger role in society and government. In the pursuit of 
good governance, the Thai government would create many new avenues for participation by the 
communities that were being formed. Whether or not to take part in these programs and on what 
terms would become a source of tension for many in NGO movement, particularly in urban 
areas, as the lines between participation for political ends and participation to relieve the 
government of responsibility began to blur.  
3.5 The Slum Movement Meets Government Community-Based Urban 
Development Policy 
At the same time that the Four Regions Slum Network and the Assembly of the Poor 
were creating community organizations to make demands of the government, elements of the 
Thai government were also making efforts to pursue community-based solutions. They received 
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support in these endeavors from international organizations, who were eager to fund programs 
aimed such efforts that broadly fit within the rubric of good governance. Nowhere was this 
government effort at community promotion more apparent than in the case of urban housing. 
However, as the use of chumchon as a unit for housing provision moved into government policy, 
it took on new meanings and functions, often having more to do with finance and management 
than with political action.  
3.5.1 The Progressives Wing of the NHA 
While the slum movement that ultimately coalesced into the FRSN was gradually gaining 
in its capacity to make demands of the government for land, infrastructure, and housing, another 
movement was occurring within government agencies provide resources to communities, albeit 
from a very different political position. Starting in the early 1980s, young architects and 
bureaucrats in the Thai government, particularly within the NHA, were recognizing the failures 
of the NHA policies and how they failed to meet the needs of the communities they were 
attempting to assist. Of this cohort of progressive NHA staff, one young person in particular 
would come to play a defining role in the future of Thai housing policy: Somsook 
Boonyabancha. 
An architect educated in Denmark in the 1970s, Somsook had been exposed to 
Scandinavian models of collective housing early in her career. She would carry these ideas with 
her after she returned to Thailand, where she began working as an architect with the NHA. As a 
young government employee, she was charged with the on-the-ground work of rehousing 
settlements that were slated for eviction. One of the early settlements she worked with proved 
pivotal in her view on how to approach community housing policy.  
The community of Ban Khrua is Bangkok’s largest Muslim community. While not 
formally a member of any of the networks of the slum movement, Ban Khrua, like Khlong Toei, 
has played a prominent role in the city’s policies. This is both because of its size and the 
collective identity as a Muslim community. The community would ultimately become as an 
example of community rights in action in the urban context because of its success in fighting a 
planned expressway construction project (Chonthira and Saneh 2000). When this project was 
proposed, Somsook had been part of a team charged with handling the eviction and rehousing of 
the community. During a visit to the community in 2018 over thirty years after her first 
engagement there, Somsook recounted to younger architects and government workers how she 
had been charged with explaining to residents how the project entailed razing the community, 
and that they would be rehoused in high rises in order to facilitate the building of the expressway. 
After she detailed the plans for the project, a local leader stood up. He made a very short 
statement, and in the end said “We are Muslims, and we do not agree with this project.” At that, 
he began ululating, and the approximately 100 residents in attendance followed suit. They then 
stood up in unison and walked out of the meeting, single file. In Somsook’s retelling, she stood 
there as they walked out in stunned silence, wanting to cry. Somsook would eventually work 
with Ban Khrua for several years as they fought their proposed evictions, and they eventually 
completed a project in which they would upgrade the community’s infrastructure and re-block 
and upgrade some of the housing.    
Ban Khrua was one of five pilot communities in which the NHA, with guidance and 
funding from the World Bank, pursued on-site upgrading, though without legal land tenure 
arrangement to assure that the communities would not be evicted. Somsook began to study the 
problems of slums in Bangkok more thoroughly, in coordination with the prominent planning 
and development researcher Solomon Angel. Eventually, Somsook and her colleagues were able 
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found a research entity on these issues within the NHA called the Center for Housing and Human 
Settlements Study with funding from the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies 
in the Netherlands. This center would serve as a sort of action research center, where staff 
members could engage in experiments with different kinds of programs to implement housing 
upgrading, particularly using methods of collective tenure and finance. In the early 1980s, this 
research entity, in coordination with NGOs and communities that were part of the slum 
movement, the first land sharing agreements were reached with government land owners in 
communities. 
3.5.2 Land Sharing: The Intersection of the Slum Movement and Government Slum Policy 
Over the course of the 1980s “land sharing” emerged through coordination between 
communities, NGO organizers, and the progressive wing of the NHA. Land sharing involved a 
compromise between communities at risk of eviction and landowners. In a land sharing, 
communities typically agree to condense their settlement to fit on a much smaller portion of the 
original lot through the re-blocking and reconstruction. Land sharing, unlike earlier on-site 
upgrading efforts, involves establishing legal long-term land tenure agreements. By sharing the 
land, the owner can still profit from developing part of the land to rent or sell at a market rate, 
but they can also avoid the political issues entailed with evicting the existing community (Angel 
and Somsook 1988; Boonlert 2008, 46–48; Ekkaphonat 2016, 86; Somsook 2018). Because the 
threat of negative attention if the community is evicted constitutes much of the incentive for 
owners to agree to land sharing, the agreements are most effective when the community is 
organized through strong leadership with the support of external organizations (Angel and 
Somsook 1988, 120). It has also been successful almost exclusively on government lands, such 
as those belonging Crown Property Bureau, the Treasury Department, and the King’s personal 
property. This is because government entities are much more sensitive to political backlash than 
private owners.  
Histories of land sharing have been written from the perspectives of both the NHA and 
international consultants (Angel and Somsook 1988) and activists and the academics who study 
them (Boonlert 2008; Ekkaphonat 2016). In these different accounts, the authors emphasize the 
roles of their respective organizations in originating the idea. Exactly who originally had the idea 
for land sharing may never be settled, but what does become clear from the different accounts is 
that the organizations played quite different roles in the process. While the NGOs and 
community leaders did the organizing on the ground and led the more controversial direct 
political actions that were sometimes necessary to open negotiations with government entities, 
the NHA wing concerned itself with obtaining the finances to perform the upgrading.  
The initial land sharing and upgrading projects were financed on a one-off basis, but it 
quickly became clear that for this to be a more widespread solution for communities, new 
financial models would be necessary. Continuing collaboration with the Netherlands, one of the 
first communities to do land sharing, Sengki, received funding from the Dutch Habitat 
Committee in the amount of three million baht. This three million was deposited in Bangkok 
Bank as a guarantee fund, and the bank then lent the money to the community. In later 
agreements, money from other donors was used to guarantee loans. In some cases, Somsook 
herself and other involved in the projects would sign as guarantors on loans. Somsook describes 
this era of piecemeal financing as “the search and struggle phase” of developing what would 
ultimately become the Baan Mankong model. The key challenge of this time period was getting 
potential financiers of projects to recognize the communities as potential borrowers. The 
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challenge was both because of the perceived poverty of the individuals involved and the fact that 
the loans would be going to a collective, not an individual.  
3.5.3 Chumchon as a Legal and Financial Unit 
The problem of finance would ultimately be solved through a combination of 
inspirations. The first was housing cooperatives. The cooperative structure was something 
Somsook had become familiar with during her studies in Scandinavia. From this she came to 
believe in the importance of establishing the community as a “legal entity” (nitibukkhon). This 
legal entity serves the practical purpose or representing the community to the government and 
banks. However, for Somsook, this new legal entity also serves a symbolic purpose, of the 
community coming together, becoming a unit that owns their housing together. The second 
source of inspiration for solving the finance problem came from the practice of savings groups. 
Like Nugaen Inthajan and the members of the Community Development Center, who had 
learned the practice of creating women’s savings groups from visiting similar groups in India, the 
NHA wing studied models of savings groups and revolving funds from groups like Mahila 
Milan. The appeal of the savings groups was that it could allow for the inclusion of people with 
multiple income levels. The final influence on the financial model also came from South Asia in 
the form of the growing influence of the Grameen Bank and the concept of microfinance. This 
aspect of the model came derived from the international finance expertise of an important new 
partner in the effort to build collective housing and land sharing, Phaiboon Watthanasiritham. 
Phaiboon had held multiple high-ranking roles in the government, including minister of the 
Department of Human Security and Social Development. He had also studied finance at 
internationally. Phaiboon and Somsook studied these various finance possibilities, eventually 
combining different elements into a model that would work as a revolving fund for community-
based savings and loans.  
The manifestation of this model would take the form of the Urban Community 
Development Fund, housed in a new office of the NHA called the Urban Community 
Development Office (UCDO). The creation of the UCDO represents the successful coordination 
of the more radical slum movement, who campaigned for the creation of a fund to assist with 
housing and infrastructure for the urban poor (Boonlert 2008, 42–43), the successful lobbying of 
Somsook, Phaiboon, and others with connections inside the government, and a desire on the part 
of the government to find a new solution to urban poverty. Which element was most important 
depends on whose is telling the story. What is certain which was initially capitalized to the tune 
of 1,250 million baht ($30 million) in 1992 and began offering loans as part of an “integrated 
credit system” that offered loans of varying interest rates for income generation, housing 
improvements, community enterprises, and the establishment of network-level revolving funds 
(Somsook 2001, 12). What all of these different loans had in common was that they were all 
made to communities, not individuals.  
3.5.3 Differences between the Slum Movement and Government in the Role of Finance 
While the creation of the Urban Poor Development Fund was pushed for by both the 
slum movement and government representatives, these groups had different reasons for 
advocating for it. For those in the slum movement, such a fund represented a way to access 
government resources that had previously been denied to the urban poor in order to pursue a 
quality of life and material improvements that a government should provide for its citizens 
equally. The ability to access these financial resources was both a right and a tool for furthering 
the movement.  
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However, for those on the side of the government, collective financial management was 
not a tool but a catalyst. It was a way to create community: 
 
Community-managed savings and loan programmes have emerged as one of the most 
powerful tools to draw together the many people and disparate groups that exist within 
poor communities. Because they are controlled and operated by community people 
themselves, savings and loan programmes build a community’s own resource base. 
People can develop themselves and provide for their own needs, both individually and 
collectively, through the ongoing process of regular, concrete decisions that are 
inherent in the collective management of a savings and loan programme. (Somsook 
2001, 9). 
 
This view of savings and loans as central to the formation of communities represents a 
reversal of the role of savings groups in the slum movement. Instead of collective savings being 
something that a strong community pursues in order to meet its needs, savings, in the UCDO 
model, was the central element around which a strong community, represented by a formal legal 
entity, could be created.  The role of finance in the creation of community would remain a point 
of contention between the slum movement and government community development institutions. 
But first, this model of financial management would be imbued with cultural primacy and virtue 
through the advent of a new approach to development by the government: sufficiency economy. 
3.6 Sufficiency Economy as a Response to an Overly “Efficient” Market 
Beginning in the 1990s, the concept of sufficiency economy, espoused by then King 
Bhumibhol Adulyadej, rose to fore of Thai consciousness and become enshrined in numerous 
policies. Rooted in the belief that the worst excesses of capitalism could be avoided through 
moderation and personal virtue, sufficiency economy aimed to lay out a new, more sustainable 
path for Thai development. The rhetoric of sufficiency economy would eventually be taken up 
by many community groups and included in the practices of the new government institute that 
the UCDO would eventually become. That sufficiency economy should play a prominent role in 
housing policies emphasizing community is fitting, considering a quite different approach to 
housing played a leading role in creating the financial collapse that led to the promulgation of 
sufficiency economy in the first place.  
3.6.1 Market Enabling and Its Discontents 
In the 1980s and 1990s, as the slum movement and NHA were gradually developing one 
set of solutions to the problem of housing in the city, the government was simultaneously 
pursuing another, as well—market enabling. Enabling policies emphasized the creation of the 
conditions under which housing markets could thrive, including clear systems of land tenure, 
transparent laws and regulations regarding the transfer of property, adequate infrastructure to 
facilitate construction by developers, and, perhaps, most importantly, the development of an 
efficient system of mortgage finance (Malpezzi 1990, 979; World Bank 1993, 26). This approach 
reflected growing attitude on the part of development experts that financial development was a 
key to the overall development of a country, and that “Housing finance is a non-negligible share 
of total finance in many countries. Housing finance needs to be considered in the light of its 
importance as finance as much as its importance for housing" (Malpezzi 1990, 979).  
Beginning the 1980s, the Government Housing Bank (GHB) played an important role in 
providing mortgage loans at low interest rates, which enabled the growth of private-sector 
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developers. After private lender entered the market, the dominant presence of the GHB forced 
interest rates to stay low, heating up the housing housing sector (K.S. Yap 2002, 39). By 1989, 
when David Dowall conducted a study of the housing sector in Bangkok, he published it with the 
subtitle, “A Profile of an Efficiently Performing Housing Market,” declaring that “The Bangkok 
story is a 'happy' one, and it should be of considerable interest to those committed to improving 
third world housing conditions." (Dowall 1989, 339). He based this assertion on the fact that 
“The slower growth of slum and squatter settle-ments suggests that the private, formal market is 
beginning to respond to the needs of Bangkok's lower income residents and that, as long as 
present conditions continue, the share of slum and squatter settlements in the overall market can 
be expected to decline over the next five years" (Dowall 1989, 330). While he was correct that 
slums would decrease as a share of the housing stock and population, their absolute numbers 
would remain constant for many years to come (Sopon 2003). Nonetheless, Thailand’s housing 
policies and their emphasis on the development of financial markets as means to stimulating 
development would become a model for the rest of the world. In the report that enshrined 
enabling policies in World Bank policy, “Housing Enabling Markets to Work,” Thailand was 
held up as an example of the success the could be achieved if such policies are put into action 
(World Bank 1993, 17).  
This “success” of the housing market, along with a general liberalization of the Thai 
economy done at the urging of the World Bank, led to enormous economic growth from the late 
1980s to the mid-1990s, leading to Thailand’s inclusion as an “emerging market” and part of the 
“East Asian Miracle.” However, this growth was not to last. As Pasuk and Baker (2014, 158) 
“By 1995, the cracks were visible.” These cracks involved a faltering stock market and clear 
bubble emerging in the Bangkok property market. Yap (1996), citing the earlier work of Dowall 
and others at the Bank, called attention to the fact that many of the new housing units being 
created by the mid-90s were sitting empty. Not long after, the bottom fell out. Exports dropped 
precipitously, and the government was forced to float the baht, which had previously been fixed 
to the U.S. Dollar. The devaluation led a massive crash that spread throughout East Asia in 1997 
(K. S Yap and Kirinpanu 2000; Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit 2014, 158). What was known as 
the East Asian Financial Crisis was underway, though locally it was known as wikrit tom yam 
kung, or ‘The Tom Yum Kung Crisis, ‘emphasizing Thailand’s role in creating it by naming it 
after the famous sour Thai soup.  
3.6.2 Sufficiency Economy 
In the face of the crash, King Bhumibol, stepped in to provide a direction for the country. 
The King had long been known for his experiments in small-scale agricultural practices to 
promote the development of rural areas, and as early as 1974 he gave a speech laying out a 
philosophy of the nation’s development that emphasized the need to proceed in gradual steps, 
first creating a foundation through which all people’s basic needs could be met before pursuing 
more advanced economic goals (Priyanut 2004). In December of 1997, when the country was in 
the throes of the economic crisis, he returned to this theme in his annual birthday speech by 
laying out the core principles of was called “sufficiency economy” (setthakit phaw phiang).  
Sufficiency economy, which has, from the beginning, been deeply intertwined with 
movements toward sustainability thinking by international development agencies, posits that 
individual greed is at the core of the inequality and suffering of the world. This greed, which has 
become rampant in the era of toxic capitalism is not a symptom of capitalism itself, but rather an 
immoral culture that leads people to act in self-serving ways and exploit the capitalist system for 
their exclusive gains, with no thought given to the good of society. In Sufficiency Thinking, a 
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number of Thai scholars, nearly all from the fields of economics and business administration, 
along with western editors, summarize the lessons of Sufficiency Economy and give case studies 
of how it has operated on the ground in Thailand. In it, they describe the core of Sufficiency 
Economy as capitalism that is fundamentally grounded in the teachings of Buddhism. Part of 
these teachings center around the importance of communal life: 
 
Buddha Dhamma preaches that a good human life can be obtained not through having 
more sophisticated technologies and materials to support life, but through a good 
balance between communal life and the ability to understand everything in its own 
nature. Continuous and rigorous training of one’s mind, instead of chasing greed and 
accumulating wealth to satisfy a basic sense of insecurity, can lead to happiness 
derived, for example, from giving or helping others or being useful to others (Avery 
and Bergsteiner 2016, loc. 123). 
 
Extended to the society scale,  
 
Sufficiency thinking within the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy seeks to balance the 
economic, societal, environmental and cultural spheres by following a middle path 
characterised by decisions and actions that are moderate, reasonable and prudent. The 
presumption is that individuals, families, communities and societies will embrace 
virtuous values that, when coupled with appropriate knowledge, enable them to decide 
and act with wisdom (Avery and Bergsteiner 2016, 3) 
 
If individual minds are appropriately trained and society adopts these “virtuous values,” then 
capitalism can flourish for the collective good, since “Capitalism is not inherently destructive, 
and certain forms of capitalism actually manage to balance social, economic and environmental 
outcomes. Among these moral forms of capitalism are some containing sufficiency thinking” 
(Avery and Bergsteiner 2016, 10). 
Sufficiency economy, seeks to maintain the capitalist system, making it more sustainable 
by tempering the desires of the individuals and collectives that comprise it. Or, in Elinoff’s 
(Elinoff 2014a, 91) analysis, “The sufficiency formulation…did not focus on issues of national 
policy or economic structures. Instead, it located the roots of the crash in the collective psyche of 
the nation." This problem with this collective psyche was that it had attempted to leap forward to 
quickly, abandoning the solid foundation that the King had been advocating since the 1970s. 
This is why, in his 1997 speech emphasized that the country had to “move backwards in order to 
move forwards” (Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit 2014, 260). Moving backwards meant, in one 
sense, returning to core Buddhist values of moderation and pursing the “middle path.” But the 
movement to the past was more than just this. It also meant returning to an imagined essential 
Thai-ness based in self-reliance (pheung ton eng) (Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit 2014, 214) and 
communal living, themes that have long characterized elite views of Thailand’s history, 
regardless of evidence to the contrary (Kemp 1988; K. Bowie 1992). 
It was on these points of moderation, self-reliance, and communalism that sufficiency 
economy resonated with the theories of the community culture school. Through sufficiency 
economy the greater Thai public came to embrace a version of Thainess in line with the theories 
of scholars like Chatthip Nartsupha. However, sufficiency economy took the idea of an inherent 
community culture and twisted it in one important way. Community culture posited that self-
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reliant communities represented a form of anarchism that existed instead of the nation-state. In 
sufficiency economy, though, self-reliance and communal life became the defining traditional 
culture of the nation, serving the development of the state. As building self-reliance and 
sufficiency came to guide the policies of the nations, they easily folded into the developing 
infrastructure to support community-based urban housing. However, the next institutional 
advancement on this front would not come directly from any initiative of the King, but from a 
wave of populist sentiment that would usher in the rise one of the most controversial figures in 
Thai politics today. 
3.7 The Creation of CODI 
3.7.1 Thaksin and the Rise of Populist Politics  
 By the late 1990s the UCDO had been up and running for several years, providing loans 
for a number of community-based activities throughout the urban areas of the country. In the 
early 2000s, with the stability of the UCDO proven, the office was restructured and expanded. 
Over the next several years, it would be expanded further, and the processes pioneered by the 
slum movement and progressive NHA employees would be institutionalized under these new 
structures as the Baan Mankong program. This entire process would be helped along by the 
populist fervor of Thaksin Shinawatra.  
 In 2000, the UCDO merged with its rural counterpart, the Rural Development Fund. This 
expanded the overall size of the fund and necessitated a new institutional location for both funds, 
since the NHA was primarily an urban agency. The solution agreed upon was called the 
Community Organizations Development Institute (CODI). CODI is located under the Ministry of 
Social Development and Human Security. The creation of CODI was significant in two 
important ways. The first was its status as a government entity. It is what is known as a Public 
Organization (ongkon mahachon). At the time of its creation, this was a fairly new designation. 
Some have described CODI as “para-statal” (Herrle, Ley, and Fokdal 2015), while others have 
described how it operates with a greater deal of autonomy than other government agencies 
(Somsook 2004; Kioe Sheng Yap and De Wandeler 2010) . The key significance of the new 
designation is that much of CODI’s funding from the central government comes in the form of 
loans to the central fund that it then on-lends to communities, charging a below-market rate 
interest rate to cover its operating costs. The remainder of the government funding does operate 
in the traditional way, as subsidies, mostly for housing construction.  
 The second way in which the creation of CODI was significant was that it moved the two 
of the government’s vehicles for community development in urban and rural contexts under the 
same roof. As Somsook describes, “This was an important change. It wasn’t an urban issue. It 
was an Urban and rural issue. No boundary for community.”28 Under CODI then, poor 
populations, regardless of their location, could access funding and support, but not as 
individuals, only as part of community organizations. 
 This type of support for community organizations fit well with the platform of Thaksin, 
who was elected in 2000. Thaksin eventually became known as a populist whose popularity 
surged with a large base of support from the poor rural communities and NGOs that had 
strengthened their influence throughout the 1990s (Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit 2014, Chapter 
9). However, he was not always so concerned with the welfare of the poor. He was, at first, a 
“modernist,” more concerned with helping the businessmen like himself who had been taken 
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76 
down by the financial crisis (Pasuk and Baker 2008). He would eventually become known for 
seemingly contradictory national development policies that emphasized, on the one hand, 
massive investments in social welfare, but on the other, a deepening of international financial 
entanglements that can be described as neoliberal. The dual character of his approach can be seen 
in the famous three-tier platform that won him such widespread support among the nation’s rural 
poor. The three tiers included first, the 30-baht scheme, a universal healthcare policy that allowed 
citizens to access almost all healthcare services for 30 baht ($1). The second tier was debt relief 
for farmers. The third was a vehicle for new forms of debt through “village funds,” which were 
government-sponsored microfinance institutions operated at the local level (Baker and Pasuk 
Phongpaichit 2014) that actually increased levels of household debt (Endo 2014, 75–76).  
 Under Thaksin, low-income housing policies also took a bifurcated path, on one end pure 
subsidy, on the other, a new financial model. The pure subsidy end took the familiar form high 
rise public housing constructed by the NHA, often on the outskirts of the city. This program was 
called Baan Ua Arthorn, often translated as “We Care” Housing (Somsook 2004, 24). The 
second was Baan Mankong, proposed by Somsook and Phaiboon to Thaksin shortly after he took 
office and enthusiastically approved by the new prime minister.  
 The Baan Mankong model, as it was designed through the trial and error of the 
collaborations between the slum movement and Somsook and other NHA workers, involves 
several phases of social, legal, and financial work. While it is designed to be flexible, all projects 
must proceed through some set processes. First, communities must form savings groups. 
Through these savings groups, they save ten percent of what they intend to borrow for physical 
upgrading, with an initial loan limit of 300,000 baht per household that has gradually been raised 
over time. In most cases these savings groups are eventually formalized as a housing 
cooperative, registered with the Department for the Promotion of Cooperatives. All loans for 
upgrading and land purchase are made from CODI to the cooperative at base interest rate of four 
percent. The cooperative then on-lends to individual households, tacking on an additional interest 
rate, usually two to four percent, to cover their operating costs. It is through the cooperative that 
communities gain legal rights to occupy land. In some cases, this occurs via rental agreements 
with landowning government agencies, preferably on 30-year lease terms, though sometimes 
shorter terms are allowed. In other cases, communities purchase land through the cooperatives, 
facilitated by additional loans. In some cases, these land tenure agreements are for the land the 
community already occupies, as is the case in land sharing agreements. However, in other cases 
communities relocate. Officially, there are four options for upgrading: on-site upgrading, re-
blocking, full reconstruction on site, and reconstruction with relocation (Somsook 2005a, 2009). 
The process, on paper, is facilitated through a series of institutional arrangements in which local 
governments, NGOs, and “community networks” (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: The Baan Mankong mechanism, replicated from (Somsook, 2005, 32) 
 The concept of the community network had, by the time Baan Mankong was approved, 
become a we’ll-established form through the many organizations associated with the Assembly 
of the Poor, including the FRSN. When Baan Mankong began, some of the early projects were 
associated with the FRSN. However, others were not.  
 Thaksin’s approval of Baan Mankong came with ambitious targets to meet. In 2003 ten 
pilot projects were selected, comprised of 1,500 units. However, within the first five years the 
program was set to complete nearly 300,000 unites in almost 2,000 communities across 200 
cities (Boonlert 2008, 51; Somsook 2005a, 22). To facilitate this massive up-scaling, CODI 
started its own network of communities apart from the FRSN. This network, called the National 
Union of Low-Income Community Organizations (NULICO), was started by the leaders of the 
some of the first Baan Mankong communities, many of whom disliked the confrontational 
approach of the FRSN and their reliance on NGOs. As opposed to the FRSN, NULICO had no 
relationship to NGOs, instead working directly with CODI and other government entities. As 
Baan Mankong grew, the majority of new projects, if they did not join the FRSN, would  be 
folded into NULICO. Despite the fact the Baan Mankong would fall well short of its targets, 
completing less than 80,000 units by 2008 (Boonlert 2008, 51), this still meant a huge initial 
growth of the NULICO network.  
 The concept of the community network clearly derived from the nationwide organizing 
practices pioneered during the 1990s during the era of expansion of NGOs throughout the 
country. In the specific case of Baan Mankong, as Boonlert (2008) as argued, the NULICO 
represents the copying of a strategy originated in the people’s sector for use in a government 
policy. In the first fifteen years of Baan Mankong, the FRSN and NULICO would both come to 
play prominent roles in shaping and sustaining the policy, albeit in very different ways.  
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3.8 Conclusion 
 Many accounts of Baan Mankong in the English language literature begin with the 
founding of CODI and discuss its role in facilitating community networks. In this chapter, I 
reversed this order, narrating the rise of community organizing and community networks and 
describing their role in ultimately paving the way for the creation of Baan Mankong and CODI. 
Along the way, I have highlighted the importance of global discourses of development and state 
policies in setting the stage for local mobilizations. This is no way to diminish the importance, 
however, of the individuals who have worked at the local level to get movements and policies off 
the ground. In telling this extended and multi-stranded history of the creation of Baan Mankong, 
I have brought together narratives of broad structural and discursive change with stories of 
people exercising their own agency to shape the future. I the following chapters, I build upon this 
strategy to show how narratives, institutions, and individuals interact to maintain and expand the 
Baan Mankong program in the present day through an analysis of NULICO and the FRSN. 
 As I have demonstrated in this chapter, the origin stories of these networks are quite 
different in many respects. While NULICO mainly derives from CODI and the Baan Mankong 
policy itself, the FRSN can trace its roots to a much longer history of activism and maintains 
close ties to NGO organizers. However, the networks cannot be said to come from entirely 
different sources. They have both come into being as a result of the same amalgam of 
urbanization pressures, good governance rhetoric, and policies that came to view chumchon as a 
unit of urban governance jurisdiction. In addition, the NGO organizers and state agency 
employees who work with the networks have long been in conversation with each other. As a 
result, the practices around community that they espouse share certain commonalities. Both 
establish community committees that serve the purpose of self-governance and representation of 
the community to the larger network. Both create savings groups and cooperatives in order 
accumulate collective resources to serve the needs of the community. Both rely on outside 
professionals to assist them in organizing, connecting to other communities, and navigating 
complex government bureaucracies. Finally, for the past 15 years, they have both come to rely on 
the resources of CODI and the Baan Mankong program, in particular, in order to meet the 
material needs of their members.  
 Given these many similarities, it is easy to see why many scholars and practitioners alike 
have tended to discuss the community networks of Baan Mankong as a monolith. However, as I 
will demonstrate in the following chapter, the differences between the FRSN and NULICO 
remain stark and reflect their origins. The contrasts in their network structures, political 
strategies, organizational affiliations, and the practices of the professionals who organize them 
have substantial consequences for both their own members and the Baan Mankong policy. 
Ultimately, these differences also reflect and perpetuate difference notions of chumchon itself 
and its role in the larger political system. 
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Chapter 4: Participation: Democracy and Development 
4.1 Introduction 
 By 2015, when I began my preliminary fieldwork on Baan Mankong, the policy had been 
up and running in earnest for over a decade. Over those years, multiple community networks had 
arisen to push the policy forward. Some of these were smaller networks exclusive to 
communities on particular forms of government land, most notably those living on Crown 
Property Bureau (CPB) land. 29 Rural networks formed as the Community Organizations 
Development Institute (CODI), the government agency that is in charge with implementing the 
policy, began to expand its housing program beyond the urban-focused Baan Mankong. 
However, within the core Baan Mankong program, two networks loom largest, either because of 
their size—the National Union of Low-Income Community Organizations (NULICO)—or their 
political influence—the Four Regions Slum Network (FRSN). I opened this dissertation with a 
scene of these two networks attempting to work together but struggling because of their vastly 
different approaches to organizing and negotiating with authority. In the previous chapters, I 
demonstrated how these two networks and Baan Mankong arose through the varied histories of 
the word community/chumchon in Thailand and the numerous local and global forces that have 
influenced Thai urban housing policy. The FRSN was shaped out of a combination popular 
movements throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, including the insurgency of the 
Communist Party of Thailand, Saul-Alinsky-inspired community organizing, and the mass 
movement of the Assembly of the Poor. Meanwhile, NULICO formed much later as a result of 
the Baan Mankong policy itself. While NULICO certainly draws some inspirations from the 
currents that informed the FRSN and even from the FRSN itself, as will become clearer in this 
chapter, it is much more influenced by the community development discourses of the 
international development agencies and the Thai government.  
4.1.1 Participation from a Comparative and Relational Perspective 
 In this chapter, I move from the broad historical narratives of chumchon that have 
informed the creation of Baan Mankong to a contemporary examination of two cases—two 
networks—that are embedded within the larger extended case study of the Baan Mankong 
program. I discuss these cases with respect to a central discourse that both employ, that of 
“participation.” Over the course of the chapter, I examine how the two networks conceive of and 
structure the participation of their members through three central features of the networks: their 
rhetoric, their organizational structures, and their practices on the ground.  
 In analyzing these two cases, I make two distinct but related contributions. First, I look at 
the networks through a comparative lens. Parsing the differences between these networks 
enriches the majority of the literature on Baan Mankong, which frequently speaks of 
“community networks” as a monolith (e.g. Somsook 2005, 2009; Boonyabancha and Kerr 2018) 
or at best makes a passing distinction as to some networks being “rights-based” while others are 
not (Herrle, Ley, and Fokdal 2015). In comparing these two cases, I demonstrate the differences 
between these networks are substantial and consequential. In short, I show how participation that 
is demanded from outside of state institutions looks quite different from participation that is 
recruited or even commanded by state agencies.  
   
                                                
29	The CPB is the agency that oversees land and assets held by the monarchy.  
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 My analysis does not end at comparison, though. On a broader level, what is most 
interesting about the cases of the Baan Mankong networks lies not in their comparison but in 
their relationship. Despite rarely working together, the two likely would not exist without each 
other. This is because of the particular political role each plays with respect to the policy, the 
government agency that administers it, and other agents of the central state. In analyzing the 
symbiosis between the two networks, I argue that in this context a de-politicized form of 
participation serves to open the space for more political forms, and vice versa.  
4.1.2 The Present State of Baan Mankong   
Since the early days in the 1980s, when the slum movement and a handful of government 
staff were working with communities to resist eviction, establish land sharing agreements, and 
search for affordable finance models, Thailand come to be a model of successful participatory 
slum upgrading throughout the world (e.g. A. K. Das and Takahashi 2009; Bhaktal and Lucci 
n.d.; A. Das 2018). Over the past 15 years, Baan Mankong has grown in scale and reputation. 
International praise often emphasizes its flexibility and allowance for “self-determination” on the 
part of communities (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2004). The program is also deemed successful 
because of the scale of its implementation, with over 2,000 communities made up of nearly 
105,000 households now living in communities that have upgraded through Baan Mankong 
(Community Organizations Development Institute 2017).  
Despite the emphasis on flexibility and self-determination, over the years the program 
has established certain common practices and parameters for communities taking part. When 
communities initially express interest in a project, they must start a savings group. In the early 
years, financing was done through these savings groups, alone, but increasingly, because of the 
types of land tenure arrangements demanded by government agencies and private sellers, the 
communities must create a formal housing cooperative that becomes the legal entity that 
represents the community. Through the cooperative, communities save ten percent of what they 
intend to borrow, up to a maximum of 330,000 baht (about $11,000) per household for housing 
reconstruction or upgrading. In addition, communities receive subsidies for infrastructure 
construction, which have ranged from 25,000 to 45,000 baht per household over time. A small 
subsidy is also made available for travel and administrative expenses. Depending on the current 
land tenure situation of the community, they may be able to stay in place. However, in recent 
years it has become more and more commons for communities to have to relocate. The 
communities that are able to stay in place are most often on government land, and they negotiate 
a long-term rental agreement with the government agency who owns the land. However, being 
on government land is by no means a guarantee that such an arrangement will be reached, and 
many communities are still forced to relocate. When private land is involved, relocation is nearly 
always the outcome. This generally involves the community having to find a new plot of land to 
purchase, for which they generally take out additional loans as a cooperative. In sum, there are 
four possible housing outcomes for Baan Mankong communities: minor on-site upgrading, re-
blocking of housing and partial reconstruction, total reconstruction on-site, or resettlement with 
total reconstruction. No matter what the final and tenure arrangement is, the community holds 
the land rights collectively through their cooperative.  
If a community is able to form a cooperative, save the requisite amount, and reach an 
agreement to purchase or rent land, they then receive financing through CODI. These loans are 
made are made from the CODI fund and extended to the cooperatives at an interest rate of four to 
six percent on a fifteen-year term, lower than most commercial loans. The cooperative then on-
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lends to individual households, generally adding a margin of two to four percent for its operating 
costs.  
This technical explanation of the program, however, belies myriad complexities. Forming 
the discrete “communities” that ultimately become the cooperatives; negotiating for land rights; 
navigating the numerous bureaucracies involved in formalizing those rights, extending 
infrastructure, and giving construction approvals—these are messy, political processes. The 
networks guide communities through this confusion. 
4.1.3 Fieldwork Failures as Finding 
 The analysis presented in this chapter is based on 18 months of ethnographic research 
conducted with the networks and CODI over the course of three years, from 2015 to 2018, with 
the bulk taking place between June 2017 and September 2018. The core of this research was 
participant observation in the form of internships with the different organizations, supplemented 
with dozens of interviews with staff, leadership, and community members. However, the shape 
and extent of the participant observation varied across sites due largely to the nature of the 
organizations themselves. This, in and of itself, was a finding.  
A first internship phase took place with the FRSN in the summers of 2015 and 2016. 
During the first summer, I stayed at the FRSN headquarters, tucked back in a small soi (alley) in 
eastern Bangkok. As an intern, I shadowed organizers, attended network and community 
meetings throughout the city, and assisted with projects when I was able, usually through 
translating or giving technical assistance on proposals by making basic maps and diagrams. This 
experience of living in the middle of FRSN activity 24 hours a day gave me a sense of the 
diversity and flow of their work, the relationships between members and organizers, and their 
positions with respect to other networks and agencies. During this time, I interacted with CODI 
staff and leadership frequently and came to understand how the FRSN and their member 
communities related to and viewed this government organization. 
After spending several months primarily looking at Baan Mankong from the perspectives 
of the FRSN and their member communities, CODI graciously allowed me to come on as an 
intern with their central Baan Mankong team. In this capacity, for over three months, I primarily 
worked out an office in CODI’s airy headquarters, just down the street from the National 
Housing Authority, also in eastern Bangkok. At CODI, I attended numerous meetings with staff 
and community members, as well as with NULICO representatives. I also shadowed staff as they 
went on community visits or carried out workshops in different parts of the country. By building 
relationships with staff and leadership, I got to know what the different networks look like from 
the staff perspective and what it is like to work with each of them. I also discovered the vast 
differences between how the networks and policy in general look from the perspective of on-the-
ground staff versus CODI leadership.  
Early in my fieldwork, I intended to do a separate phase of participant observation with 
the NULICO in the same way I had with the FRSN and CODI. I attempted to initiate this by 
asking NULICO leaders I met during meetings at CODI when there would be an NULICO 
meeting I could attend. The meetings they pointed me to were invariable at CODI, and when I 
arrived I would find that it was, in fact, a CODI team meeting of some sort in which NULICO 
representatives were taking part. Unlike CODI and the FRSN, there is no separate, central 
headquarters for NULICO. Their headquarters, for all intents and purposes, is CODI. Therefore, 
in order to do participant observation with NULICO, I continued my engagement with CODI, 
but through projects in which NULICO members were most heavily involved. Initially, this came 
as a frustration to me, as I felt that I would not be able to adequately compare NULICO and the 
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FRSN if I had not done the same kind of research with both of them. What became apparent over 
time, however, as I interviewed more and more NULICO representatives and attended meetings 
with them at CODI, was that my inability to work with them in the same way as I had with the 
FRSN was, itself, a finding. It indicated, on one hand, an organizational structure that had been 
laid out intentionally in the hopes of avoiding some of the characteristics of the FRSN that both 
NULICO and CODI leaders found undesirable—namely, a hierarchical structure tied to NGOs. 
On the other hand, its looseness had become a major obstacle to the network’s functioning and 
pointed to a key challenge in the Baan Mankong policy. 
In what follows, I unpack the relationships between the rhetoric, organizational structure, 
and practices of the two networks, summarized in Figure 7. I demonstrate how the point to 
different forms of participation that serve different purposes with respect to the policy and urban 
politics more broadly. 
 
Figure 7: Summary of the core beliefs and practices of the FRSN and CODI/NULICO 
  
4.2 The Principles and Rhetoric of The Four Regions Slum Network: Fairness, 
Rights, and Democracy for the People 
 
As discussed in the previous two chapters, the FRSN can trace its history back activists 
involved with Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) in the 1970s, as well as a movement to 
spread Saul Alinsky-inspired community organizing throughout Asia. Along the way, the 
network has incorporated a number of other influences to varying degrees, including the rural 
activists, NGOs, and intellectuals working in the vein of community rights who led the charge in 
the massive demonstrations of the Assembly of the Poor in the mid-1990s. While these various 
influences align in many ways, they do not constitute a single, coherent ideology. The various 
influences on the principles and practices of the FRSN often lead to a diversity of opinion, both 
among the community members themselves, as well as among the professional organizers that 
support it. However, it is perhaps the allowance for such dissent that most explains why the 
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movement has endured for over twenty years. Despite this diversity of thought, a few major 
themes remain constant: fairness, rights and democracy, and mutual aid.  
 
4.2.1 Fairness/Justice 
An oft-repeated phrase at the FRSN headquarters is that the group is struggling for a just 
and fair society (sangkhom thi pen tham). Members will often react to decisions by government 
agencies by explaining that what is being done is “not just” or “not fair” (mai pen tham). This 
sense that the movement’s ultimate goal is to create greater fairness and equality is manifested in 
many initiatives. For example, in 2018, the network began work with allied groups to push for 
expansion to the welfare system, including improved healthcare provision and social security. 
However, the primary way in which the FRSN struggles for greater justice in society is by 
pursuing more equal distribution of land. The just distribution of land is motivated by both 
immediate and pragmatic rationales. The first rationale, which is the primary motivator for most 
members of the network, is that gaining access to urban land is the only way in which chaoban 
(“villagers”) will be able to create secure housing (ti yu asai mankong), which is a prerequisite 
for meeting all other needs. The deeper rationale is often clearly articulated by leadership but is 
unevenly held or understood by chaoban below the leadership level. This is that inequality in 
landholdings is the fundamental source of injustice and inequality in wealth and power. Land 
holds a fundamental place in many of the larger policy initiatives of the FRSN, such as the one 
illustrated in Image X.  
 
 
Figure 8:A t-shirt from a 2015 land reform campaign called Four Laws for the Poor that the 
FRSN carried out in conjunction with its allied network, the People’s Movement for a Just 
Society (P-MOVE). The t-shirt’s logo reads, “Whose land is Thai land?” and contains numerous 
statistics about the inequalities in land holdings in the country. 
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4.2.2 Rights and Democracy 
Though the FRSN is known by the other networks—not to mention bureaucrats and 
elected officials—for its confrontational style, over the years it has become decidedly less radical 
and more pragmatic. Despite the remaining focus on land redistribution against the accumulation 
of and wealth by the rich, not all leaders would necessarily even claim that theirs is an anti-
capitalist organization anymore, which it most certainly was twenty years ago. What everyone 
can still agree on, though, is that it is a movement that works toward rights (sitthi) for poor 
people. This is the key distinction between the FRSN and other networks—the primacy of rights 
in their organizational principles and their mission to gain access to rights through mobilizing to 
negotiate with the government. The exact rhetoric of rights takes on many flavors. In some 
moments, members talk about the right to housing as a human right (sitthi manuthsayachon). In 
other moments, rights are invoked as belonging to “the people” or “citizens” (prachachon).30 At 
other times, rights are specifically articulated as an element of democracy.  
The type of democracy promoted and practiced by the FRSN extends far beyond having 
elections to choose officials and representatives, though they do actively campaign for this. As 
one FRSN leader explained it to me, they practice and advocate for three forms of democracy: 1) 
representative democracy (prachathipotai baeb tua thaen), 2) participatory democracy 
(prachathipotai baeb mi suan ruam), and 3) direct democracy (prachathipotai trong).  
Given Thailand’s long history of coups and frequent curtailments of electoral rights, 
representative democracy is often not an option. However, in cases like the 2016 constitutional 
referendum and the eventual 2019 elections following five years of overt military dictatorship, 
the network encourages members to vote and makes efforts to educate members on the issues. 
However, they do not tell members how to vote. This is a part of a longstanding commitment to 
avoid affiliation with any particular political party. They hold this commitment for two reasons. 
The first is the pragmatic fact that politicians come in and out of power, and allying the 
movement with one party will mean that when their candidates are out of power, they will not be 
able to move forward. The second reason is a matter of principle. They assert that a people’s 
movement should remain separate from government and elected politicians so as not to fall under 
their sway and to retain the capacity to hold whoever is in power accountable. This principle was 
put to the test in the early 2000s when founding network mentor and former communist party 
ranger Suwit Wattanoo decided to take the step of starting an “alternative political party.” After 
much consideration and debate, he decided to step away from the FRSN and related NGOs in 
order to avoid entanglements between the party and the movement. Unfortunately, he passed 
away before the party could come to fruition  (Nitirat 2007) 
By participatory democracy, they mean using avenues already in existence to voice their 
opinions and call upon their rights, such as taking part in public forums, voicing their opinions in 
legally condoned ways, and meeting with public officials in formal meetings. By direct 
democracy, they mean pushing for rights they do not yet have through means that have yet been 
                                                
30 As Elinoff (2013) has discussed, “citizen” has more than one translation in Thai, and each version carries a 
somewhat different connotation. Prachachon, the version most often used by the FRSN, equates most closely to “the 
people.” Meanwhile, khon thai literally means “Thai person” and can imply citizen of the Thai state, but it can also 
carry ethnic implications. Phonlameuang, on the other hand, is closer to “population” and has bureaucratic 
connotations. However, despite the absence of one single term that equates to “citizen,” I agree with Elinoff that the 
English word citizenship is still a relevant concept that captures the many claims made by activists.   
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condoned, such as through protests, demonstrations, or simply refusing to move when 
commanded. This distinction between participatory and direct democracy harkens to Miraftab’s 
(2009) description of insurgent planning as working in both “invited and invented spaces.” In the 
framing of the FRSN, the principle of participation is related to rights in two ways. First, 
participation is in and of itself a democratic right. Second, participation through the exercise of 
rights is a means of achieving other rights.  
A final rights-based discourse surrounding the work of FRSN is that of community rights. 
This comes primarily through the network’s associations with affiliated community rights 
movements in the north and northeast who were pioneers of the concept in the era leading up to 
the Assembly of the Poor. Organizers and members of the FRSN sometimes sport t-shirts touting 
community rights-based events and initiatives or post about them on Facebook. An example of 
such an initiative is the Four Law for the Poor, discussed above. These community rights 
initiatives explicitly aim to recognize various forms of collective land tenure. The most concrete 
manifestation of community rights for FRSN members occurs for those communities who 
achieve tenure through a community land tenure deed (chanod chumchon). The community land 
tenure deed is a new form of land agreement that was passed after many years of lobbying by 
community rights groups. It allows communities, as a collective, to remain on government land 
with certain use rights, provided the community takes care of the land. The classic form of the 
community land title deed applies to community-managed forests; however, some communities 
of the FRSN have also used this form of land tenure in urban areas.  
4.2.3 Mutual Aid 
This belief that the government should provide for the rights of citizens is accompanied 
by the belief that in practice, rights must be realized through work. One professional organizer 
with the FRSN explained when asked what new communities need to understand before joining 
the FRSN, he replied, 
 
Before joining the FRSN, they need to know that this is not a social service 
organization. This is not the Department of Social Services that will cover your 
expenses. Second is that you have to do things yourself. No one can do it for you. The 
FRSN is an organization that can advise you on the way forward, tell you what to do, 
help you on your way, supplement your efforts when you lack what you need. But we 
are not the primary doers. Communities need to do things for themselves. The third 
thing is that you have to help your friends. After we have helped you, you need to go 
help others.31 
 
Doing things for yourself and helping others, like other aspects of the FRSN’s work, is 
both a matter of principle and practicality. In principle, the network is concerned with building a 
movement that is independent from the government so that it can hold the government 
accountable. This means needing to be able to sustain its work without total reliance on the 
                                                
31 เขาต้องรู้ก่อนสลัมสี+ ภาคไม่ใช่องค์กรส่งเคราะห์ ไม่ใช่ว่าเรียกร้องอะไรต้องได้ทุกอย่าง เราไม่ใช่กรมประชาส่งเคราะห์ ที+ คอยลดแลกจ่ายแขมให้ 
อันที+ สองคือ คุณต้องทําเอง จะไม่มีใครทําแทนคุณ สลัมสี+ ภาคจะเป็นองค์กรที+ แนะทางให้ บอกทางให้ เสริมทางให้ ขาดเหลืออะไรเพิ+ มเติมให้ แต่จะ
ไม่เป็นคนทําหลัก ชุมชนต้องทําเอง อันที+ สาม ต้องช่วยเพื+ อน นะคับ นอกจากว่าเรามาช่วยเขาแล้ว เขาต้องรู้จักช่วยคนอื+ นด้วย 
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government. This is why the different communities and sub-networks within the organization 
maintain their own dues and collections to fund travel for leaders and other administrative 
expenses. As a practical matter, the movement cannot endure if its members’ basic needs are not 
met.  
Meeting needs in a way that sustains both individual members and the larger movement 
is the motivating factor behind creating savings groups to protect against disasters and starting 
small group enterprises around handmade goods to be a source of supplemental income. This 
principle of mutual aid as both individual and group sustenance became clearest to me through a 
practice of a sub-network for the homeless, who in 2015 and 2016 would hold weekly events at 
in a public park space near Sanam Luang, a prominent royal and governmental space. At these 
events existing members of the homeless network would hand out bowls of rice to other 
homeless people in the area, make announcements and hold a public forum, and then show a 
movie on a portable screen. The act of handing out rice met the immediate needs of potential 
members. The announcements and feedback sessions helped the network understand the needs of 
the homeless people who attended and gave those in attendance information on how they could 
take part in the network’s political organizing. Finally, the showing of the movie provided a 
much-needed diversion, as well as sense of belonging in a space symbolic of state power where 
they are frequently hassled by police.  
In the FRSN’s rhetoric, fairness, rights, and mutual aid are tied together as crucial 
elements of building a movement that hold the state accountable to “the people.” However, these 
lofty goals are constantly checked by the practical necessities of meeting the basic needs of a 
poor population and working in a context where democratic rights are constantly being curtailed, 
and government turnover occurs frequently. At certain times, these practical elements can 
overshadow the more radical and democratic rhetoric of network, particular for members of the 
lower echelons of the network’s organization. Nonetheless, these higher-level discourses have 
been maintained for over twenty years by a dedicated group of organizers and community 
leaders.  
4.3 The Principles and Rhetoric of NULICO: Sufficiency Economy towards 
Participatory Development 
  While the FRSN played an important role in the creation of Baan Mankong, Baan 
Mankong is that raison d’être of NULICO. The first members of NULICO were leaders from 
some of the first Baan Mankong communities. The primary purpose of becoming a network was 
to exchange knowledge and support about challenges they faced getting projects off the ground 
and to advise newer communities who were just beginning the process. From the beginning, 
NULICO was facilitated by CODI. Thus, its rhetoric closely aligns with CODI’s. The key 
elements of this rhetoric are savings and finance as principle organizing element; cooperation 
and basic needs in lieu of rights; and city-wide upgrading. 
4.3.1 Savings and Collective Finance 
 In the rhetoric of CODI and NULICO, the role of savings and collective finance is nearly 
the reverse of what it is for the FRSN. In the FRSN’s view, the activity of saving together serves 
to meet the needs of members and protect against emergency. It is a practical necessity. 
However, for CODI and NULICO, as well as their associated higher-level networks, savings is 
where everything begins. The act of creating a central fund is what brings people together, forces 
them to establish methods of collective governance, and “unlocks” their potential to better their 
situations (Archer 2012).  
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 A second key aspect of collective finance is that it is supposed to serve as a means to 
unite a community despite difference. This comes from the acknowledgement by the policy 
architects that within settlements, there are people of different means and who hold different 
statuses within the community. But when everyone has to commit to saving together, it unites 
their interests, reducing hierarchies. This union is not only financial; it is legal. In conversations 
with leaders and advisors to CODI and the FRSN, the FRSN emphasizes that community does 
not need to be a legal entity, that it is about a sense of commitment that is not enforced from the 
outside. However, CODI leaders emphasize the need for community to become a new legal 
entity through housing cooperatives. It is this legal entity that secures the community and creates 
a sense that they are one.  
In the initial establishment of the CODI model, many potential financial models were 
considered, including the Grameen Bank model of microfinance that promotes access to credit 
for the poorest of the poor. However, they decided against this. The CODI model is not about 
just reaching the poorest of the poor, but about uniting people of different means as way to 
extend “flexible finance.” Having people of higher incomes in the mix allows for the extension 
of credit to more people. And once you get credit extended to a community, it is up to the 
community to manage it. They can decide how to allocate it, and the forced deliberation over 
how to manage money is key to building community. Once this community is established 
financially, legally, and, in this logic, morally, then the members are able to advocate for 
themselves through their collective power.  
4.3.2 Cooperation against the “Rights-Based Approach” 
 The way in which community advocates for itself, however, is quite different from how 
the FRSN conceives of advocacy. The CODI and NULICO emphasis on savings and collective 
finance as a key element of bringing community together is accompanied by an assertion that 
collectivity is appropriate to the Thai context and that such forms of cooperation and mutual aid 
can provide for “basic needs” (pajjai si) without necessarily appealing to the concept of rights. 
The eschewing of the rhetoric of rights, in the CODI doctrine, is grounded in the belief that Thai 
culture is fundamentally cooperative and that claiming rights represents a confrontational 
approach that is inappropriate to the That context. It also posited as disempowering because it 
relies on the state to provide for the needs of citizens.  
 While some of the leaders of CODI worked hand-in-hand with rights-based groups such 
as the FRSN and the HSF during the experimental period of establishing collective land 
agreements in the 1980s and early 1990s, by the late-1990s, a schism emerged among 
community members and professionals between those who believed that communities should 
exercise their power by negotiating with the government as collective of citizens outside the 
government and those who believed that way forward was to encourage communities to work 
with the government. With the establishment of CODI, the latter group became the staff and 
leadership of CODI and the NULICO.  
 While avoiding that language of rights serves the strategic end of avoiding what is 
believed to be unnecessary conflict, it is also based on the belief that the individualistic nature of 
the Western thought that produced the idea of rights is actually the source of inequality and 
unfairness, as one prominent CODI leader explained to me in an interview: 
 
The rights-based approach is going to be concerned with the rights of people. Specific 
groups. This person should have the right, this person shouldn’t. But the word 
community, if we try to understand the work community, it’s the coming together of 
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people who are very poor, people who aren’t that poor, or are moderately poor. 
Community is something that mixes, it’s an integrated unit, in which people who aren’t 
equal can come together and be a part of a setting. This is a community. It’s not really 
an issue of rights. But they can come together and help each other and take care of each 
other. Community is a social system based on the concept that people can be equal or 
unequal, but everyone can be part of the system (emphasis added). 
 
In this interpretation, community is social form that can tolerate inequality without having that 
inequality become a source of conflict. Rights, on the other hand, draws attention to inequality, 
which leads to conflict. The leader went on:  
 
The rights-based approach has several issues, and I include housing rights in this. One 
issue is that in the housing rights based approach, we must protect the rights of the 
have-nots, all of the people who don’t have rights. But sometimes it’s really more of a 
theoretical way of thinking. It’s real, but it’s a theoretical way of thinking in that people 
who don’t have rights should have rights. But if we use the community approach, in 
this way people should be one part of a system, should have access to resources, should 
have dignity. If it’s a story of community, then we use the words dignity as human 
beings. And we also employ religion. For example, housing is one of the basic human 
needs. Everyone needs security in life. Everyone certainly has basic needs. The way 
you explain needs, human needs, dignity, human being, this sort of thing, you do not 
elaborate in terms of rights. You elaborate in terms of needs and what human beings 
need to have.  
 
Thus, rights, in this way of thinking, can only draw attention to inequality and help to point out 
what should “theoretically” be equal. Rights themselves cannot actually be used to improve 
material conditions. “Needs,” on the other hand can be worked toward in tangible ways. The leader 
then explained how this understanding of needs, based in religion and culture, was also a way of 
opposing the imposition of Western ideology: 
 
Asian societies elaborate needs in this way. So we don’t spell out rights. Rights is a 
Western concept, right? In the Oriental concept, the Eastern concept is more on human 
needs. Integration. Accept everybody as humans whose need to exist equally. Equally, 
yes, sometimes we use it—equally—as human beings, as people of the society. You 
can say that, but you don’t use rights very much. Rights is understandable, and people 
should have rights, but it’s a Western concept. So, [if you say] ‘we have to secure rights 
for the people,’ suddenly Oriental society feels awkward. Secure rights means what? 
You know? 
 
Not only are rights ineffective and theoretical, then—they are also illegible in the Thai context. 
In tying sufficiency and communalism to Thainess and Asian culture, this CODI leader 
discursively twists rights from being a means of making democratic demands to an imposition of 
Western thought. The leader went on to explain a further problem with the rights-based 
approach. This is that when you demand rights from the government, you are then dependent on 
the government to provide for those rights. This is how you can lose your independence through 
rights. Thus, rights, far from being emancipatory, can be oppressive. 
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 The insistence that community is appropriate to the Thai way of life and that community 
can serve to meet the necessities of life without need to resort to the state combine to create a 
discourse that strongly harkens back to the community culture school, which envisioned 
community as a form of libertarian anarchism made up of self-sufficient communities (see 
chapter 2). This may seem ironic, given that it is state program espousing these beliefs. However, 
as Thongchai (2008) has argued, the self-sufficient aspect of the community culture school of 
thought can readily be appropriated to serve neoliberal agendas. This become especially apparent 
through CODI and NULICO’s use of the core principle of Sufficiency Economy.  
4.3.3 Sufficiency Economy 
The assertion that individualism is antithetical the Eastern way of life makes itself 
apparent in the concept of sufficiency economy, which is infused in many aspects of CODI’s and 
the NULICO’s work. Sufficiency economy, first fully elaborated by King Bhumibol Adulyadej 
in 1997, in the wake of the East Asian Financial Crisis, serves as a response by the monarchy to 
social ills that led to the crisis (see Chapter 3).  
One manifestation of sufficiency in CODI and NULICO rhetoric comes through in the 
common saying “communities must be self-reliant” (chumchon tawng pheung ton eng). This 
insistence on self-reliance and self-sufficiency makes its way into CODI and NULICO both 
institutionally and in rhetoric of community leaders. The most recent program aimed at 
development Baan Mankong in rural areas goes by the name “Sufficient Housing.” On the 
ground floor of the CODI offices, there is a store touting hand-made “sufficient” products from 
communities. The English motto embroidered on the backs of CODI staff’s polo shirts reads 
“Our goal is Self-Reliance Communities (sic).” However, in the Thai written above this line on 
the shirt, a closer translation would be “CODI aims to build strong communities.” An emphasis 
on building strong communities is something that CODI and NULICO share with the FRSN. 
However, what they mean when they stay a “strong community” is quite different. It is 
impossible to say why this English translation was chosen exactly. However, the equation of 
strong (khem khaeng) and self-reliant is revealing as to CODI and NULICO’s conceptualization 
of what constitutes a strong community.  
 
 
Figure 9:CODI staff shirts. Note: The English Translation reads “Our goal is Self Reliance 
Communities. However, the closer translation of the Thai written above would be “CODI aims 
to build strong communities.” 
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The discourses of sufficiency economy, with their focus on moderation and self-reliance, 
have clearly disciplining effect. As Elinoff (2013, 2014a) has demonstrated, sufficiency, as a 
discourse, seeks to discipline the desires of poor residents, limiting the kinds of demands they 
can legitimately make as citizens. While Elinoff also points how that poor citizens can dispute 
and manipulate this logic to make political claims, in the context of CODI and the leadership of 
NULICO, sufficiency discourses are generally employed as a means to promote discipline both 
of the self and of the community. This line of thinking clearly operates among NULICO 
community members, as well. At one planning meeting, an NULICO leader described the 
problem of debt in her community as being caused by the fact that “people lack knowledge about 
how to live according to sufficiency economy.”  
 
4.3.4 Participatory Modernism through City-wide Upgrading 
The highest goal of both CODI and NULCIO is “city-wide upgrading” with the belief 
that this is how “systems change” occurs, by many communities in a jurisdiction sitting down to 
negotiate with local authorities, thereby creating a “shared power” (amnat ruam) among the 
community members and the authorities. In contrast to the rhetoric of independence and self-
reliance of communities and the network, this aspect of CODI’s work emphasizes cooperation 
and collaboration with government agencies, even to the extent of copying their structure so as to 
work better together. In the city-wide model, communities will come together as a network 
within a jurisdiction and establish a joint committee with local authorities and relevant NGOs. 
They will do a survey of the communities and land in the area to identify who is at risk of 
eviction and where vacant lots are located. Then everyone will sit down together and make a 
housing plan for the whole area. This kind of planning process, where community members have 
a seat at the table, is what CODI leaders mean when they speak of systemic and structural 
change. It has been carried out in a couple of smaller cities throughout the country, most notably 
the town of Chumphae in the northeastern province of Khon Kaen. Community leaders in these 
initial city-wide efforts have become some of the most prominent figures in NULICO. 
The city-wide approach, while emphasizing structural change, also demonstrates a desire 
on the part of policy leaders to plan at the level of the whole city, to see the city from a birds-eye 
perspective, allocating land from above and pushing forward large-scale plans. In this sense, the 
vision of city-side upgrading shares much in common in more modernist planning approaches. 
The difference is that this bird’s eye vision is to be carried out by community members 
themselves, rather than the government. In this sense, city-wide upgrading presents a kind of 
participatory modernism. This seemingly oxymoronic term demonstrates the paradox of the 
vision of city-wide upgrading. It is a vision of top-down planning supposedly put forward by the 
“grassroots.” As I will demonstrate in subsequent sections and chapters, in practice, the forms of 
participation this type of vision engenders have a tendency to emphasize labor, management, and 
public performance over democratic practice.  
4.4 Organizational Structure of the FRSN  
4.4.1 Four Regions Slum Network 
The structure of the FRSN reflects its self-conception as a social movement (khabuan kan 
khleuanwai thang sangkhom). Perhaps reflecting its communist party roots, its organizational 
structure is quite formal, in the sense that it is well understood and strictly maintained. However, 
the FRSN is not registered in any way through the government.  
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 In principle, the FRSN is a movement of chaoban (“villagers,” which they continue to 
call themselves, despite living in the city). The professionals who support the network are not 
considered members. The primary unit of organization for the FRSN is the chumchon 
(“community”), just as it is for both networks. The next level of organization is the sub-network. 
The functions of the sub-networks are carried out by a committee of one or two representatives 
from each chumchon. It is up to the sub-networks and their member chumchon these 
representatives are to be selected. Some of the subnetworks predate the FRSN, and some have 
been added since its founding. Unlike the NULICO, the subnetworks of the of the FRSN do not 
follow existing governmental boundaries. Instead, the they reflect a shared interest and at least 
some level of self-selection. For example, one network is communities living on land belonging 
to the State Railway of Thailand (SRT) in different regions of the country who banded together 
nearly twenty years ago to negotiate 30-year rental agreements. Another is people who live in the 
Rama 3 area of Bangkok, which was one of the first focus areas of the CO activists and began 
not with eviction cases, but with efforts to gain housing registrations and legal access to basic 
services. In some cases, new member communities join with existing sub-networks. In other 
cases, new networks are formed. The two most recent are a network of the homeless and network 
known as Kao Nah (“progress”). The homeless network was started as an effort to include the 
most marginalized members of society into the network and build forms of collective housing 
suitable to their needs. Gao Nah, on the other hand, is a group of communities that are moving 
near to land near to each other on the eastern fringe of Bangkok, where the network was able to 
find large amounts of affordable land.  
 In total, the FRSN is made up of nine sub-networks with a total membership of nearly 
100 total communities comprised of over 3,000 households (see Figure 9). Because of the way 
they have been constructed and added to over time, at first their formation might seem organic or 
piecemeal. And while it is true that the FRSN leaves sub-network formation to be an open-ended 
process, there is a definite logic behind them. Each sub-network represents a particular strategy 
being pursued at a particular time, and the member communities have a clear shared interest.  
 
 
Figure 10:The Structure of the FRSN Network 
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4.4.2 Organization of the Central Committee 
 At the highest level, the sub-networks come together to form the FRSN. Each network 
sends at least one, but up to a handful of representatives to monthly meetings in Bangkok. The 
central committee of the FRSN is made up of a representative from each network, which each 
network chooses through a process that they determine once a year. This can be a a competitive 
election, but in practice the number of interested people are usually few, and subnetwork 
committees are able to reach a consensus. The new committee is announced at a yearly multi-day 
assembly of the whole network that rotates location throughout the country. At the end of the 
assembly a new president is chosen through an election in which each network gets one vote.  
 Representatives to the FRSN at the national level split up responsibilities by dividing into 
teams that are in charge of the different facets of their work. These include the land team, the 
housing development team, the quality of life development team, the network coordination team, 
and team HOTLINE (in charge of responding to urgent eviction cases). Central committee 
members also serve on work teams, but any member of an FRSN community is welcome to join, 
as well.  
4.4.3 Larger Networks 
 The FRSN itself is also a member of two other networks. The first, and most active, is a 
national movement called the People’s Movement for a Just Society, or P-MOVE. P-MOVE is 
made up of several grassroots networks from rural and urban areas throughout the country. Most 
of the goals of P-MOVE correspond to those of the FRSN, including creating a more fair and 
democratic society and land reform. P-MOVE also has monthly meetings that the FRSN sends 
representatives to. The other larger network in which the FRSN holds membership is a 
supranational network of urban community networks called the Leaders and Organizers of 
Community Organizations in Asia, or LOCOA. This network consists of organizations formed 
by the effort to spread CO throughout Asia. At present, there are fairly active member 
organizations in Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. There are efforts to build a 
group in Burma, and Cambodia has gone through phases of having a network, though the 
network is difficult to maintain because of the violent oppression of the Hun Sen regime. The 
activities of LOCOA are less regular than those of P-MOVE. However, they do have a yearly 
meeting, and generally at least once or twice a year one national network will travel to another 
country to observe the work (du ngan) of another network.  
4.4.4 Connections to Professionals 
 These networks make up the official structure and relationships of the FRSN. However, 
the network is unofficially supported by a team of professional organizers who are themselves 
employees of NGOs. The most significant of these is the Human Settlement Foundation (HSF), 
which was founded in the 1990s and whose first secretary general was Somsook Boonyabancha, 
before she left to form CODI. The HSF is now lead by Nopphon Phomsri, better known as Pi 
Tui, who has been at the helm for several years. The HSF funds several full-time organizers. Its 
sources of funding have varied over the years. In prior eras it received funding from international 
agencies, but more recently it has relied on domestic sources, including the Thai government’s 
Department of Pubic Health Promotion, which has a reputation among activists for being quite 
liberal with its definition of public health. Any project that works toward improving the social 
determinants of health is fair game for its resources, making it a government agency that 
occasionally provides funding to groups that are quite critical of the government. The HSF 
receives funds from other government sources, as well, most often through the various pots of 
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money available from CODI. Aside from the HSF, a couple of other organizers are supported by 
the NGO, Community Organization for People’s Action (COPA).  
 These professional organizers serve a significant function for the FRSN. They facilitate 
meetings, guide communities through the Baan Mankong process, do much of the writing and 
documentation for public advocacy work, educate community members about the underlying 
causes of their challenges, and guide policy priorities. They have assigned networks and 
communities that they are in charge of. However, while one organizer from COPA serves as the 
secretary of the FRSN, he is not considered a member. The other organizers have no documented 
function with the network.  
4.4.5 Entry into the Network 
 Communities join the FRSN through a very intentional process. Most often, communities 
become aware of the FRSN through referral. This occurs most often in cases of threatened 
eviction, and the ways in which communities are referred can be surprising. While occasionally 
it is a mutual acquaintance who passes on the HOTLINE number to at-risk communities, in 
many cases it is actually government staff. The police or district officers put in charge of issuing 
eviction notices might tip off residents that the FRSN may be able to help them. In a few cases, 
lower-level CODI staff might do the referring, understanding that the community is in a 
particularly complicated or politically charged predicament. The two on-the-ground CODI 
staffers who work with both NULICO and the FRSN explained to me that the FRSN is more 
adept at organizing new communities quickly and navigating complicated land issues, so they are 
the better network for handling cases where eviction seems imminent.  
When a community is considering joining with the FRSN, they must do so through an 
existing sub-network or create a new one. To do this requires that all parties agree to work 
together. Before the new community joins, it must prove itself by sending representatives to 
meetings and events, paying dues to the network, and generally demonstrating an understanding 
of the network’s goals and functions. While the FRSN’s goal is to grow the movement, and it 
readily admits communities that demonstrate a sincere desire to join, the demands the network 
places on member communities to participate in organizing and political activities that do not 
directly benefit them means that the network has stayed relatively small compared to NULICO. 
4.5 The Organizational Structure of NULICO 
4.5.1 Structure 
 The structure of the NULICO is paradoxically related to its own ideology, but reflects its 
close relationship with CODI.  In terms of rhetoric and practice, CODI and NULICO are difficult 
to tease apart. However, at least in theory, the network has a structure that is entirely independent 
of CODI, and leaders pride themselves on this. In meetings, NULICO and CODI leaders often 
remark on the close relationship between NGO staff and the FRSN, arguing that the communities 
are strongly under the influence the NGOs, making them less of a community-based movement. 
Like the FRSN, the NULICO operates as a system of nested networks. NULICO’s 
structure, however, is at once simpler and more complex than the FRSN’s. Its simplicity lies in 
the fact that networks all levels are determined by geography and follow pre-existing 
government jurisdictions. Its complexity lies in the multiple layers of subnetworks it uses. At the 
most basic level, communities belong to their city network. In Bangkok, because of its size, the 
district (khet) serves as the city. Bangkok has 50 districts. At the level above the city, there is a 
provincial network. Above the province is the region, of which there are five. Finally, the five 
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regions form the national network. The process of joining the NULICO is vastly different from 
that of the FRSN. While communities joining the FRSN must be accepted by a particular 
subnetwork or begin a new one of their own, new NULICO communities are assumed to be a 
member of the subnetwork that corresponds to their location. The result is much larger network. 
In contrast to the FRSN’s 88 communities and 7,000 households, the NULICO has over 400 
communities containing approximately 50,000 households. This structure aligns with the 
approach that CODI takes to city-wide upgrading because it mimics government structure. 
 
 
 
Figure 11:NULICO’s network structure 
When Baan Mankong began, the FRSN was the largest network of slum communities in 
the country. However, the rise of NULICO presented another option. Leaders from both the 
FRSN and NULICO acknowledge that in the early years of NULICO some communities left the 
FRSN because they preferred the less confrontation approach of NULICO. One NULICO leader 
also explained to me that they didn’t like the centralizing structure of the FRSN. She said that 
one of the things the NULICO stands for is being a leaderless movement and that the 
communities work together, but no one is in charge. However, in practice this means that 
original members become de facto long-term leaders.  
These de facto leaders serve on many of the committees and work teams for CODI 
initiatives. Their appointments typically occur through invitation or through agreement of the 
leaders of a region. Some of the committees have regular functions, such as the Baan Mankong 
central committee or the project approval board. However, many others are ad hoc, determined 
by current needs, usually determined by CODI. These work groups are rarely entirely populated 
by NULICO members, almost always including either local government officials or CODI staff 
in some capacity.   
4.5.2 External Networks 
This approach to building “collective power” is shared by the other members of the 
(somewhat ironically named) Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR). Though the ACHR 
works toward city-wide upgrading in all of its member countries, Thailand is the sole country 
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with a government institution to support such efforts. Though members of the NULICO 
participate in ACHR activities, CODI is the member, and activities are facilitated through the 
Institute. This is not the only aspect of the NULICO’s work that is led by CODI.  
4.5.3 Connections to Professionals 
NULICO leaders pride themselves on the fact that they are a movement of chaoban 
(“villagers”). The implication is that, unlike the FRSN, they are not controlled by professional 
NGO staff. However, in practice, CODI staff and leadership step into some of the same roles as 
the NGO staff—guiding agendas, setting work plans, and educating. However, as I will 
demonstrate in the following section, when CODI staff operate in this capacity, they are often 
doing so while being under the demands placed on them as government staff to move projects 
forward quickly and efficiently.   
4.5.4 Entry into the Network 
The growth of NULICO differs from that of the FRSN both in terms of how communities 
come to learn about the network and the process through which communities join it. While most 
communities who later join the FRSN learn of them through personal referral when they are 
faced with immediate eviction, a relatively large number NULICO communities do not begin 
Baan Mankong through such urgent situations. In many cases, localities who have an interest in 
upgrading the housing in their area work with CODI to create city-wide upgrading plans in 
which communities are gradually brought in to the process more or less voluntarily. In other 
cases, communities who are threatened with eviction might encounter both the FRSN and the 
NULICO. Though there is no formal process for determining which network the community will 
go to in such cases, often what happens is that representatives from both networks will make a 
pitch to the community and it will be up to the community to decide with whom it would like to 
work, if either (there certainly exist cases in which communities decide that they do not wish to 
do Baan Mankong and simply disperse when faced with eviction).  In other cases, communities 
are simply referred to CODI or the NULICO by local officials or landowners wishing to develop 
their land and never hear from the FRSN. 
 From the point of view of CODI and the NULICO, every community not handled by 
another network may be a member of the NULICO. However, the assumption of membership 
does not always go in both directions. Not every community is necessarily aware of its own 
membership in the NULICO. At a meeting to plan the “city-wide” upgrading process in the 
Yannawa district of Bangkok, I spoke to a leader of a community that was just beginning the 
Baan Mankong process. I asked her if she was a member of the NULICO. She said no, that 
members of the NULICO had come to advise them, but they were not officially members. 
Overhearing this conversation, a CODI staff member sitting nearby stepped in to correct her. In 
fact, she was a member of the NULICO because everyone was a member of the NULICO who 
worked with them and did Baan Mankong. There was not official process for joining. At this 
both women laughed. However, as will become apparent in the next section, the looseness of 
many members’ sense of affiliation with NULICO has increasingly become a problem, not just 
for the network, but for the Baan Mankong policy.  
 For both networks, organizational structures enable and foreclose the possibility of the 
participatory practices of community members. However, the extent to which network structures 
and the principles that underlie them function in practice varies greatly between the two 
networks. 
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4.6 Participatory Practices of the FRSN  
 The participation of individual members of the FRSN can be described as taking place at 
the different levels of the network itself. On the most fundamental level, they participate in their 
own communities. Then, they participate at the level of the sub-network, and then at the level of 
the FRSN. Through membership in the FRSN they participate in ways that attempt to create 
larger societal change. At each level, participation is uneven across community members, and the 
intensity of participation at different levels waxes and wanes for individuals and entire 
communities.  
4.6.1 Participation at the Level of the Community 
 The most basic way in which participation takes place at the community level is through 
attendance at meetings. Organizers and leaders constantly stress that without meetings there is no 
chumchon, and without chumchon there can be no movement. That being said, scheduling 
meetings and getting people to attend them is much easier said than done. Schedules rarely align, 
and even when they do, the life of a slum dweller is unpredictable and often determined by 
emergency. From the perspective of leaders and organizers, meetings may be a priority, but for 
the average chaoban they are just one of a litany of obligations that fall below putting food on 
the table. Though regular meetings with good attendance are usually achieved in moments of 
struggle, such as when fighting eviction or in the early phases of Baan Mankong, when 
communities become more stable this most basic form of participation loses its sense of urgency.  
 Other ways in which community members participate is through the collective 
management of resources, mostly financial. This occurs through managing savings groups or 
Baan Mankong cooperatives. The most basic responsibility of each household is to send their 
money monthly to pay off loans and contribute to the collective pot. Despite the progressive 
rhetoric and efforts of the FRSN and its leaders, for many chaoban this financial transaction is 
their most common and significant way in which they contribute to community life. Many of the 
financial resources that FRSN communities manage come from CODI. Increasingly the demands 
of CODI’s bureaucracy and the complexity of the cooperative system mean that an outsized 
portion of the FRSN’s time is actually spent doing work that is both enabled by, and serves the 
demands of, this government agency. The practical demands of financial management play an 
especially outsized role for community members who do not take on leadership positions.  
The level of knowledge and enthusiasm of the average chaoban about the work of the 
FRSN drops off significantly after for those who do not serve in leadership. However, when 
asked if they know who they FRSN is, with very few exceptions people are able to tell you who 
they are and what their role is with respect to the community. In many cases the role described is 
something along the lines of “it’s an organization of poor people who help each other solve our 
problems (“Chuay kan keh panha” or “chuay kan ha thang awk“) they help us get housing,” or 
“they are our mentors (Pi Liang)”. If they have not participated in larger actions of the network 
themselves, they probably have a family member who has. Only a few community members I 
spoke to who had not served in some leadership capacity articulated the rhetoric I had come to 
associate with the FRSN—fairness, rights, democracy, land—but their presence was generally 
known in the communities.  
4.6.2 The Participation of Leaders 
 The case is quite different, however, among a select few in each community who take up 
the reigns of leadership. Each community has a committee, usually of seven to thirteen members, 
that are in charge of running things and representing the community to the networks. Some 
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committee members’ participation is mostly nominal. It is a constant complaint of leaders that far 
too few people are willing to step up to do the collective work.  
 The committee members who represent their communities to subnetworks have, as their 
basic responsibility, the obligation to attend monthly meetings. Professional organizers attend 
these meetings when there is need, but in cases where there is a strong competent community 
leader at the helm, the meetings are chaoban only. In these meetings, each community reports 
out on its current issues, and information from the larger network is passed down. If there are any 
issues that require attention, teams will be created to go out to member communities or attend 
meetings with or support negotiations with local governments. A common topic of conversation 
is how to settle community disputes. 
 At the level of the larger FRSN network and its partner networks, community members 
and leaders take part in a variety of strategies and activities. As described above, representatives 
from each subnetwork attend monthly meetings at the FRSN. These are almost always 
facilitated, at least in part, by the professional organizers. However, at the HSF headquarters and 
locations throughout the country, meetings occur throughout the month among the regular work 
teams, as well as many ad-hoc groups that are formed to address particular issues or carry out 
planning for initiatives.  These ad-hoc groups are typically comprised of members of leadership 
or professional organizers, but they might also include community members involved in a 
particular land dispute or negotiation.  
4.6.3 “Invited” Spaces of Participation  
 Aside from meetings of the network and its organizers, members of the FRSN meet and 
negotiate with a variety of public officials under more and less confrontational circumstances. 
Most community committee members have made at least one trip to CODI to discuss their issues 
with their project. CODI staff also frequently work with the FRSN to negotiate with local 
government officials or large landowners when projects hit snags. By virtue of being a public 
agency, CODI is often able to schedule meetings with these groups with relative ease. On 
contentious issues, higher ranking CODI officials may even lead meetings, acting as mediators. 
In these situations, chaoban are always accompanied by FRSN leaders and organizers.  
 An example of such a situation is a case where a nearly 100-year-old community was 
threatened with eviction by a prominent university. In the original land bequest to the university 
several decades prior, the wealthy owner had stipulated that the community living on the land 
that was to become the university’s should be allowed to stay. However, the university asserted 
that they were no longer obligated to honor that request because the actual people living on the 
land at the time of the bequest had long since passed on, and only some of the current residents 
were the descendants of the original community members. As is the case in most “original 
communities” (chumchon dang deum),32 influxes of new urban migrants had come to settle in the 
community, and some of the original households had moved on. In this case, it had already been 
determined that the law was on university’s side.  
 At a meeting with the university in early 2018, three members of CODI staff and the 
deputy director met the community and a contingent of FRSN organizers and leaders at the 
university for a meeting. I had come with a member of the CODI staff, and during the car ride 
she had briefed me on the situation. She explained that the eviction was certain, and this meeting 
was about negotiating the timing and nature of the relocation. However, when we sat outside the 
                                                
32	For a full discussion of the term chumchon dang deum and its implications, see Herzfeld 
(2016). 
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building where the meeting was to take place, Nophaphan Phromsri (Pi Tui), secretary general of 
the HSF, and Nuchanarot Thaenthong (Pi Mam), then-president of the FRSN, began discussing 
the agenda with the CODI staff. They made it very clear that they wanted to start the meeting by 
stating their case against eviction. The first choice of the community was to stay. They would 
only discuss relocation if the university made a truly compelling case for it.  
 In the conference room, the university official charged with handling the situation and the 
CODI deputy director sat at the head of the table. One side the table was filled with other 
university representatives, and the other with FRSN leaders and community representatives. 
Behind them three rows of additional chairs were filled with members of the community, the 
FRSN organizers, and other CODI staff. When the meeting opened, the conveners gave opening 
remarks summarizing the situation, and each side was allowed to describe their position. The 
leader of the community spoke forcefully and at length. He described the poverty of the 
community and the problem of debt that comes with a cost of living that increases while wages 
stay stagnant. After a few minutes, an organizer stepped up and whispered in his ear. He spoke 
just a couple more sentences and closed his remarks. This same dance was repeated one more 
time during the meeting, as the community leader, frustrated and impassioned, spoke in ways 
that were combative or potential damaging to their position. Debt is a particularly sensitive topic. 
It is no secret that debt is a huge problem in nearly every echelon of Thai society. In poor 
communities, debt is most often informal, or “outside the system” (ni not rabob), with loan 
sharks charging interest rates of 20 percent or more per month. However, despite the problem 
being so widespread, such debt is still perceived as an individual failing, sometimes even by 
people who otherwise consider themselves pro-poor. Furthermore, the presence of a large 
amount of existing debt makes investing in poor communities seem risky to those who might 
work with them, not least of all CODI. This combination of factors makes trying to discuss debt 
as a systemic hardship a poor strategy for communities.  
 At the end of the meeting, the result was that the university agreed to come up with a 
concrete alternative plan for working with the community that included a proposal for land they 
might reasonably buy or obtain a long-term lease for. The community was to collect detailed 
information on their current demographics, including how many houses had formal registrations. 
A follow-up meeting was scheduled for the next month. 
 This case represents the work process between the FRSN, CODI, and local officials or 
landowners. CODI helps to call meetings and mediate. The community members themselves, 
along with FRSN leadership, represent the side of the chaoban. Organizers take a back seat, 
stepping in when they perceive the chaoban to be miss-stepping or when information is needed 
that the chaoban cannot provide. In the case above, the information was whispered to the 
chabahn. In other cases, the organizers will actually raise their hands and make statements, and 
occasionally they will ultimately pull a chair up to the table.  
 At the end of the meeting at the university I walked down the stairs from the conference 
room with Pi Tui. I asked her what she thought would happen or what they should do. She said 
she didn’t know. The community would have to discuss the situation and come up with their own 
way forward. They would have to decide whether they wanted to keep fighting the eviction or 
whether they wanted to pursue relocation. The decision was ultimately theirs. When we exited 
the building the community was already gathered in a circle, speaking animatedly with Pi Mam 
and another NGO organizer facilitating the discussion. 
 I left with the CODI staff member I had come with to attend a meeting with another 
FRSN community at a district office. There, a similar scene would play out, this time between a 
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community and a handful of different district officials. These civil encounters between chaoban 
and local governments or landowners constitute a large portion of the participation of FRSN 
communities in planning and local governance. The interactions between the chaoban and 
officials are simultaneously both direct and mediated. They represent themselves at the table, but 
their remarks are structured by the groups that support them. Most leaders have been coached in 
some way as to what to say prior to the meeting, and the professionals, both from CODI and 
from organizers, occasionally step in on their behalf. Moreover, established FRSN leaders often 
do as much talking as the community members directly affected. Thus, their participation, while 
still being an expression of their own agency, takes place within a specific institutional 
framework that is determined by the FRSN, CODI, and other powerful institutions.  
 According to the framework of the three types of democracy, meetings like the one 
described above fit squarely in the participatory democracy bucket. They use established 
channels and “invited spaces” (Miraftab 2009). However, such spaces are not always sufficient 
to settle the issues communities face. At this point, the FRSN takes a more direct approach.  
4.6.4 Inventing New Spaces of Participation 
 Protests, demonstrations, and rallies are another important tool in the FRSN’s toolbox. 
There is great variety in terms of where, how, and how long these actions take place. Based on 
my own observations, as well as conversations with organizers and participants, I believe these 
actions serve three main purposes for the FRSN: pragmatism, symbolism, and solidarity. 
Different actions serve the three purposes to greater and lesser extents.  
 Actions that are high in pragmatism but low on the other two functions are those that take 
place to apply pressure to government officials or landowners. Such actions occur when these 
power holders are slow to respond to community or network requests, fail to deliver on promises, 
or conduct business in a way that is inconsistent with established policies. Actions only take 
place when other, less confrontational means have failed. The size of these actions may be as 
small as a dozen or so people at a district office or as large as 2,000 people at a ministry 
headquarters. The goal of such an action is nearly always to push for a meeting to negotiate the 
issue at hand, and the office or individual that is the target of the action is notified beforehand 
that the action will take place. A written statement of the demands is prepared. Because of the 
advance notice, often the target of the action is prepared to meet, and the demonstration aspect of 
the action does not take long. If the official agrees to meet that day, community leaders, FRSN 
leaders, organizers, and as many representatives from the community as can fit in the room sit 
down to negotiate. Unsurprisingly, CODI is not involved in these meetings. In cases where the 
official cannot meet that day, the demonstrators stay until a meeting is at least scheduled. In the 
relatively rare cases that the target of the action refuses to meet, demonstrators have been known 
to sleep multiple nights in front of office buildings.  
 At a minimum, a successful action ends with an important pragmatic and symbolic 
process called kan yeun nangseu (see Figure 11). The phrase translates awkwardly into English, 
but it means the presentation of a letter or written statement. It is the public presentation of 
demands—or, in the case that an agreement is reached that day, a signed copy of the agreement 
reached. This is done in front of the gathered crowd, and photos are taken of a community leader 
handing the statement to the official. This small ceremony and the photos taken of it provide 
proof for the future that the official has seen, acknowledged, and in some cases agreed to, the 
demands. It is also a gesture of civility, as presentations and photo ops of a similar vein occur 
when bestowing honors in a variety of Thai contexts. When an official has accepted the 
statement, the leader of the demonstration opens the floor for the official to make a statement to 
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the crowd. To close the ceremony, the network makes a formal statement of thanks on behalf of 
those gathered and assures everyone that the network will follow up on the issues discussed that 
day.   
 
 
Figure 12:Pi Mam presents a government official with a list of demands as part of a kan yeun 
nangseu ceremony in front of the United Nations on World Habitat Day in 2017 
It is rare that an FRSN demonstration does not end in a gan yeun nangseu ceremony. 
They occur even at the most symbolic of demonstrations, such as the one that happens annually 
on World Habitat Day in front of the United Nations building in Bangkok. Large gatherings such 
as this are the most common venue for less active chaoban to participate in issues outside their 
own communities. Thus, they also serve the purpose of building solidarity. These demonstrations 
have a festive atmosphere, with demonstrators waving paper flags with statements that range 
from expressions of their values, like “housing rights are human rights” to the specific goals of 
current initiatives, such as “Baan Mankong must provide sufficient funding for basic services.” 
At the end of the World Habitat Day demonstration in 2017, the ceremony ended with Pi Mam 
and other leaders presenting a statement to the Minister of Social Welfare and Human Security, 
the ministry that oversees Baan Mankong. After the action at the UN, smaller groups of 
demonstrators split up to go to smaller actions at the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration.  
 Large FRSN rallies tend to coincide with other actions. In some cases, these actions are 
larger, conducted by P-MOVE for issues such as increased public welfare or land reform. 
Associated networks often schedule actions on the same day so that they can achieve larger 
numbers. For example, on one July day in 2015 the FRSN demonstrated at parliament with P-
MOVE for a land reform package called “Four Laws for the Poor” in the morning and then went 
to the ministry of natural resources in solidarity with another P-MOVE subnetwork advocating 
for communities being evicted from land that had been declared a national reserve.  
The networks always try to obtain permits for their rallies, and they are mostly successful 
at obtaining them. However, even when permits are not granted, it is rare that the government 
uses force to remove demonstrators, as the optics of violently removing or publicly arresting 
poor citizens would prove politically damaging, even to a military junta. Arrests and can do 
happen, nonetheless. Most of the professional FRSN organizers and many of the leaders have 
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been arrested on at least one occasion, and there are plans in place for how to deal with arrest 
cases. Funds are saved, and a small number of sympathetic legal advisors provide pro-bono 
assistance. It is rare for chaoban not in a leadership role to be arrested, though. In meetings 
leading up to actions, leaders and organizers explain to chaoban that they need not be afraid 
because the vanguard of network leaders and professional organizers will take the heat. In my 
three years with the FRSN this was always the case. For the typical chaoban who comes to an 
action, the experience is one of festivity and solidarity.  
For the FRSN, solidarity is constructed both through pragmatic victories and symbolic 
expressions of their mission. This kind of solidarity is most obvious at large demonstrations, 
which are frequently conducted P-Move and other allied movements. Direct actions draw 
together large numbers of community members, particularly community leaders in visible 
displays of the network’s solidarity and provide opportunities to shout out the movement’s 
principles over loudspeakers. These demonstrations that serve to make demands of the state on 
behalf of communities are facilitated by a cadre of elected community leaders, with the guidance 
of a team of experienced NGO organizers. However, these same leaders and organizers also 
spend a significant amount of time working at the community level. In this capacity, they are 
often doing the work advising on the administration of cooperatives, helping communities 
comply with the bureaucratic demands of CODI and other government agencies in order to gain 
access to state resources. In this sense, the line between making demands of the state and 
carrying out its functions becomes blurred.  
Despite this blurring of boundaries with respect to the practical aspects of moving 
projects forward, what distinguishes the FRSN from other networks involved in Baan Mankong, 
especially NULICO, is its willingness to take a confrontational stance against government 
agencies. When some element of government policy is not serving communities’ interests, the 
FRSN is willing and able to mobilize its members to make strategic and public interventions 
through direct actions and negotiations. Even though the FRSN often works with CODI in the 
interest of communities, CODI is not exempt from the FRSN’s efforts to hold government 
agencies accountable. CODI leaders have been on the receiving end of direct actions and kan 
yeun nangseu ceremonies on numerous occasions, and monthly meetings between Baan 
Mankong staff and FRSN leaders are often marked by debate. This type of stance toward CODI 
and government agencies stands in stark contrast to the practices of NULICO.  
4.7 Participatory Practices of NULICO  
 In the early days of NULICO, new communities worked closely with CODI staff and 
government officials on pilot projects, which sometimes turned into city-wide upgrading 
processes in smaller cities. The leaders of these early communities became close allies, and they 
all enjoy sharing stories of learning from each other, alongside early CODI staff and leadership, 
as they tried to figure out how to create something new together. However, as Baan Mankong has 
chased the dream of “going to scale” (Somsook 2005b), the enthusiasm and capacity to innovate 
has waned. Nonetheless, NULICO has remained the face of Baan Mankong in many ways, both 
to outside researchers and to other state agencies, and the cooperative stance of their members 
toward government officials has played a role in pushing the policy forward.  
4.7.1 Lost Below the Top 
An example of the current state of NULICO efforts is the meeting at which the new 
member in the Yannawa city-wide process was informed of her own membership in the network. 
At this meeting, there were no members of the NULICO present beyond the communities 
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directed affected. This was not on purpose. The previous day, CODI staff and several NULICO 
representatives had conducted an outreach event in district, giving a large presentation on Baan 
Mankong and the proposed city-wide process and then sending teams out into five different 
communities to collect preliminary data and spread awareness of the effort and of a planning 
meeting that would take place the next day at the district office. At the end of the day, CODI staff 
asked the handful of NULICO representatives who would be attending the meeting. They all 
replied that they could not, mostly because they did not have the time. 
An important aspect of the NULICO structure not mentioned in the above section is the 
extent to which it is theoretical. When asked to describe how the network works, multiple 
NULICO leaders described the city, province, region, nation structure in the same way. However, 
when I began to probe as to how the different layers of the network work in practice, the 
accounts began to diverge, albeit with some common themes.  
There is large agreement that, in principle, each community should send representative to 
the city network, the city to the province, etc. In a meeting where I presented the preliminary 
results of my research to CODI and NULICO leadership, I pointed out that there seemed to be no 
system of internal democracy. One leaders responded that there was at the beginning and that 
they had that intention, but that it had gone by the wayside.  
 It is widely understood that many of the networks no longer meet regularly and that they 
have “been lost” or “gone away” (hai pai). At one CODI meeting a staff member was asked how 
the network was handling an issue with a project, and she described the network as phaew-- 
“faint” or “weak”—and at meetings there is frequent talk of the need to “restore” (feun fu) this 
network or that. One CODI leader acknowledged in an interview the need to reform the network, 
describing it as “clumsy” and “top-down.” 
 However, in some respects the NULICO is not so much top-down as top-only. In lieu of a 
representative leadership team, a class of quasi-professional participators has solidified at the 
top, most of whom come from the early projects. These NULICO leaders are called upon when 
staff or leadership requires help on a community visit or to attend a conference. In some cases, 
the leaders themselves respond to calls from CODI, and in some cases they call members from 
other communities. During a break in a meeting at CODI, I asked a small group of NULICO 
members how they decide who will go on community visits or go to certain meetings. The group 
generally agreed that in theory, the NULICO should be organizing how and when its members 
work, perhaps in conjunction with CODI staff. However, in practice the NULICO as an 
organization is bypassed. The decisions as to who should attend a given meeting are generally 
made through ad-hoc referrals. One man said that just the week before he had gone on a 
community visit after being called directly by a CODI worker. In the absence of any distance 
from CODI, there is also no independent agenda setting. Work teams and initiatives are set by 
CODI staff and leadership. 
4.7.2 Blurred Boundaries 
If the community-level work of FRSN leadership and organizers blurs the boundaries 
between state agencies and a people’s movement, for NULICO the blurring is even more 
extreme. This is most clearly demonstrated in an anti-eviction mapping project taken on by 
NULICO in 2018. As part of this effort, NULICO would partner with the FRSN for the first 
time, under the recognition by both networks that they have different ways of working and 
different strengths. The FRSN would take the lead on organizing policy action, as this was their 
strength. To this end, they organized the demonstration at the Ministry of Transportation 
discussed in the opening scene of Chapter 1. NULICO, for their part, would do a study, as it was 
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agreed by all parties that their their strength was their large numbers and skills in documentation 
and data collection.  
With the rate of evictions increasing rapidly as the central government has committed to 
numerous large infrastructure projects, including massive canal redevelopment and the extension 
the sky train and subway, the central leadership of CODI believed it necessary to document all 
current and probable evictions throughout the country. I volunteered to perform the GIS 
component of the project. The data was supposed to be collected by the NULICO, so a team of 
eight or so (attendance at meetings was inconsistent) community leaders from the different 
regions was assembled. A consultant with ties to CODI leadership who frequently works with 
communities was lead on the project. A fair amount of data on existing communities had been 
collected by region two years prior, but there was no geodata, and the information was deemed 
not detailed or reliable enough. It needed to be checked, updated, and made mappable. Each 
team member was initially charged with checking the information in their region, either by 
calling the leaders of the communities or by going on site visits. In a subsequent planning 
meeting a couple of weeks later, the team members had done this with varying levels of success, 
as the contact information for all communities was not up to date. At this meeting, though, the 
project head decided that it was not sufficient to just map the communities as points, which could 
be done by looking at maps. In order for the data to be really useful for negotiations, it was 
reasoned, the exact boundaries needed to be mapped by going out into the communities with 
GPS units. There were over 400 communities. The project lead believed this could be done in 
under two months.   
 CODI had held trainings on how to use GPS units the previous year. In theory, many 
community leaders knew how to use the technology. The team made a list of who knew how to 
use them throughout the country, and from that it was decided who the extended work team 
would be. Unfortunately, this extended work team did not materialize.  
 Throughout the process, from the incomplete attempts to confirm the preliminary data to 
the failure to mobilize a larger team to do the geographic survey, the project lead bemoaned the 
fact that the community members were “rising up” (luk kheun) as they must in order to fight 
evictions. In a conversation before one of the meetings, he explained to me at length the many 
forces of eviction in the country, from the national infrastructure projects, to the Chinese 
investment in the Eastern Economic Corridor, to the Special Economic Zones that were 
attracting large amounts of foreign investment. He recognized the need for a movement of 
communities to rise up to fight these larger political and economic forces.  
 In the meeting, he posed the question to the group of why they were facing more and 
more evictions each year, and why the number of projects that they were able to do each year had 
stalled, even though they had plenty of funding, and the network had grown larger, so they 
should be able to support more people to go through the process. The team members responded 
with practical responses: they don’t have time; they have to take care of children; they have to 
work to pay of their loans; the cost of living is going up. To this, the project lead responded that 
they may have loans now, but the cost of their water and electricity had gone down because they 
were no longer to siphon it from someone else under the table. And as for the other costs of 
living, almost everyone had a TV, and he had even been to communities were almost everyone 
had air conditioning! No, the problem was not these practical things. The problem was these days 
the community members were not stepping up the way they had in the past. They were living 
beyond their means, and they were not working together, collectively.  
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 In a rare show of defiance, the team members pushed back. They were not getting paid 
for this work. They barely even got the costs of their travel covered. For the work they did within 
their own districts, they got nothing. For overnight trips, they got a per diem, sure, but that was 
also a day that they were not working in their own occupations. Participating in these projects 
cost them time and money.  
 And in this case, their labor resulted in no tangible benefits. The team reported back that 
people who were supposed to be on the extended work team did not understand the project and 
how it would benefit them or did not have the time. The project fizzled and got put on the back 
burner. Community members, while sitting at the same table with a government employee, were 
not permitted to set the agenda. When they expressed concerns or voiced their needs, they were 
met with a disciplining rhetoric. They were expected to carry out a project of mapping out the 
boundaries of communities at risk, but what actually occurred was a blurring of the boundaries 
between state employees and a supposedly independent community network.  
4.7.3 Participation in Pubic 
 Despite the frustrations expressed in private meetings by some NULICO leaders and the 
absence of a mechanism for new communities to take an active role in shaping the network, 
NULICO plays a significant role in representing the community networks of Baan Mankong to 
those in power, both inside Thailand and outside. This type of representation and the message of 
cooperation and self-sufficiency spread by leaders have facilitated the popularity of the program 
and helped to pave the way for its expansion. 
 A handful of NULICO communities who have leaders who are prominent in the network 
have served as examples to other communities and to outsiders. One such community is 
discussed in the following chapter. Some of these communities have been profiled in more than 
one academic case study and have had their stories told in English-language materials produced 
by CODI partner organizations, such as the ACHR.  
In addition, these leaders directly represent Baan Mankong on the international stage with 
CODI. An example is the U.N. World Urban Forum in Kuala Lumpur in 2018, where several 
NULICO leaders traveled with CODI representatives as part of the ACHR coalition. At sessions, 
leaders stood up to speak about their experiences. However, like the FRSN members who are 
coached by NGO organizers, these NULICO members’ speech is also structured by 
professionals. The difference is, in this case the people coaching them are government staff from 
CODI, who are charged with promoting the policy. Many of these NULICO leaders have 
presented their communities as cases many times and have well-rehearsed narratives about their 
experiences, lessons learned, and how others can replicate their successes. These lessons include 
the importance of cooperation with local officials and doing their part through self-
documentation, collective financial management, and mapping. 
These same types of presentations by CODI leaders happen in many ways within the 
country. NULICO leaders regularly appear at public events with government officials to present 
their communities as success stories. Along with CODI staff, top leaders also have the 
opportunity to sit at meetings with government officials to discuss elements of the policy. 
However, as described by the NULICO leader in Chapter 1, the network leaders take a 
compromising and conciliatory tone in these meetings, and much of the talking is done by the 
CODI staff who accompany them. 
The sum of these forms of participation by NULICO leaders amounts to a form of 
participation in public in which these community members do pay an active role in the 
promotion of the policy, but they have little say in the program’s direction. Though their network 
 
105 
is ostensibly independent, in practice it is tied to the professional staff at CODI. In addition, 
because the structure of their network is tied to government jurisdictions, their own network 
structure blurs with that of the government. Thus, the network and its leaders are constantly 
being shaped and coached by representatives of state agencies. While this proves frustrating to 
leaders at times and prevents new members from feeling connected to the network, it nonetheless 
has paved the way for Baan Mankong’s “going to scale.” 
 
4.8 A Comparative and Relational View of NULICO and the FRSN 
4.8.1 Comparison of the Two Networks  
 At the heart of the differences between the FRSN and the CODI is the issue of rights. 
Rights of many varieties form the core of the FRSN’s motivating ideology. The unequal access to 
land rights lies at the heart of inequality and societal injustice. This deprives the poor from their 
basic human rights to housing and a reasonable quality of life. The means to achieving this a 
more equal distribution of land is to form new types of land tenure that grant land rights to 
communities, not private property owners. In order to achieve this, they deploy their rights to 
expression and assembly in order to influence the government. When these rights are not granted 
to them as citizens by the authoritarian government, they are asserted as human rights and used 
to push for greater democracy, which, it is believed, will allow for a more just distribution of 
rights to land and other resources. Rights upon rights upon rights.  
 However, for CODI, the rhetoric of rights is used only in the technical sense, such when 
speaking of the rights to plots of land within the cooperative. A right, in this sense, has no moral 
content, but is rather something that is distributed by the collective.  Rights in the larger 
democratic sense that the FRSN uses them are, in the basic needs framing, a source of conflict, a 
block to getting things done. The justification for this is the assertion that calling upon rights is 
equivalent to asking the government to do something for you and ceding the power and 
responsibility to them to get it done. The more productive approach, under this logic, is to work 
with the government to create alternative ways of doing things, calling for the opportunity to 
meet one’s own basic needs. This basic needs argument reflects the long-standing image of 
chumchon that is most evident in the community culture school of thought and sufficiency 
economy. It puts forth a vision of Thai communalism in which the poor live on what is 
“sufficient” and do not ask for more. Demanding rights, then, is un-Thai. 
 Under these two logics, the purpose of the community is quite different. Under the rights-
based approach, the community is the basic unit of organizing in order to cultivate the only 
sources of power the poor have: their numbers. Under the basic needs approach, on the other 
hand, the community is a source of self-sufficiency, a unit for collective provisioning and support 
in order to meet needs without having to rely on the government. However, in practice, NULICO 
is more closely tied to state structures than the FRSN.  
 The network structures of the FRSN and NULICO reflect, in different ways, their 
different rhetorics. The FRSN views itself as part of a citizens’ sector whose role is to hold those 
in power accountable. It has therefore maintained the separation between the network and the 
government. In the FRSN’s logic, it is only through being a coherent outside group that the poor 
can have the power to negotiate with those as power. NULICO and CODI also tout the need to 
negotiate with those in government. However, they believe that negotiations can take place by 
establishing a “shared power” in which community members and officials are part of a network 
together. This collective power amounts to a “systemic change” in power relations, where 
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arguing and fighting is no longer necessary, and everyone can solve problems together. This line 
of thinking makes no mention of why existing power relations should change simply because 
everyone is in the same room. And in practice, they do not. NULICO members frequently sit in 
rooms with powerful people, only to be told how to become better communities, as was the case 
in the eviction mapping project. On the other hand, when FRSN representatives sit at a table to 
negotiate with officials, they often do so with rows of people behind them and sometimes 
hundreds of others outside. 
 In the cases of both networks, however, interactions with officials are highly mediated. 
NULICO prides itself on being independent from the influence of NGOs. It is true that the 
professional organizers behind the FRSN have considerable influence on the direction of the 
network and even the public actions of the individual members. However, it is not the case that 
NULICO is free of such influences. In practice, CODI staff and other government officials step 
in to serve a similar role, but with very different results.  
 The FRSN professional organizers serve a vital function for the network. To hold together 
a network of thousands of communities and move it in any coherent direction takes an immense 
amount of coordination. It is not just a full-time job, but many. The capacity of community 
members to take on this task on their own is limited by the need to feed and provide for 
themselves and their families. An obvious solution might be for an NGO to pay community 
leaders to lead the network themselves. However, if some community leaders were paid while 
others weren’t, this would likely result in internal conflicts. And a considerable amount of the 
organizers’ work is mediation. So, while the professional organizers with the FRSN do have 
considerable influence, and the FRSN cannot be said to be a “pure” community movement, they 
play an important role in keeping the movement going. In addition, despite the fact that their 
opinions often carry considerable weight, their influence is not unchecked. As is evident from the 
example of the funeral savings group, their capacity to sway popular opinion has its limits. 
Communities and the larger network are under no obligation to follow the organizers.  
 In theory, the functions served by the professional organizers in the FRSN are served by 
the community leaders themselves in the NULICO. However, in practice the absence of this 
professional role merely creates a vacuum that CODI steps into. Much of the community-level 
coordination that is done by organizers for the FRSN must be done by CODI staff in the case of 
the NULICO. Unlike the professional organizers, though, the CODI staff’s primary 
responsibility is not to develop the network, but to move projects forward and promote the 
broader, city-wide vision of CODI leadership. The CODI ground staff includes architects, 
engineers, and “workers” (those in charge of general project management). Most are under 30, 
few have any training in law or political issues, and all face enormous pressure to get projects 
approved, disburse budgets, and get houses built. They call upon NULICO members when they 
need assistance without consideration for any overarching goals or strategies of the network. The 
role of NULICO members then becomes to back up staff in their efforts to push projects along 
and carry out CODI’s ultimate vision of city-wide upgrading. In addition, leaders of prominent 
communities within NULICO often serve as the public face of Baan Mankong, sharing their 
stories as case studies to the rest of the world and to the government. 
 The difference in these two approaches amounts to what I call demand-driven versus 
command-driven participation. Whereas demand-driven participation mobilizes community to 
call upon rights from the government, command-driven participation utilizes community as a 
unit of governance. The vision of participation in command-driven participation comes from the 
top, expressed most clearly in through CODI’s emphasis on city-wide upgrading. The city-wide 
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initiatives, which I have described as participatory modernism, express the desire for large-scale 
urban development carried out from below by residents. NULICO’s emphasis on self-reliance, 
financial management, and cooperation with government serve as rhetorical and practical 
mechanisms to push this large-scale vision forward. However, both networks have played a role 
in creating the conditions for Baan Mankong’s expansion and “scaling up.”    
4.8.2 A Relational Perspective on the Two Networks  
 This is not a story of one network being purely emancipatory and another being purely 
oppressive. Far from it. Many members of both networks are deeply committed to their work and 
acknowledge that the other network has strengths that they lack. This is why the networks chose 
to attempt to work together to fight eviction. However, I argue that the differences in the 
networks complement each other in other ways, as well, which are not articulated or immediately 
apparent to those involved. The networks and CODI exist in a complex symbiosis, and these 
mutually beneficial, if tense, relationships are what have kept Baan Mankong going and growing 
for over a decade.  
 At numerous points during fieldwork when FRSN members became frustrated with 
CODI policy, I asked why they continued to work with CODI, if they disagree with them so 
strongly on many issues. The answer is that, despite these frustrations, the FRSN is materially 
and politically reliant CODI. Funding in the form of both subsidies and loans from CODI allow 
the FRSN to help member communities meet their material needs. CODI also provides an “in” 
for many forms of negotiation for the FRSN. This financial support and mediation support the 
material successes that give the movement momentum.  
 CODI could not provide this type of support if it did not maintain the non-confrontational 
rhetoric of self-reliance, sufficiency, and development, exemplified by the practices of NULICO. 
The large size of the NULICO, theoretical as it may be, creates the image of an organization 
building up an association of urban poor that develops good citizens working toward the 
development of the nation. Thus, the NULICO serves an important role in maintaining the 
government support of CODI. 
 This is not always enough, though, and in stickier political situations, CODI becomes 
reliant on the FRSN. After the 2006 coup that put the Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva in power, 
CODI came under the budgetary chopping block. The government wanted to largely privatize 
CODI, passing the role of credit provider over to private banks. Leaders of the two networks tell 
different stories of how CODI was saved during this time. The NULICO leaders will talk about 
how they held a massive protest on World Habitat Day, and this persuaded the government to 
continue its support of CODI. Leaders of the FRSN tell a different story. In this version, both 
networks put forward proposals. NULICO called for a modest budget for CODI that would be 
extended entirely as credit to CODI, and which CODI would have to pay back through the 
interest on loans. The FRSN called for a much larger budgetary concession and insisted on 
keeping the existing funding model, in which the budget is given to CODI. The FRSN mounted a 
smaller, but more persistent protest and gained entry to negotiate. It was this proposal that was 
ultimately accepted. The NULICO rally on World Habitat Day took place, but it was merely a 
show of numbers of those who had benefited from the policy. It did not gain them entry into the 
halls of power. It was the FRSN who had done the negotiation and won concessions from the 
government.  
 Thus, CODI at least in part owes its existence to the FRSN, and the FRSN largely owes 
its success to CODI. NULICO serves an instrumental role in maintaining state support for Baan 
Mankong policy by presenting the image of a large and cooperative movement of self-sufficient 
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chumchon. The participation of both networks is essential to ensuring the continuing existence 
and expansion of the policy. 
 The widely-shared ideal of participation manifests in many forms. In the case of Baan 
Mankong, two networks of communities representing divergent ideologies coexist and 
occasionally interact within the context of a single policy. By examining how these two networks 
came to be, how they are structured, and how they operate in conjunction with the professionals 
that guide them, I have demonstrated how these different elements flow from one another and 
how they produce very different sets of participatory practices.  
 In comparing these two networks, I have shown how participation conceived of as a 
democratic practice based on the principles of rights and strategic interaction with the state can 
produce significant and sustained policy change, even when the number of participants is 
relatively small. On the other hand, participation called for by representatives of the state can 
easily come to serve instrumental purposes, placing burdens and responsibilities on citizens 
without a corresponding increase in voice. What is interesting about these two cases is not 
merely their comparison but in the political roles they play in the sustaining the Baan Mankong 
program and paving the way for its expansion. In the following chapter, I demonstrate how this 
expansion impacts participants at the level of the community and how the two networks differ in 
how the changes that come with the increasing scale of the policy.  
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Chapter 5: Commoning or Being Commoned? 
5.1 Introduction 
Baan Mankong communities function within the institutional structures of their networks, 
CODI, and other state agencies involved in the governance of land and municipal services. In the 
previous chapters, I have detailed the emergence of these larger institutions and how they have 
formed alliances in order to produce the Baan Mankong program. However, the ultimate aims of 
Baan Mankong and the many organizations involved it are to improve the material living 
conditions of the urban poor and to increase the possibility that they might have a voice in the 
plans that impact them. To understand the outcomes of the program, it is therefore necessarily to 
see how Baan Mankong projects play out on the ground. In this chapter, I look at how Baan 
Mankong operates at the level of the community through four case studies. I begin by looking at 
the different community-level institutions that residents use to manage their collective space, 
resources and debts. Then, I analyze how local practices relate to the larger institutions and 
organizational politics of which the communities are a part. To do this, I use the concept of the 
urban commons as a framework for analyzing the relationships between institutional 
arrangements and political motives of different commoning movements. 
 The “urban commons” has been invoked by scholars across the many disciplines of 
planning and urban studies as an alternative to the market-based system of private property. The 
most well-known conceptions of the urban commons draw from the broad, Lefebvrian view that 
the city itself is a collective work, with “commoning” referring to acts of appropriating space for 
collective use (e.g. Harvey 2012; Blomley 2008; Maringanti 2011). Though the work of Elinor 
Ostrom is frequently gestured to in urban commons literature, researchers have rarely employed 
an institutionalist lens to understanding the urban commons (Huron 2018). Taking inspiration 
from Huron’s effort to emphasize the labor involved in commoning, this chapter employs both 
institutional and broadly political conceptions of the commons to investigate how the work of the 
commons is done in Baan Mankong in Bangkok. In doing so, I argue that for early Baan 
Mankong commoners, the process of producing the institutions to support the commons, 
regardless of the ideologies and rhetoric employed, proved to be empowering and emancipatory. 
In this sense, they were true examples of commoning. However, as time has gone on, the state 
has recognized the usefulness of these commons institutions for governing the poor populations 
of the city. Thus, more recent participants in Baan Mankong projects have the sense of “being 
commoned,” as they are pushed to adopt pre-existing institutions of self-governance. However, 
in analyzing how two recent communities who belong to different community networks with 
different sets of politics and internal institutional arrangements, I show how active, 
emancipatory, bottom-up commoning can still exist, providing resistance to the top-down 
commoning efforts of the state. 
In what follows, I examine the case of Baan Mankong through both institutionalist and 
broadly political conceptsions of the commons, discussed in Chapter 1. I draw from the 
institutionalists and their attention to the details of commoning practice. However, I also look to 
the larger political projects of those involved in the Baan Mankong program. This dual 
perspective allows me to draw conclusions on several level. First, the institutional lens permits 
the comparison of communities on several levels, demonstrating how certain commonalities in 
form and appearance emerge across different commoning movements. Second, it allows analysis 
of how political motives influence institutional differences between the different movements. 
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Finally, it points to how institutional arrangements can enable or foreclose certain kinds of 
political action.  
5.3 Case Studies 
 In this chapter, I present case studies of four Baan Mankong communities. Two 
communities are members of NULICO, while the other two are members of the FRSN. For each 
of the networks, one community is well established, having begun the Baan Mankong process 
nearly ten years prior to the research, while the other two were in the early stages of the process 
at the time of fieldwork and had not yet begun home construction when fieldwork was 
completed. Figure 13 illustrates the general characteristics of the four communities and the 
names by which I will refer to them. All communities are also located in the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Region (BMR), so the larger urban context and municipal governance structures 
they operate in are quite similar. The selection of these communities was intentional, so as to be 
able to compare the processes of establishing and maintaining these urban commons across the 
two networks. While I focus narrowly on the individual communities at certain points, the 
selection of these communities and my interpretation of them is guided by having visited over 
forty communities over the course of fieldwork, from 2015-2018. They are illustrative of larger 
trends and processes operating in the policy.  
 
                     Network 
 
Age of community 
National Union of Low 
Income Community 
Organizations (NULICO 
Four Regions Slum Network 
Well established (At least 
ten years old; houses are 
nearly all fully constructed) 
 
NULICO A FRSN A 
New (Baan Mankong was 
begun less than two years 
prior to fieldwork, and no 
housing construction had 
begun prior to the end of 
fieldwork) 
NULICO B FRSN B 
Figure 13: Characteristics, network memberships, and aliases of the four case study 
communities 
Throughout the case study descriptions, I will highlight a number of themes that arose 
throughout the research process and which are relevant to analyzing the commoning processes of 
the communities through both the political production of space and institutionalist lenses. To 
begin, I discuss the commonalities between the four communities in terms of physical forms, 
collective life, and formal institutions of collective governance. I describe how the higher-level 
institutions of CODI, other government agencies, and networks result in these commonalities. 
The case study descriptions are organized along the first set of themes, I then discuss the case 
studies individually, beginning with the oldest communities of each network and ending with the 
more recent ones. This comparison across network and time allows me to demonstrate how the 
Baan Mankong program has changed across time and how the differences between the networks 
impact how communities adapt to these changes.  
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5.4 What is Common to All 
This section discusses the physical forms, features of collective life, and institutions of 
governance that are now common to nearly all communities and have produced as a result of the 
policy. It also demonstrates why those concrete productions of the policy occur. 
5.4.1 Physical Forms 
Once one has visited a few Baan Mankong communities, picking them out amidst the 
complex urban forms of Bangkok becomes quite easy. Though the program is touted for its 
flexibility in meeting individual community needs, the resulting settlements nonetheless bear 
striking similarities. These similarities do not necessarily come from any single person’s or 
group’s aesthetic taste, but rather from an amalgam of legal requirements, economic and space 
limitations, and construction constraints. It is within these institutionally-determined constraints 
that residents and architects express both aesthetic tastes and beliefs about ideal communal life.
 The first notable characteristic of Baan Mankong communities is that they contain single-
family homes (see Figure 14) and rowhouses (Figure 15). The emphasis on having low-rise 
homes is what distinguishes Baan Mankong from the multi-story public housing (Ua Arthorn) 
developments. Many residents express that Baan Mankong is preferable to public housing 
precisely because they can have their own home. The reasons for this preference vary. For some, 
it is a matter of livelihood. Selling goods from home is easier when you have a space out front to 
sell from. Storing construction materials or motorcycles requires having space on the ground. On 
top of this practical consideration, though, is an element of values. Having your own home is a 
matter of status for some. For others, they have never lived in an apartment-style home, and that 
option would not be appealing. In the rhetoric of both networks and CODI, however, this style of 
low-rise settlement more resembles what a village community looks like. It is what people are 
used to, and it facilitates the possibility of living as a cohesive group, whereas high rise 
apartments isolate and atomize. In this sense, single family home laid out in clusters represents 
an ideal physical form of a chumchon. 
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Figure 14:A resident of an early-stage case study community considers a proposed home design, 
taking a photo to show residents who could not attend the meeting. 
 
The second feature of Baan Mankong communities is that their Most communities only 
have two or three different home layouts that residents can choose from, usually a cheaper 
version and a larger, more expensive version. The uniformity in this sense is due to the fact that 
the structures must be conform to district zoning and building codes in bulk. It would be too 
onerous and expensive to gain approval for many different designs. The community architects 
that work with residents to design the overall layout of the communities must also take into 
consideration the often-limited space of the settlements, as well as cost. While residents do have 
a level of input on the designs, consideration such as available space, cost, ease of infrastructure 
installation, and legal requirements as to the width of roads and lots, often carry at least as much 
weight in designs as resident desires (see Figure 16).  
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Figure 15: A draft of one option for a rowhouse layout for a case study community. 
 
 
Figure 16: Residents of an early-stage community gather around a proposed layout. Homes are 
clustered together into zones along neat alleyways. 
The third feature of Baan Mankong communities is the individualization of each of the 
homes (see Figure 17). While there is little diversity in terms of the layouts of the houses, the 
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facades are nearly always meticulously painted and decorated by hand, often with brightly-
colored textures or faux brick. Residents use planters, small statues, and door mats to express 
their individual tastes and care for their new homes. Variations in doors and window dressings 
demonstrate differences in both aesthetic preferences and financial status. These differences in 
the details of the homes reflect the building process of Baan Mankong. Whereas the approval 
process requires a certain element of mass production, the actual construction is highly 
individualized. Within the communities, some residents of means often hire contractors to build 
their houses quickly, allowing them to move in when the homes are finished. Meanwhile, others 
use their own labor and sometimes supplies from their original homes, building their homes 
slowly and frequently moving in long before construction is finished.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 17:A resident walks through a Baan Mankong community. Houses have the same design, 
but they are brightly painted and individually decorated. 
The physical forms of Baan Mankong communities bear similarities to, and yet are 
visibly distinct from, two other forms of development one encounters frequently in Bangkok. 
The first form is the chumchon eh—“congested community”, colloquially called a slum—which 
nearly all Baan Mankong communities were originally. Like the congested community, Baan 
Mankong communities contain houses that are located close together and painted or decorated in 
distinct ways. The homes are frequently constructed slowly and constantly evolving, 
representing what Endo (2014) calls “housing as process” and Holston (1991) and Caldeira 
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(2017) have called “autoconstruction. They also have some of the structures common to many 
congested communities that are registered with their local districts, included a central meeting 
space, or suun. These central meeting spaces are frequently funded through the local districts, 
which provide monthly community development subsidies for registered communities of 100 
households or more. They provide space for community committee meetings, occupation group 
activities, and public health events, such as well child checkups or disease screenings. Higher 
income developments generally do not have such central meeting spaces and do not register as 
chumchon with the districts. However, in other ways Baan Mankong communities are more 
similar to higher income developments than to congested communities.    
The most common higher income development that Baan Mankong communities bear 
similarities to is the muban jadsan—literally “arranged village,” or planned development. Muban 
jadsan are generally constructed developer-constructed and contain many identical homes along 
long, wide streets. The layouts are frequently described as riab roy, or orderly. This type of 
construction is frequently used in more suburban areas, though some developments are local near 
the central city. Muban jadsan are generally considered to be middle class developments. The 
layouts are quite similar to Baan Mankong communities, and the homes are likewise of a similar 
design. However, they lack the personalization of Baan Mankong houses and often all the same 
or similar colors, reflecting the fact that they are built wholesale by developers. They also 
generally do not have central meeting spaces, as middle class residents of muban jadsan 
generally do not apply for the government assistance that is used to build such structures, nor do 
they have need of the types of public services that are often provided at them. Similarly, they do 
not bear evidence of occupations conducted at home—small homes-based shops or construction 
materials—that are present in front of many Baan Mankong houses. These elements of difference 
reflect the process of construction, the class of the residents, and the types of either private or 
government institutions those residents interact with.  
 The physical forms of Baan Mankong projects reflect a distinctive blend of class-based 
processes and institutions. The necessity to comply with government regulations and to produce 
a sufficient quantity of housing at a reasonable cost leads them to resemble middle class pre-
planned developments. However, at the same time, the layouts of the communities and the style 
of low-rise housing reflect values and images of a traditional chumchon on the part of many of 
the actors in involved. The process of building and the resulting aesthetics are likewise a hybrid, 
falling somewhere in between the middle class muban jadsan developments and the symbols of 
poverty, the chumchon eh at, from which residents hail. In the end, Baan Mankong communities 
have a hybrid form, falling somewhere in between mass production and autoconstruction. As the 
physical manifestations of common ownership, they represent an interaction of the active 
construction of residents and the institutions off urban governance with which they must interact, 
or “carve out” space from (Huron 2018).  
5.4.2 Features of Collective Life 
 The physical features of Baan Mankong communities enable both sociability and mutual 
monitoring. These aspects of collective life are present in both FRSN and NULICO 
communities, and residents belonging to both networks describe them in similar ways, even 
though other elements and purposes of “community-ness” (khwam pen chumchon) are conceived 
of differently across the networks.  
 The homes of Baan Mankong communities are clustered together with streets or 
alleyways (soi) that are wide enough to accommodate pickup trucks and easy ingress and egress 
in the case of emergency but narrow enough that residents can easily yell across the street to 
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each other their homes. Since traffic is generally light in the communities, the alleys are also 
used as a public space for socializing, selling goods in carts, and playing. The alleys do not so 
much separate homes as link them. My own assessment of Baan Mankong communities echoes 
Endo’s (2014) description of many informal settlements, in that the functional lines between 
public and private do not necessarily follow the visible cues of doorways and other physical 
boundaries. The fronts rooms of houses often function as semi-private spaces that bleed into 
public areas of the street. Residents generally do not have individual yards or porches. Instead, 
many of the houses have large front doors that are often left at least partially ajar. It is common 
for groups of men to gather in a front room with the door open to watch football matches or for 
home-based production activities to spill out of a front room and into the street. Even when doors 
are closed, passers-by yell greetings in to their neighbors. The layout of the community, as well 
as the design of the homes, facilitates a communal social atmosphere. It also allows for social 
monitoring. 
The monitoring that community members do of each other has both positive and negative 
valences. On the positive side, members of multiple communities express the layout and sense 
“brothers and sisters” (phi nong-literally “elders and youngers”) makes keeping children safe and 
out of trouble. One leader of a FRSN A credits the layout of the community and the relationships 
among its members with the fact that they don’t have a drug problem, and their kids graduate 
from secondary school at a much higher rate than in many poor communities. She explains that if 
a kid tries to sneak out late, someone is bound to see them and let their parents know. Also, 
everyone is so close, no one is shy about disciplining other people’s children. “We’re all brothers 
and sister,” she says. “Living in a community can be fun.” Community leaders of NULICO A 
also reported that are able to observe community members’ actions. They know if people come 
home late or are bringing drugs into the community, and they can intervene with the family. In a 
severe case, they have even had to evict one household because of this. Even though that was 
viewed as an unfortunate outcome, many community members across the different networks 
express that it is important to be able to watch out for each other and maintain “transparency” 
(khwam prongsai) among the members. This type of informal monitoring is part of that.  
The flip side of the ability to monitor, though, is living under observation. A few 
community members, including the NULICO A leader who extolled the virtues of being able to 
monitor others, expressed that being constantly visible leads some people to feel they are being 
judged. This is especially true in cases where residents from multiple settlements come together 
to form a new community. When people do not know each other, they are likely to spy and judge 
each other, at least for a time. Organizers from the FRSN, as well as leaders of NULICO, 
described to me that this always happens at first with new communities that come together, and it 
can take many years to gain each other’s trust.  
The collective sociability that occurs in communities is enabled by physical form, but it 
also follows from the habits of life that many residents carry with them from life before Baan 
Mankong, when they lived slum settlements. The physical layouts of the communities are, at 
least in part, the result of the explicit desires of networks, CODI, and community members to 
create an atmosphere where the type of sociability they enjoyed before can be maintained or 
even strengthened. Along with this sociability comes the capacity to monitor and surveil the 
activities of others. Many residents have mixed feelings about this. However, what is certain is 
that the informal socializing and monitoring often works as a handmaiden to the more formal 
elements of collective governance that communities must enact.  
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5.4.3 Formal Institutions of Collective Governance: Where the Work Begins 
In Chapter 3, I discussed the emergence of a series of practices that arose around the 
governance of community through the efforts of the slum movement and the rise of community-
based housing efforts on the part of government agencies. These practices have endured to form 
the most widespread institutions that Baan Mankong communities use to govern their commons 
land, resources, and debts. These practices include savings groups to create collective financial 
resources, as well as the use of elected committee to govern community affairs. Through Baan 
Mankong, in association with other government agencies, these institutions have been highly 
formalized (see the institutional arrangements of communities in figure 19). In addition to these 
formal institutions, communities are frequently encouraged to break their communities into 
zones to delegate work and make communication and money collection more efficient. These 
common practices constitute the core common institutions of Baan Mankong communities.  
 Regardless of the network, a huge part of being a Baan Mankong community revolves 
around the practical necessity of managing collective finances. As outlined in Chapter 3, 
communities began creating savings groups around the late 1980s, when the practice was learned 
through visits to communities in India and the global spread of community organizing 
techniques. They became integral to many of the first land sharing agreements, and they have 
endured to this day. Having a functional savings group is the first step for most communities in 
the Baan Mankong process. Savings groups work through regular, usually monthly, deposits into 
a common bank account. Communities vary in how they make these collections and deposits, but 
a few techniques are most common. The first technique is to schedule a specific day of the month 
on which community members drop off their contributions to the leaders of the savings group, 
who holds the bank account. This is the technique used by NULICO B, who holds an event in 
their community center on a Sunday morning each month. The second technique is to divide the 
community into multiple zones. One person on the community committee is then in charge of 
each zone and must collect all of the money from their zone and pass it on to the account holder 
by a certain day of each month. This technique is used by FRSN A and two of the sub-
communities that make up FRSN B, NULICO A when they were beginning their project, and 
several other communities observed during fieldwork. The final technique is generally used by 
smaller communities, including the other sub-communities of FRSN B. This is simply to have 
communities drop off their savings to the account holder by the set day of each month.  
 Some of the early Baan Mankong communities, including FRSN A, have managed to go 
through the entire upgrading process with using only a savings group. However, in more recent 
years, nearly all communities have had to register their savings groups as housing cooperatives 
with the Department for the Promotion of Cooperatives (DPC) in order to have a legally-
recognized collective entity that can own or rent land and interact with financial institutions. To 
do this, the community must go through an onerous process of registration, which includes 
having all intended members of the cooperative (the official rights-holder of each household) 
attend three separate trainings on functions and management of the cooperative. Rallying 
members to attend these meetings and finding times that work for 100 percent of upwards of fifty 
working adults to attend is an onerous task for community leaders. However, the trainings are 
also necessary, as operating a cooperative is a much more intricate task than maintaining a 
simple savings group. In many ways, it is akin to running a bank. 
CODI’s vision and that of the DPC, a housing cooperative is also supposed to serve as 
financial resource for the community, similar to what in the English literature would be called a 
community development financial institution (CDFI). In the case of land purchase, the way Thai 
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housing cooperatives work is that each household first saves ten percent of their share of the cost 
of the land plus ten percent of what they intend to borrow for their home. These loans are issued 
to the cooperative by CODI at a rate of 4 percent, and the cooperative purchases the land. The 
individual households are responsible to repaying their share of the loans taken out by the 
cooperative, plus a margin of interest charged by the cooperative, typically two to four percent. 
In addition, each household holds at least ten shares in the cooperative, more if they would like 
to use the shares as a way to save. As the community gradually repays loans and collects on the 
monthly share fees, the cooperative builds capital, which it can then loan out to members for 
things like additional physical upgrading, small business investments, or covering shortfalls. In 
this way, the Baan Mankong cooperatives become not just vehicles for enabling housing 
security; they are a source of savings and credit for a population that is seldom served by 
traditional financial institutions. They can also generate a profit for the community, which they 
can invest back into the community.  
The management of the cooperatives is performed by a committee, usually made up of at 
least three or four, but up to a dozen or so members, depending on the size of the community. 
When the cooperative is up and running, the committee meets regularly to count and deposit debt 
repayments, discuss the status of loans, and strategize as to how to deal with delinquent 
members. In addition to working with the DPC, once cooperatives are registered, they must go 
through regular audits with the Cooperatives Auditing Department (CAD), which is a completely 
separate bureaucratic entity from the DPC. All of these tasks requires a significant amount of 
ongoing labor. However, in the early stages of Baan Mankong, the work load is even greater. 
The committee must collect large amounts of documentation for each member, including 
temporary housing registrations, national ID cards, marriage certificates, and spreadsheets 
detailing approximate incomes and the intended loan amounts for each family. In addition to  the 
basic requirements of DPC registration, cooperatives leaders are generally charged with 
overseeing early design and construction processes, which means negotiating with land owning 
agencies, registering their new collective landholdings with local authorities, and navigating the 
complex bureaucracies involved in infrastructure provision.  
All of the work on behalf of the community often means that committee members have 
less time to carry out their own livelihoods. All early-stage community leaders I spoke with 
reported that community work cut into their own incomes. This intense work echoes Huron’s 
(2012) emphasis on the labor involved in creating the urban commons and Endo’s (2014, 190) 
observations regarding one Baan Mankong community, reporting that “The saying 'no rest for 
the weary' perfectly encapsulates the reality that is lived at these sites of community 
development. We must never forget that the principle of respecting residents' agency and 
community independence always carries the dangerous possibility of crossing an invisible line, 
wherein financial and bureaucratic limitations may result in the entire responsibility for project 
implementation being dumped into the laps of the residents themselves."  
 In addition to cooperative committees, many communities govern aspects of their 
collective life through a separate community committee that is registered with the local district, 
which is described above. The community committee is elected through elections held by the 
district officers. Community committee members are often also active in community financial 
management, and there can be overlap between the community committee and the cooperative 
committee. However, in practice the community committee is not accountable to CODI and 
operates as a separate entity. As mentioned above, it is through the community committee that 
residents can access monthly community development funds and take part in other municipal 
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programs. Being registered as a community with the local district also enables the community to 
send representatives to their local community assembly. Community assemblies represent an 
effort to create an avenue for district-level organization of all communities within a jurisdiction. 
The functioning of community assemblies is However, not all Baan Mankong communities are 
able to achieve this registration with the district and access these resources because in many 
locations only communities of at least 100 households can register. This is a source of frustration 
for many smaller communities.  
  
 
Figure 18: Community-level institutions and their connections to larger institutions 
These formal institutions of collective governance are what make Baan Mankong projects 
possible. This is because they enable the community to be legally recognized, which lets them 
interact with institutions of finance and municipal government. Beyond this, however, these 
institutions perform another task that is key to the pushing Baan Mankong projects forward. 
While part of the claims of empowerment of Baan Mankong rest on the fact that the projects are 
led by communities themselves, this also means that most of the work of the projects must be 
completed by residents. An important task of these formal community-level institutions is to 
provide a framework for organizing the labor of community members.  
5.4.4 Similarities Can be Deceiving 
In this section, I have outlined the commonalities that are visible in nearly all Baan 
Mankong communities. These commonalities have arisen for many reasons, many of which have 
to do with the necessities of producing large numbers of homes and getting approval and 
financing from government agencies. Some of the commonalities also reflect common 
aspirations for a collective life on the parts of residents and their associated networks. These 
commonalities are not the end of the story, though. Because so many Baan Mankong 
communities look similar in terms of their physical results, the collective activities that take 
place in them, and the institutions that govern them, it is easy for those researching and writing 
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about the policy to assume that the networks organizing these communities are doing similar 
work. This assumption underlies many sweeping claims about “community networks” in general. 
However, as I will demonstrate in the following sections, while certain institutions and forms are 
common to nearly all Baan Mankong communities, other practices and the political valences that 
institutions take on vary considerably depending on the communities’ connections to another 
higher-level institution—their network.  
 
5.5 Early Communities 
In the following sections, I narrate the histories and practices of four communities. Two 
of the communities began their Baan Mankong projects in the early years of the policy, while the 
other two were at the early stages of organizing their projects during fieldwork and had not yet 
begun construction as of the end of fieldwork. For each time period, one community belongs to 
the FRSN, whereas the other belongs to NULICO. This comparison across both network and 
time permits an analysis not only of the differences between the networks, but also of how the 
processes of going through the Baan Mankong have changed in the past 15 years. Ultimately, it 
allows me to draw conclusions about how the politics and institutional structures of the networks 
influence the capacity of communities to maneuver within an increasingly rigid set of regulations 
as the program has been scaled up over time. 
5.6 NULICO A: Becoming an Example 
Nearly fifteen years after its inception, NULICO A has distinguished itself from most 
other communities. It is among a handful of Baan Mankong communities in the BMR that are 
frequently used for site visits by researchers and other communities. NULICO A also often 
partners with local NGOs and researchers to pilot new research or community development 
ideas. I became acquainted with the community through just such an activity with other foreigner 
researchers. It has won numerous awards and recognitions from government and private 
organizations because of the effectiveness with which it runs its cooperative, as well as the 
myriad activities community members have undertaken as part of a local development plan 
based on the principles of Sufficiency Economy. A few of the leaders of NULICO A also play 
prominent roles in the larger NULICO network. Because of these distinctions, in some ways 
NULICO A is unique compared to the majority of Baan Mankong communities and not 
representative of most Baan Mankong communities. However, as I will argue, it is precisely 
these distinctions that have led it to be held up by CODI and NULICO to the outside world, 
making it, along with just a few other communities in the BMR, overrepresented in research on 
the policy. In this section, I do not question the overall success of NULICO A. Rather, I 
highlight the factors that have led NULICO A to become successful, including the presence of a 
strong leader and the fact that it was an early community that received a great deal of attention 
from CODI.  
5.6.1 History  
As is often the case with Baan Mankong communities, NULICO A was assembled out of 
several different settlements. Its members originate from six settlements across four districts in 
Bangkok. The community was formed through the initiative of CODI, who had identified the 
different original communities as being at risk of eviction during the era of the Baan Mankong 
pilot projects in the early 2000s. Though NULICO A was not itself a pilot project, it began 
shortly thereafter. According to Pi Jim, a prominent leader and administrator of the NULICO A 
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cooperative, one of the impetuses for starting NULICO A was that a tract of reasonably priced 
land had been identified that could house a large number of households. The target group for the 
project had originally been 300 households. Through of process of meetings and mutual 
community visits, CODI and a group of community leaders began to organize the households in 
these disparate settlements into savings groups so that they could later form a cooperative and 
move to the new tract of land. However, in the end it was not financially or logistically feasible 
to create such a large new community all at once. It was decided that the households in the most 
“hot water” (deuad ron) would move first, and the remaining would form a different community.
 This first group included a settlement of households that was living on private land in 
which the owner wanted to sell to a hotel developer. The community was negotiating for more 
time to relocate, such situations can be especially precarious because of the risk of “accidental” 
fires that might force immediate evacuation even when an agreement to delay eviction has been 
reached between the community and the owner. Other communities were also on private land, 
and one group of households was living in an apartment building near the new site that was 
being demolished to make way for a new development.  
The NULICO A officially registered its housing cooperative in 2006 with 153 
households.  
As one of the first Baan Mankong communities, the members NULICO A played an active role 
in working with the architects that helped to design the layout of the community and the houses 
in it. After brainstorming with designers and coming up with a number of possibilities, the 
community settled on the possible designs for their homes. They created a small field at the front 
of the community to provide space for festivals and regular evening aerobics, and the 
cooperative office and health station occupy a centrally-owned and centrally located house. This 
is where meetings take place and people come to make their monthly payments and update their 
account books. There is another centrally-owned house off the main alley into the community 
where various groups produce and sell locally-made products. 
One of NULICO A’s leaders, Pi Jim, describes the community as “one house with 153 
rooms.” This image family succinctly captures the ethos of NULICO A. The leaders strive to 
build a community that functions in many ways as an extended family. However, it has not 
always been this way. Many of the main sources of conflict throughout the first several years of 
NULICO A revolved around the differences between the groups of people deriving from 
different settlements. People arrived in the community with six different sets of norms and 
existing relationships that had to be reconciled in order for everyone to live together. The 
community does not operate by formal administrative zones anymore, but when people selected 
the locations for their new houses, people who already knew each other tended to cluster 
together. There were disagreements about petty things. Pi Jim recalls a time when some of the 
adults stopped speaking to each other because of arguments between families. She says that she 
and other community leaders decided that the way around some of these adult conflicts was to 
unify people around the children. The community committee sponsored a futsol tournament. The 
first year, it began small, and the teams were based on their original communities. However, 
organizing the tournament involved adults from multiple groups working together, and everyone 
came together to cheer on the kids. Even though it played on the competition between the 
different sub-groups, the larger activity provided a platform for working together. The futsol 
tournament has now grown over four years, and most of the conflicts between the internal groups 
have dissipated.  
 
122 
 While these internal issues have been solved through interventions by the community’s 
internal leadership, much of the founding of NULICO A took place through the facilitation of 
CODI. CODI helped to find and negotiate for the land purchase agreement and facilitate the 
coming together of the different settlements. During this early phase of the program, community 
architects worked quite extensively with community members to create the first designs and 
layouts of the new settlements. Residents and leaders of NULICO A recall with fondness the 
process of designing their new homes. However, many also expressed that they had doubts 
throughout the process as to whether or not the project would come to fruition. It was so new that 
they had few examples to draw from and were really creating this new type of community from 
scratch. At that time, there was no real NULICO to speak of, so the leaders of NULICO A were 
part of the group of Baan Mankong communities that formed the network, helping and advising 
each other through this new process and creating friendships along the way. The presence of 
strong leadership is one of the enduring keys to NULICO A’s success. 
5.6.2 Leadership in the Shaping of Ideology and Institutions  
NULICO A has one of the most well-functioning housing cooperatives in all of Baan 
Mankong. They have rarely had issues balancing their accounts, and several years ago they won 
an award from the Department for the Promotion of Cooperatives (DPC) for their consistency in 
accounting, saving, and building up the cooperative not just as a means of securing housing, but 
also as a CDFI.    
The NULICO A cooperative functions well largely because a consistency of personnel 
has enabled institutional adaptation. Pi Jim, NULICO A’s most vocal spokesperson, was the first 
president of the cooperative. As one of the most educated members of the community, she took 
on the role early in the process. Over time, as the demands of the job increased, her devotion to 
her own community and the cause of creating sustainable development based on the principles of 
sufficiency economy grew commensurably. Even after her term with the committee ended, she 
continued to be the main force behind the cooperative. Over time, she cut back on her hours at 
her day job at a textiles business. By the time we spoke in 2018, she had been managing 
community affairs full time for several years and was quite happy to do so, despite the cut in pay 
compared to her previous life. The community provides her with a monthly stipend for managing 
the cooperative accounts, and she makes some additional income through speaking and training 
engagements and by selling her locally-produced goods. Mostly, though, she learned to live more 
modestly and reduced expenses through home-based production. 
The installment of Pi Jim as a long-term accountant who is compensated for her work 
represents a unique arrangement among Baan Mankong communities. Most communities are 
encouraged to run the cooperatives through the voluntary labor of the cooperative committees 
with rotating memberships. However, this institutional adjustment on the part of NULICO A has 
allowed for the build-up of institutional knowledge that facilitates easier transitions of leadership 
on the committee, since she is constantly there to advise. Her expertise and dedication has also 
enabled her to exert influence on higher-level institutions. 
Over the past decade, Pi Jim’s devotion to the NULICO A cooperative has manifested in 
changes in the practices around cooperatives more broadly. According to Pi Jim, in the early 
years of Baan Mankong, there was a lot of confusion as to who was responsible for “closing” the 
accounts at the end of the year.33 Many communities thought that the CAD was supposed to do 
                                                
33	“closing” accounts (pit banchi) refers to a process of auditing accounts at the end of a fiscal term and ensuring 
that they balance.		
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this for them. Because there were so many problems with community accounts, this is, in fact, 
what frequently occurred. However, through meetings in which CODI, community leaders, and 
the CAD sat down to figure out the policies, they were able to clarify who had responsibility for 
each step in the accounting process, and they were able to institute trainings for community 
members on how to carry out the processes.  
This solution, which emphasized the training of community members to do more of the 
work of management themselves, is common to Pi Jim’s approach. She takes the idea of self-
sufficiency in the community very seriously. She views her own lifestyle changes since 
becoming a leader in the community as a process of learning to live more in line with the 
principles of sufficiency economy. When she discusses the ongoing issue of residents in her 
community holding informal debt outside their housing loans, she says the problem is that 
residents do not have adequate knowledge of how to conduct themselves in line with sufficiency 
economy principles. In a powerpoint presentation that she often uses in presentations to outsiders 
about the community, the first slide is an illustration of sufficiency economy imagery, and the 
long-term community plan is explicitly designed according to sufficiency principles (see Figure 
20).  
 
 
Figure 19: The introduction slide of the NULICO A’s community presentation used by leaders to 
explain their community to outsiders. The slide contains images of small-scale agriculture, the 
late King Bhumbol Adulyadej, and reads “Sufficiency Economy: A Project of Royal Initiative.” 
 
The fact that the community has such a presentation demonstrates the role that it plays in 
NULICO and the Baan Mankong program more broadly. Pi Jim is also one of very few Baan 
Mankong residents in the country who speaks English at a conversational level, making her able 
to communicate easily about her own community with foreign researchers. She has even assisted 
researchers by translating in other communities. 
Pi Jim is the most prominent leader of the community, but she is not the only one. A 
handful of leaders have stepped up over the years to run different internal initiatives, serve on the 
community and cooperative committees, and advise other communities through NULICO. These 
few leaders play a strong role in the community, running it as a self-sufficient entity. They are 
also active in the larger NULICO network. However, this is not to say that NULICO plays a 
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strong role in the community. Outside of these few leaders, when asked if they are members of 
NULICO, most residents I spoke to said no, they personally are not member. However, the 
leaders of the community are jaonathi--“functionaries”—of NULICO. This word, jaonathi, most 
commonly applies to staff and administrative positions in government agencies and businesses. It 
is the title of many CODI employees. The word jaonathi and its implications in terms of 
administration and management accurately describe how the NULICO A leaders run the 
community and encourage leaders of other settlements to run theirs. 
5.6.3 Self-Sufficiency at Work 
 NULICO A does interact with outside agencies. These interactions emphasize 
cooperation and partnership and are generally focused on different aspects of development in 
order to create greater self-sufficiency in areas such as the environment, public health, and 
strengthening supplemental livelihoods. Partners in these initiatives are frequently local 
universities and the local district. CODI is also a source of these partnerships, referring other 
agencies who wish to do development work or research to NULICO A. I first came to know 
NULICO A through just such an initiative, in which domestic university professors, community 
architects, and international funders were collaborating to pilot a model of a training activity 
aimed at building greater resilience at the community level in the case of environmental or 
economic shocks. In the training, the residents in attendance were led through a process of listing 
their resources and challenges, creating a map displaying what they had listed, and coming up 
with a plan of how they would respond to certain external shocks at the community level. 
Participants were explicitly discouraged from thinking about their responses to these shocks 
either at the individual household level or through appealing to the government for assistance. 
These acts of making lists and maps to document aspects of the community, as well as thinking 
about solving problems at the level of the community without reference to larger institutions, are 
quite familiar to NULICO A. 
This training is just one example of an activity that has resulted in a map of the 
community. More than any other community, NULICO A actively represents the space of its 
community to the outside. In some cases, these maps serve the straightforward purpose of 
providing data for service delivery. In the community office building, a professional computer-
generated map used by the district denotes the exact dimensions of the community, the sub-
parcels of each house, and their addresses. However, most maps used by community leaders to 
represent the community are hand drawn, such as the one in Figure 21, which plots out the 
different assets and danger zones in the area. This carefully hand-drawn map, which displays the 
community’s assets and concerns that had been made prior to the training I attended, is one of 
several that feature in the community’s PowerPoint presentation. Others display the genders and 
ages of the members of the community’s households or which houses have members with 
diabetes and other common diseases. Collecting and displaying this type of data, according to 
community leaders, helps them better manage the community and care for the needs of different 
members.  
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Figure 20: A hand drawn map of NULICO A displaying the community’s resources and 
challenges used in PowerPoint presentations to outsiders. 
Careful management of the community’s members and finances is key to the success of 
NULICO A. One of the benefits of having a well-run cooperative is that it provides the ability to 
meet the needs of the community without having to appeal to outside help. During the initial 
construction phases, the first major financial obstacle the community hit involved infrastructure. 
Though Baan Mankong now provides a subsidy of, on average, 45,000 baht ($1,350) per 
household for infrastructure, at the time of NULICO A’s initial construction it was only 25,000 
baht ($750), which proved much too little. In order to cover the shortfall, NULICO A worked 
with the CODI staff and the DPC to devise an arrangement whereby the community gradually 
borrowed against future profits to pay for infrastructure over several years. In this way, the 
community was able to overcome the shortfall itself, rather than appealing for a greater subsidy. 
In many other instances, the community has managed to solve its own problems, including 
dealing with stray dogs by creating a team to lure them out and creating their own plans to deal 
with the refuse that started to collect in the community because there was no regular trash 
collection.  
When NULICO A runs into a problem, they make every effort to manage it themselves 
and to cooperate with CODI and the local district. However, in one case this was not possible. 
After the cooperative had been up and running for several years, NULICO A won an award from 
the DPC of 100,000 baht (~3,300 USD) for their effective management. The money was to be 
funneled through the local district office. The district officers decided that the money should be 
used to plant trees in the community, and they were going to take a margin of the winnings for 
administration. However, the community leaders did not want trees. They wanted to put the 
money toward refurbishing their community center, and they did not see why the district needed 
to take a portion. They thought the money should be transferred directly to the cooperative. It 
was theirs that they had won on their own. Community leaders, led by Pi Jim, complained tot eh 
district officers, gradually working their way up the chain of command at the district and 
eventually demanding to speak to the district head. In the end, they won. The head of the district 
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agreed with them, and they got their money. However, the incident soured relations with many of 
the district officers. Pi Jim describes the community as being “blacklisted” for a long time 
afterward, and that the community used to be the “star” of the district, but no more.  
Two aspects of this incident stand out. The first is that when the community hit an 
obstacle, they confronted the district on their own, without calling upon the help of their network 
to back them. The second is the response of the district. The backlash the community received 
when they spoke out against unfair practices speaks to the tenor of their relationship with the 
local government before. It had been cooperative, but conditioned on the community acting like 
a “star” and not making demands. This speaks to an inequality of power, a sort of patron-client 
relationship, that is not a partnership among equals. This two elements of NULICO A’s 
management stand in contrast to how FRSN communities tend to handle issues with government 
agencies.  
5.6.4 An Example Commoning the Self-Sufficient Way 
NULICO A serves as an example of a successful Baan Mankong program, both to other 
communities and to the outside world. The types of mapping and development activities that the 
community engages in is just one way that community leaders and CODI represent NULICO A. 
International visitors, university students, and government officials frequently visit the 
community or invite its leaders to events. In this way, the community serves as an ideal 
commons, representing the manifestation of a particular set of ideologies around community. 
The community, particularly a few prominent leaders, have actively created this commons, in 
terms of the physical layout and the institutions that govern it. By having strong leadership and 
managing their collective resources well, they have gained recognition and established good 
cooperative relationships with many external institutions. The strength of their community 
allows them to occasionally push back against unfair governmental practices. However, the 
“rules of the game” of their relationships with institutions have largely been based on 
cooperation. This means that their taking a stand is viewed negatively, creating a backlash for 
them.  
As an early and successful Baan Mankong community, they leaders also played an active 
role in the creation of NULICO and continue to have a voice at CODI through their involvement 
in the organization. It is also through NULICO that they help to train other communities to 
become self-sufficient in similar ways. In this way, NULICO A serves as an example of this type 
commoning, both to other communities and to those outside organizations.  
 
5.7 FRSN A: Struggle Before and Beyond Baan Mankong 
5.7.1 History 
FRSN A has been active in the FRSN for many years, since before they took on their 
Baan Mankong project. Through their affiliation with the FRSN, they have successfully fought 
to stay on their original land and struggle alongside the network for greater access to democratic 
rights. However, this has not been their only struggle. They have also faced difficulties in their 
internal management, and rifts between different factions in the community have arisen over the 
years. Despite this, they have managed to stay together by relying on mentors from the network 
to mediate disagreements and adapt both external and internal institutions to better suit their 
needs. An ongoing struggle, however, comes from a portion of the residents of their original land 
who chose to affiliate with NULICO.  
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FRSN A is located along a canal in the Rama 3 area of central Bangkok. The community 
began approximately 40 years ago with just a few scattered houses along the canal. Over time, it 
grew and became more congested. Because of the of its proximity to the canal, each morning at 
10 am parts of the houses would flood as the waters rose, and then in the afternoon the waters 
would recede. Despite this hardship, the land was quite desirable because of its proximity to 
schools and jobs.  
 For the first 20 years of its existence, the members of the community lived together but 
had no real collective organization. They were not under threat of eviction, so there was no 
immediate need for it. Their land, though located along the canal, is owned by the State Railways 
of Thailand (SRT), which holds an enormous amount of undeveloped land throughout Thailand.  
FRSN A first started to come together as a collective organization around the year 2004. 
At that time, the FRSN was working with communities throughout the Rama 3 area, some of 
which were under threat of eviction and others who were not. In the case of communities not 
being evicted, community organizers that were working as part of an active movement supported 
by NGOs were going into communities and using techniques base on Saul Alinsky’s principles 
to work on small projects to improve living conditions of the urban poor in order to gradually 
build solidarity. In the case of FRSN A, they had two main pressing concerns. The first was the 
cost of utilities because of thy way they were forced to branch water and electricity from nearby 
houses. The second was their lack of housing registrations, which prevented many community 
members from being able to access basic medical and welfare services and send their children to 
local schools. With the help of the organizers and the leaders of other communities in the area, 
which form the Rama 3 subnetwork of the FRSN, FRSN A was able, over the course of a couple 
of years, to press local authorities to extend some basic services to them and to provide 
temporary housing registrations. However, because they fell under the 100 necessary households 
to register as a community with the district, they were not—and are still not—able to access 
some municipal resources.  
 Before they could build all of the infrastructure they were aiming for, however, the 
community was served a notice of eviction. The BMA had made a plan to have a company 
develop The SRT a water treatment plan along their area of the canal. Because they had already 
formed a basic community organization with a committee and institutional connections to their 
subnetworks and the larger FRSN movement, they were well situated to launch a fight to stay on 
their land.  
Pi Som, who was one of the main leaders of the community at that time and who 
continues to play a prominent role in the Rama 3 subnetwork and FRSN, describes the time of 
fighting the eviction with a mixture of emotions. It was a prolonged process, and they had to 
launch active protests both in the community and at the ministry of transportation. They joined 
together with 60 other FRSN communities from throughout the country that were trying to call 
for long-term land rental agreements from the SRT.  She recalls it as a period of intense stress, 
but also as an exciting time. They had to be patient, but their “mentors” (phi liang) in the FRSN 
“never abandoned [them].” The organizers, many of whom were college students at the time, 
slept in the community, blocked the way of construction vehicles, and pointed the way when 
things seemed grim. For their part, the community members, particularly the leaders, sacrificed 
their own well-being and incomes. Pi Som had to stop doing the sewing that had been her 
livelihood in order to do the community’s work. She had to rely on help from the network to get 
by. 
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Eventually they were able to reach an agreement. In 2008, The SRT agreed to extend 30-
year leases to 61 communities following a multi-day protest of 3,000 FRSN members outside the 
ministry of transportation that forced the opening of negotiations. FRSN A was then also able to 
get the BMA to adjust their plan. Their agreement entailed land sharing, meaning they would 
move their community onto a smaller section of the original land that was farther away from the 
canal, and the company would be able to build its plant on the other side of the canal and 
construct fortified embankments. As part of the agreement, FRSN A would reconstruct their 
homes through Baan Mankong. 
5.7.2 The Beginning of Baan Mankong 
 The community faced a number of challenges throughout the Baan Mankong process 
having to do with technical construction issues, external conflicts, and internal management 
issues. Throughout all of these obstacles, they have relied on their network to negotiate amongst 
themselves and with outside entities.  
 The first problem the community ran into involved the filling in and level of the land 
prior to construction. Because of the community’s proximity to the water, the land was soft, so 
they had to use expensive piles for the foundation. A more significant problem arose when they 
went to drive the piles was that they discovered an oil company had run pipes through the land. 
Without telling either party, the SRT had granted rights below the soil to both the oil company 
and the community. With the FRSN’s support the community waged a multi-year legal battle 
ensued before an agreement could be reached to let the community install the necessary 
infrastructure to build.  
Other obstacles FRSN A has faced are financial. Like many communities, including 
NULCIO A, FRSN A exceeded their infrastructure subsidy provided by CODI, and they had to 
use savings or other borrowed money in order to pay for the installation. The time and expense 
of this process led some people to drop out, so they had to recruit new members. Because of the 
delays, a handful of houses in FRSN A are still being constructed over ten years after the 
initiation of the project. They also have a partially constructed house and a nearly vacant lot that 
have been abandoned by owners that ran out of money or who promised to find someone to take 
their place but never came through. Another partial construction is their central meeting hall in 
the middle of the community. They got a grant to make it from the district, but it wasn’t enough 
to cover all of the construction. It has a roof and a concrete floor, so it is sufficient for holding 
meetings, but one of the goals of the community is to somehow get the money to finish it so that 
that it looks nice. 
FRSN A has struggled to find a workable system to manage its finances. Because it 
started in the early days of Baan Mankong, it was not a Baan Mankong requirement that 
communities form cooperatives. Since their land tenure was a rental agreement with the SRT, 
they were able to do their finances through a savings group. They could have converted their 
finances to a cooperative model, but they have not. There are a couple reasons for this. The first 
is practical. Starting the cooperative is an arduous process, and they were busy fighting other 
battles to get their land and start construction. By the time they were able to get settled in their 
houses, they had already been using the savings group model for a long time, so no one 
particularly wanted to switch. The second reason is ideological. Unlike CODI, the FRSN does 
not believe that having an official legal entity is an integral part of being a community. In 
addition, the goals of cooperatives are to create a profit. The goal of the FRSN is to create 
models of occupying land that do not follow a market logic, so using the community to produce a 
profit is anathema to their ideology. 
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There has also been another problem with finances, which has caused a significant rift in 
the community but is spoken of only circumspectly by the members. Several years ago, there 
was mismanagement of the collective funds. Pi Som herself admits to having made mistakes. 
Others say that mistakes were made by multiple parties. More than one person described the 
situation as one of “cheating.” Though people are reluctant to talk about exactly what happened 
or to assign specific blame (at least to an outsider), what is clear is that community was 
eventually able to reach a solution. This was only possible through the mediation of the FRSN. 
Organizers and other members of the Rama 3 network held meetings in which the community 
could air grievances and deliberate on a way in which people could continue to make their 
payments and trust that those payments would be deposited in the proper accounts at the proper 
time. The solution reached involved splitting the community into three different payment 
collection groups. They decided on these groups themselves, based on who they felt they could 
trust. This way everyone could feel that they were not being forced to have their money pass 
through the hands of someone they didn’t trust. This arrangement has solved the practical 
problems of the community’s finances. However, the rifts in relationships remain.  
5.7.3 Ongoing Struggles 
FRSN A developed a tremendous esprit de corps during their struggle against eviction. 
However, even though they ultimately won the right to stay on their land, the fight was not 
without its costs. “Everyone was tired,” Pi Som says of the era after they reached a deal with the 
SRT. It started to get harder to get people to come to meetings, and with all of the difficulties 
they had during construction, money got tight at the household level, and people left. Like many 
other communities, household-level financial hardship on the part of people handling the 
community money created an environment ripe for mismanagement. The cheating created rifts in 
the community that have been hard to overcome. When asked about the overall atmosphere of 
the community, one older said succinctly, “there are good people here. There are also bad 
people.”  
Rifts and fatigue have led to a laxity in internal management. The community no longer 
has regular monthly meetings. Pi Som laments that when she and other leaders try to call 
meetings, no one shows up. This does not mean that there is not community administration, 
though. When their mentors from the FRSN come to hold meetings, everyone shows up. Even 
though trust in some of the community leaders has broken down, the residents maintain a level of 
trust in and commitment to the FRSN. They also send three to our representatives (tua thaen) to 
meetings of the Rama 3 subnetwork each month. Since these meetings rotate location, every few 
months they are held in the community, which provides as opportunity to deal with broader 
community issues through the mediation of the subnetwork.  
 Unlike the majority of communities who have a cooperative committee that reports up to 
CODI, the DPC, and the CAD, FRSN A’s institutional connections are, first and foremost, with 
the FRSN. Since their small size precludes them from being registered with the district and they 
do not have a cooperative, the committee of FRSN A is primarily nested within the institutional 
infrastructure of the FRSN. This means that, although finances do occupy significant amounts of 
energy for the community’s leaders, the management of that financial institution is simpler. 
Consequently, a much larger portion of their sense of collective identity comes from interactions 
with their political movement. The fact that the community’s primary institutional allegiance is 
to a social movement, not a government entity also means that community interactions with the 
state and other communities are quite different. When they meet with CODI officials or 
government entities, it is quite often with the assistance of FRNS organizers or leaders of their 
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subnetwork there to support them. The most recent case of the community needing this support 
has come in a case of the community struggling against a NULICO community.  
Not everyone on the original land of the settlement along the canal near Rama 3 joined 
FRSN A. Some people left on their own for a variety of reasons, moving in with family or 
returning home to the provinces. A more significant group, though, was on a portion of the 
settlement adjacent to FRSN A that was further away from the canal. This community shared the 
same plot of SRT land. However, because they were farther away from the canal, their land was 
not slated to be developed as part of the water treatment plant, so they were not being evicted. 
There was considerable conflict between this group and the FRSN, and this group decided not to 
join the FRSN, but rather to go with the NULICO.  In the end, though, they never organized to 
do Baan Mankong upgrading. However, since they occupied the same piece of SRT land, they 
did sign on to the lease with FRSN A. The conflict between this NULICO community and FRSN 
A continues to play out to this day, long after most of the new homes have been constructed and 
the majority of the loans have been paid off.  
The problem is that the NULICO portion of the settlement has become delinquent in their 
payments, putting the entire settlement at risk. NULICO has lost track of this community 
entirely, and it is unknown whether they have any form of coherent organization anymore. 
Efforts by CODI to reach the leaders of this portion of the settlement have gone unanswered, and 
none of the leaders of NULICO are connected to the group. Since both CODI and NULICO have 
been unable to organize this portion of the residents, FRSN leaders and organizers are now 
working with FRSN A to split the lease to the land under the recognition that the FRSN portion 
should not be punished for the delinquency of the NULICO portion. As of the end of fieldwork, 
it appeared that the FRSN and SRT were well on their way to agreeing to a split in the lease.  
5.7.4 Politics, Daily Life, and the Role of the Network 
Although the FRSN is well known and supported in FRSN A, now that the community is 
well established, being part of a social movement rarely permeates daily life. I interviewed Pi 
Deng, another leader in the community and FRSN, outside her house, which is located at the 
front of the community, on a Sunday evening. She talked about the community’s long struggle 
and the importance of the FRSN, but other realities of life continually injected themselves into 
the conversation. Her nieces and nephews and their friends ran in between her house and their 
neighbors’. Motorcycles whizzed by, their drivers occasionally yelling greetings or asking where 
so-and-so could be found. 
Nonetheless, the FRSN remains a consistent presence in the community and forms a 
significant part of their collective identity, if not each individual’s identity. I visited the 
community a couple of weeks before a large planned action by the FRSN at the ministry of 
transportation to aimed at negotiating granting 30-year leases on SRT land to more than just the 
original 61 communities that had gotten them in 2008. Even though this action did not directly 
affect Four Regions A, when I spoke with residents in casual conversation as they were going 
about their day, preparing dinner or watching a muay Thai match, they were aware of the action 
said that they would be sending representatives to it. They also knew the importance of such 
actions. As one woman told me “you can fight alone.” Another woman described the FRSN as 
organization where poor people help each other to get secure places to live. They also said that 
they, individually, and their community were members (samachik) of the FRSN.   
FRSN A’s is not a story of unbridled success. They have faced numerous challenges, 
both internally and externally, and they continue to face existential threats to their ability to 
maintain their land and collective strength. However, despite the fact that they have been far 
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from perfect in their own management, their affiliation with the FRSN has kept them together. 
The ability to appeal to a higher-level mediator allows them to persevere through internal 
conflicts and lapses in trust. Furthermore, being part of a larger movement continually provides a 
reason for community residents to come together, either through meetings of their sub-network 
or through larger political actions. While participation in the leadership roles at the community 
and network level vary greatly among the residents, everyone is aware of the FRSN and their 
affiliation, and this creates a sense of collective identification with the larger movement. FRSN 
A has continued its efforts in commoning across nearly fifteen years, not only through its own 
efforts to carve out the chance to manage collective land in a way that benefits its residents, but 
also through its larger involvement in seeking to expand similar access to other poor urban 
residents.  
The endurance of the community despite their challenges appears most striking when 
compared with the NULICO portion of the land they inhabit. Despite nominally belonging to 
NULICO, that community has completely lost touch with its network, and it has fallen apart with 
respect to its lease agreement. This is not the type of story commonly told about Baan Mankong 
or NULICO. Instead, most of the narratives more closely resemble NULICO A.  
5.8 Early Community Lessons 
 The physical settlements of NULICO A and FRSN A, as well as many of the observable 
day-to-day aspects of the community, look quite similar. The processes they went through to 
construct their communities also have some shared elements. Both have leaders that had to make 
tremendous sacrifices in terms of their own livelihoods in order to make Baan Mankong happen. 
Both ran into obstacles in construction having to do with insufficient funding for infrastructure, 
making it necessary for the community to shoulder some of the cost. Both have faced problems 
of divisions and lack of trust among residents that required mediation. Most importantly, both 
were embarking on a new process was they undertook Baan Mankong upgrading, which 
necessitated creating new practices and institutional arrangements, new ways of being a 
chumchon in the city.  
Because of their active involvement in this creation of collective land and assets, which 
in both cases was motivated by a particular set of political beliefs, I consider both communities 
to be practicing commoning. However, the institutions and practices they created were quite 
different and reflect the differences in their political motivations. NULICO A, under the financial 
focus of CODI and the rhetoric of sufficiency economy, focused on running a strong cooperative 
that can sustain the community while minimizing reliance on the government and higher level 
institutions. Somewhat ironically, however, NULICO A has a great deal of contact with higher 
level institutions, as it often serves as an example of effective management and testing ground 
for pilot programs aimed at community development. The nature of these relationships, however, 
makes it difficult for NULICO A to push back against practices it deems unfair.  FRSN A, on the 
other hand, has made pushing back a key part of its collective work. They fought to stay on their 
original land; they resisted moving to the cooperative model and instead remained a savings 
group; and they regularly participate in larger FRSN efforts to expand access to collective land 
rights for other communities and hold government agencies accountable. While FRSN A has 
struggled more on the management front than NULICO A, they have been able to rely on their 
network and the professional organizers that serve as their mentors for guidance and mediation. 
NULICO A, while having member who are leaders of their network, mostly relies on these 
strong leaders internally to solve their problems, while the average community member has little 
to do with NULICO. This is most clearly expressed through the language community members 
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use to describe their relationships with the network. While NULICO A members below 
leadership do not consider themselves “members” (samachik) of the network and call their 
leaders “functionaries” (jaonathi) of NULICO, FRSN A residents consider the whole community 
to be members of the network, with their leaders who serve roles in the higher-level network 
functions are their “representatives” (tua thaen).  
5.9 Newer Communities 
 When the early Baan Mankong communities began their projects, they were embarking 
on a process that had not yet been determined. By working with CODI, their networks, and 
government agencies, they established internal institutions and relationships with external 
institutions that allowed them to legally occupy land collectively and manage communal 
resources, as well as debts. In the more than ten years since these early communities started Baan 
Mankong, a lot has changed.  While the program still represents a department from business as 
usual for many of the government entities communities interact with, for others, especially 
CODI, there is now a system in place for carrying out projects. There is also a vision for 
upgrading communities on a larger scale through city-wide upgrading (see discussion in Chapter 
4). Both NULCIO B and FRSN B are part of efforts to undergo upgrading alongside other 
communities. However, the ways in which they undertake these larger projects and their capacity 
to voice their opinions differs greatly because of the larger institutional arrangements and 
political goals of their networks.   
5.10 NULICO B: Working toward Someone Else’s Vision 
5.10.1 History  
NULICO B is located below a busy highway overpass in the Rama 3 area of Bangkok, 
not far from FRSN A. Despite the settlement being approximately the same age as FRSN A, 
NULICO B is a fairly new Baan Mankong community. At the time of fieldwork, it had just 
begun the process of registering as a cooperative and making concrete physical upgrading plans. 
This process of becoming a Baan Mankong community has involved interactions with numerous 
organizations and state entities that seek to mold the residence into a particular type of collective 
entity.  
Due to its central location near the large Khlong Teoi slum, NULICO B has been part of   
numerous development projects by charity organizations, local government, and NGOs that over 
the years, which have resulted in extensive documentation of its existence. In an interview with 
Pi Nara, NULICO B’s current president, she presented me with a thick folder full of a long 
narrative of the community’s history and present issues, as well as maps or the present layout 
and Baan Mankong upgrading plans. The documents details of how the community was 
originally built as housing for people working at Shell and Esso plants in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The initial settlement was split between private and land belonging to the Department of 
Treasury, another major landholder in Bangkok.  
Pi Nara says that in the early days people lived in way that was “to each their own” (tang 
khon tang yu). However, in the 1990s the residents of the private land were evicted. The people 
in the area started to come together to fight the eviction, In the end, they lost, though. Some left 
the area, but others moved onto the Treasury land, making it more congested.  
Aside from the overall crowded conditions of the community, residents suffer from a 
number of environmental hazards. The area experiences an extremely high level of air pollution 
from the nearby factories, as well as dust and car exhaust issued from the busy overpass and a 
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four-lane access road beneath. Many community members suffer from respiratory diseases. I 
myself came down with a respiratory infection after spending a weekend in the community. In 
addition to air pollution, the ground pollution is so severe that when it floods—which is 
frequently during the rainy season, due to the lack of permeable surfaces in the area—the water 
is coated with a layer of froth. 
 Despite these poor environmental conditions, many of the residents in NULICO A have 
made comfortable interior living spaces. Since they have been there such a long time, many of 
the established households have well-constructed two-story homes that they are loath to 
demolish in order to re-block the community. However, re-blocking the community is a 
prerequisite of staying in place. CODI established a deal with the treasury giving several 
communities the opportunity to obtain 30-year leases to the land they occupy if they significant 
efforts at “development.” Development, in this case, means forming a cooperative to officially 
take on the lease and create a more orderly physical layout through Baan Mankong. As one 
community put it, they need to become more like a muban jadsan. According to the agreement 
with the Treasury department, NULICO B has two years to demonstrate that they are making 
progress.  
NULICO B is in a better position to begin the Baan Mankong process than many other 
communities. It began a savings group in 2006 at the encouragement of charity-based NGOs 
working in the community and the local district, and a significant portion of the community has 
contributed savings on and off over the years. They have never had problems with cheating. Pi 
Nara has made sure of it. She has been in the community for 30 years and has taken the lead on 
many of their initiatives. The established savings group and the presence of an active leader is 
one of the reasons NULICO B was chosen to be one of the first of the 18 communities in their 
district initiate a Baan Mankong project. 
 The agreement with the Treasury is just one of the larger initiatives NULICO B is part 
of. The other is the first effort at city-wide upgrading that CODI has attempted. City-wide 
upgrading has gone on in several smaller cities throughout the country, a process that includes 
partnering with local government to perform a survey of all slum areas, identify possible land 
sharing arrangements or new plots of land, create a comprehensive housing upgrading plan for 
all slum communities in the area. However, because of Bangkok’s size, CODI leaders have 
determined that city-wide efforts should be conducted at the district level. The Yannawa district, 
in which NULICO A is located, has been identified as the first district in which a “city” (i.e. 
district) committee has been established with local officials, academics, and community leaders. 
Preliminary efforts at collecting data on slum communities in the area has found that there are 18 
total communities in the district, locating on a variety of different types of land. Four of these 
communities have begun the Baan Mankong process as part of the NULICO network. As of the 
end of fieldwork, the farthest along had just begun construction. As one of these communities, 
NULICO B finds itself in the position of trying to initiate its own community upgrading while 
simultaneously serving as an example to other communities as part of the city-wide effort.  
5.10.2 Searching for Support at the Community Level 
 The primary work of NULICO B revolves around getting their own project off the 
ground. Despite being a large community, Pi Nara and a handful of other community leaders, 
nearly all women, have struggled to recruit help to do the administrative work of registering the 
cooperative. It is difficult to even get people to attend meetings. On top of this challenge, they 
often struggle to get adequate support to guide them through a process that seems to have pre-
determined steps that they must follow, either from NULICO or CODI. Mostly, staff and 
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NULICO leaders just tell the community members that they need to “rise up” (luk kheun) and 
drive the project forward. All the while, when they encounter higher level government officials, 
they present themselves in particular, acceptable ways in order to prove themselves deserving.  
Pi Nara does her best to rise up in her own community. There is a great deal of work to 
do, though, and not many people volunteering to do it. There are four women in the community 
who regularly coordinate the community activities, but it is hard to even get people to come to 
meetings. One meeting had to be rescheduled after the CODI staff arrived because too few 
people were there. Getting people to meetings has been the greatest obstacle to moving the Baan 
Mankong process forward for NULICO B. Because of the failures of so many Baan Mankong 
communities to manage their cooperatives according to regulation, the DPC started requiring that 
every single member of a cooperative attend three three-hour trainings on how the cooperatives 
work and what their responsibilities will be. In the case of NULICO B, this would mean that 
over 150 people who work irregular hours would have to be in the same place at the same time 
for nine hours, spread across at least two days. Because this hurdle is seemingly insurmountable, 
the community has decided to begin the Baan Mankong process with just 50 households.  
At the advice of CODI staff, they have divided the community into a total of 18 zones, 
with each zone having a leader. Only a few of the zones are doing the upgrading. For these, the 
leaders must collect formal documents, including ID cards, marriage licenses, and housing 
registrations. They must all sign numerous agreements and present estimates of their incomes 
and assets, demonstrating that they are financially stable and responsible enough to follow 
through with the project, but at the same time, that they are poor enough that they could not 
access housing through other means. At the same time, everyone must decide on the different 
floorplans. Collectively, they need to come up with just three or four options for people to 
choose from. The few active community leaders had some input on the designs, but the CODI 
architects who are helping with the projects all have many other communities to work with. They 
do not have time for an extensive design process. Most of them are young and have worked for 
CODI for less than three years. They work according to the advice they have received from those 
who trained them and they do their best with limited time and resources. They lay out housing 
plots as a sort of jigsaw puzzle in order to fit the most units into the space, and the community 
members have to negotiate with each other to form themselves into pieces that will fit.  
By May 2018, it had been over a year that NULICO B had been organizing to try to form 
its cooperative and move forward with Baan Mankong. CODI staff was getting anxious because 
they needed to disburse the funds that had been approved for the project or they would disappear. 
An event was held in the community to publicize the district-wide effort and push the project 
forward. The community put on a celebration with sponsorship from the district and other 
government health and welfare agencies. They made “traditional” (boran) food and showcased 
projects in the community that represented how “strong” (khem khaeng) they are, as well as how 
responsible, such as how the community is a “white community” (chumchon si khao), meaning 
that they are drug free.  
The honored guest of the event was the chief advisor to the mayor of Bangkok. He 
arrived flanked with military officers and sat at the head of a large oval of tables, where 
numerous CODI and district officials were also seated. Pi Nara was the only community member 
to sit at the table. The rest of the community filled several rows of chairs behind the main table. 
No representatives from the NULICO were in attendance, only CODI staff.  
Pi Nara was given the chance to describe the community and the current state of the 
project to the Chief Advisor. She focused on how they were having difficulty starting the 
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cooperative because of not being able to find a time when all the people could do the trainings. 
She also said that many people were not interested in doing the project because they were not 
willing to take on the additional debt and did not think they would be able to pay the rent once 
they were formalized.  
The Chief advisor responded to her issues. He asked for, and received, the cooperation of 
the DPC and the district in scheduling times on weekends for the trainings, even though this 
would mean the staff members would have to work outside of their normal hours. On the issue of 
the reluctance to take on debt, he was less amenable to complaints. He explained that this was 
not all debt-financed. They were getting subsidies from the government for infrastructure, and 
the government was helping them in the process and providing them with the opportunity to live 
as legal residents and not squatters. The government needs for them to do their part. He 
explained that in this case, “Debt is responsibility… Debt is an investment. Debt is the right to 
build a house. You should not think of it as getting into debt. You should think of it as making an 
investment. It is debt that creates a benefit.” 34 
This kind of speech imploring the community members to take responsibility, to “rise 
up,” has become a common refrain for Pi Nara. She says that they need a “mentor” (phi liang).  
The CODI staff are nice enough, and she appreciates them. But they are so overworked, they 
barely have time to help with the administration of the project. When asked who is helping them 
to do the project, most community members say CODI. None mention NULICO, and when 
asked directly if they know who NULICO is, outside of a few leaders, they either do not know or 
have only a vague sense of having heard the acronym before. And the NULICO advisors just 
come by every once in a while to give advice with CODI, yet more people urging the community 
to “rise up” and be “strong.” 
5.10.3 The City-Wide Effort 
The Yannawa district in which NULICO B is located was the first district to establish a 
city committee to do Baan Mankong, and the district head has enthusiastically endorsed the 
project. With four communities already underway, in February 2018 CODI staff held a workshop 
in the paved sports field just outside NULICO B. The workshop was slated to take two days and 
was supposed to include dozens of community members from all of the communities. The 
morning of the first day was an introduction to CODI and the proposed process of city-wide 
upgrading, as well as how Baan Mankong worked. An important first step in this process, 
according to CODI, was the collection of data about the community and the creation of a 
community map. In the afternoon, the workshop attendees would break up into groups to go out 
and do an initial survey of three additional communities. On the second day, they would gather at 
the district office with all of their data to discuss how to move forward.  
On the first day of the workshop, a team of eight CODI staff members and five NULICO 
representatives arrive at the sports field under the overpass with rolls upon rolls of vinyl sheets. 
On the sheets are printed enormous aerial image maps of the district and each community that is 
to be surveyed, as well as posters explaining the process of Baan Mankong. The process, 
according to the posters, begins with a community data collection. The images on the posters 
demonstrate the surveys that must be conducted and show pictures of the GPS units used to 
create maps of community land. 
The process overview sheets were hung on a chain-link fence, and one blank sheet is set 
up in front of a projects. Around 9 am community members start to arrive to fill several rows of 
                                                
34	“หนีSเป็นความรับผิดชอบ…หนีSเป็นการลงทุน หนีSเป็นสิทธิ[ ที+ ได้สร้างบ้าน ไม่ควรจะคิดว่าเป็นหนีS นี+ เป็นการลงทุน หนีSทีเกิดประโยค”	
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plastic chairs arranged in a semi-circle around the projector. The vast majority of attendees are 
older, even elderly. Many lean on their canes as they listened to the presentation. As the staff 
take turns explaining different aspects of the Yannawa city-wide plans and the Baan Mankong 
process, a handful of attendees begin to nod off. A few more conduct side conversation, and 
several of the younger ones look down at their phones. 
One of the staff leaders of the Bangkok region explains how Baan Mankong is another 
kind of social welfare, outside of what is provided by the central government. But it’s not 
provided to individuals, only to community organizations, so communities have to “rise up and 
manage themselves” (luk kheun jad kan ton eng). They emphasize how the communities here 
“are in hot water” (deuad ron) because they don’t have legal rights to their land. They are likely 
to be evicted, so they all to need to “step up” and “help each other solve their problems” (chuay 
kan keh panha). The lead They a staff member explains how they need to get long-term leases, 
and through Baan Mankong they can get access to 15-year loans. He says that If they have to 
move, a district-wide survey can help them to identify new land they can move onto.  
This same staff member, in a conversation in the car on the way to workshop, had 
bemoaned the fact that if they are working at the district level, it is unlikely that any community 
that gets relocated would be able to find a place inside the Yannawa district. The land prices are 
simply too high, and the head of the district does not have control over the government land in 
the area. That power lies with the national government agencies like the State Railways of 
Thailand (SRT) and the Treasury Department.  
Other obstacles to the CODI city-wide strategy reared their heads over the course of the 
two-day workshop. As the formal presentation gave way to questions on that first day, one older 
man stood up and asked them who they were to tell him that he was in hot water. He had been 
living on his land for decades. They had been told that they would be evicted many times, but it 
never materialized. Why should he start paying rent and go into debt? The next day, at the 
meeting at the district office, another older man would bring up the point that many of the people 
in the community were so old that uprooting themselves and building a new home would be 
physically taxing, if not impossible. Plus, many of the people who lived there would not live 
another 15 years to experience the benefit of owning their homes outright, and the payments on a 
loan would be a huge burden in their old age.  
The initial presentation proved uninspiring to many of those in attendance. After lunch 
was served and CODI staff started to rally the troops to divide into groups to go out to survey the 
three communities, most of the attendees disappeared, a few explaining apologetically that they 
“were not up to it” (mai wai). Many more said nothing and simply walked off.  
With the few community members remaining, the CODI staff and NULICO 
representatives divided into teams, first doing an interactive mapping exercise with the aerial 
photos, marking off the limits of where they were going to survey and identifying key 
landmarks. Then the teams split off. They knocked on doors and called into houses. When the 
residents emerged, the staff and NULICO members explained what they were doing and asked to 
administer the survey, which included a few brief questions about the household. After the 
survey, they had the person hold up a sheet of paper with their name and address for a picture in 
front of their house. Some of the people did this willingly, telling the staff about issues in the 
community and generally making friendly conversation. Others were not so pleased. They asked 
who the surveyors were with suspicion. One older man even asked outright if they were going to 
evict them. Most people wanted to know if they were with the government. The CODI staff, ever 
patient, explained that they were an institute that the government had created to help poor people 
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get more secure housing. One CODI staff member worked on drawing up a preliminary map of 
the community as they walked, only to discover halfway through that a detailed map of the lots 
and fire escape routes in the community was posted outside a store at one of the main 
intersections.  
By late afternoon, when the three different survey groups came back together at the 
sports field, only a few members of the target communities remained. Pi Nara was among them. 
An announcement was made about the meeting the next morning at 9am at the district office. As 
the work group cleaned up, the CODI staff tried to coordinate who among the NULICO 
volunteers would attend the meeting in the morning. They were all busy, they said. They had 
already given up an entire day of their weekend.  
The following morning, by 9 o’clock just over a dozen people gathered in a meeting 
room in at the district headquarters. Though the district had arranged for the meeting facilities, 
the only representative of the district office at the meeting was the facilities manager who 
unlocked the door. Pi Nara was there, along with a just a handful of members of the other 
communities. They spoke about the general challenges going on in the community, the different 
landowners they were dealing with and what the state of the projects were. I asked Pi Nara if she 
was a member of NULICO. She replied, no, her community hadn’t officially registered as a 
member, but the NULICO had come to the community a few times to advise them. At that point, 
a young CODI staffer interrupted politely to correct the women. Actually, that actually NULICO 
B was a member. There was no official process to register, it’s just that if you do Baan Mankong 
and you’re not part of another member, you belong to the NULICO. At this, both women 
laughed, and Pi Nara jokingly corrected herself, saying “So we’re members and we didn’t even 
know it!”  
As the meeting began, the CODI project lead acknowledged that they had not gotten the 
level of participation they had hoped for the previous day, but they would proceed, nonetheless. 
They gave a presentation on the information that had been collected two years prior by CODI 
and the district, which now needed to be updated. They had mapped out the locations of the 18 
communities, whose land they were on, and the state of their tenure. The staff described the 
various levels of eviction threat the communities were under. When it came time for a discussion 
of the next steps, the community members raised a number of issues. First and foremost, one 
man said, was the issue that many of the people in the community do not see themselves as “in 
hot water.” In most of the communities, no one has come to tell them that they have to leave. 
And if they are not being evicted, why would they voluntarily take on debt and start paying rent? 
Even the community leaders, in many cases, were not convinced that this was necessary.   
The project lead emphasized the process would not be easy, but that community leaders 
needed to “step up.” They only needed a few strong leaders, maybe ten percent of the 
community, for it to get started. And the leaders of the project did not need to be the official 
leaders of the community committee. Once they got started, it would spread “like a germ” 
(meuahn cheua rok). And they needed to do it now, even if they were not under the immediate 
threat of eviction. “If you do it now, CODI can help you. If communities wait and come to CODI 
in a couple of years when they are being evicted, we will try to help, but there will not be much 
we can do.” This is why they needed to “rise up.” 
Though she continues to work on behalf of her community and wants to do the 
upgrading, Pi Nara is tired of being told to rise up, in particular with the issue of the city-wide 
project. She explains that CODI and the district want the communities to lead the projects, but 
the community leaders don’t know how. It is hard enough to organize their own projects. They 
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have so little help and direction. Ruefully, she calls the thought that she has the ability to 
somehow lead the process “funny” (talok). 
5.10.4 Working in a Pre-Established System with Little Support 
The case of NULICO B demonstrates several important points. The first is the overall 
stress and labor involved in coordinating a Baan Mankong project. In NULICO B, just like 
FRSN A and NULICO A, the leadership is mostly, if not entirely, female. Second, it 
demonstrates how the larger goals of CODI and other government agencies do not necessarily 
align with the needs and capacities of the communities. For this reason, the network of 
community support that is supposed to lead the city-wide process does not materialize, and 
community leaders are lectured for not rising up to lead the process. Community members, and 
even leaders of the NULICO, see the city-wide coordination as extra work for which there is no 
clear benefit for them. Third, the threat of eviction is subjective. In some cases, CODI, the 
district, and other government agencies play up the threat in order to move Baan Mankong 
processes along. Providing collective leases and extending group credit are mechanisms that 
place the burden of making the city look more “orderly” (riap roi) and “developed” on 
communities, both financially and in terms of labor. As evidenced by the city-wide effort, the 
emphasis of these upgrading interventions is on getting community members to document and 
map themselves, making their settlements more legible and amenable to management. It is not 
always clear whether the opportunity to upgrade is being extended because the threat of eviction 
is already there or if the knowledge that there is a program that can upgrade an area in a 
politically expedient way creates the opportunity for government agencies to threaten 
communities with eviction.  
For all of these reasons, even though NULICO B residents are doing a great deal of labor 
in order to create communal land and resources, the actions that they undertake do not have the 
ethos of commoning. There is little political motivation behind their actions, and the institutions 
that they are working within are setting the terms of their practices. 
5.11 FRSN B: Finding Room to Maneuver 
 
FRSN B, like NULICO B, is going through the Baan Mankong process during a period in 
which there is a pre-defined process for carrying out projects. They area also undertaking the 
project due to government, not private, development projects. Unlike NULICO B, though, I. 
Because of their association with the FRSN, they have taken part in larger commoning practices 
that are quite different from those of NULICO A. Also, despite the fact that they are going 
through the Baan Mankong process in same time period as NULICO B, they have ample 
guidance and have been enthusiastically engaged in initiatives at the city and even national scale. 
5.11.1 History 
Like NULICO A, FRSN B is a community produced for the purpose of doing Baan 
Mankong. Unlike NULICO A, though, the original FRSN B settlements were all originally 
located on public lands, not private. Their evictions stem not from a direct market-based desire to 
develop land for profit, but from state efforts improve infrastructure or beautify the city. The four 
original settlements were located throughout the city, mostly along canals or lands owned by 
agencies controlling the canals, such as the treasury. The plans for their original land are either to 
redevelop the banks of the canal for flood protection or to create public parks.  
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The original settlements of the four communities that have together to form FRSN B are 
located throughout the city. They all came to the FRSN through referral; the FRSN did not seek 
them out. These referrals came from a variety of sources, from district staff to police officers to 
friends. The FRSN’s Team Hotline, a working group that responds to urgent eviction cases, went 
out the communities to investigate the situation and explain their work. None of the original 
settlements had savings groups, and only one had any kind of formal governance structure. Even 
in the case of the settlement where people had lived together for nearly 100 years, the leader 
described their way of living as “to each their own” (tang khon tang yu). 
As is the case in nearly all Baan Mankong communities, only a portion of each original 
settlement actually joined the project. At the time that FRSN B created their cooperative, they 
had 144 households combined. This number has gone up and down as some people drop out 
while others who may have been skeptical at first, after seeing the progress being made, decide 
to join.  
5.11.2 Uniting with a Network and Pushing Back at the Community Level  
FRSN B has faced many of the same challenges as NULICO B and most early-stage 
communities. It is difficult to recruit enough people to do the necessary work to get the project 
off the ground, and some of the requirements of completing the project do not meet their specific 
community’s needs. However, unlike NULICO B, who has limited help from their network and 
relies mostly on CODI staff to advise them, FRSN B has extensive contact with their network. 
Because of this association, they have been able to push back against some policies and practices 
that government institutions impose on them, and they have had a great deal of help in 
navigating the bureaucracies they must operate in.  
Prior to working with the four settlements that would become FRSN B, another two 
communities had recently joined the FRSN and were settling on unused and agricultural plots on 
the eastern edge of the city the district of Minburi. There were a few large plots in the area for 
sale, so the organizers and community leaders of the FRSN began working with the FRSN B 
residents, the owner of the land, and the local authorities of Minburi and the home districts of the 
communities to facilitate the project. The leaders of FRSN B also started to get to know the 
leaders of the other two new communities who were resettling on the nearby land in Minburi. 
Together, the leaders of these new communities, along with their NGO mentors decided that 
since they were all in similar situations and settling on land close to one another, rather than join 
an existing  sub-network of the FRSN, they would start a new one. This newest sub-network is 
called khreua khai kao na, or “the progressive network.”  
The early phases of the careting the community required working on multiple levels and 
in multiple places at once. Leaders and organizers had to first negotiate with the land-owning 
agencies and home districts of the original settlements in order to forestall eviction long enough 
for the communities to plan and save enough money to do Baan Mankong. Thai law only 
provides for 30 days’ notice prior to eviction of informal settlements. In two cases, though, they 
were able to negotiate for the communities to stay for as long as it took to prepare for relocation, 
provided they continued to demonstrate to the district that they were making progress on Baan 
Mankong. In another case, they got nearly a year of extension. In the worst case, they were only 
able to negotiate for a few months. 
Though immediate eviction had been forestalled, the leaders of all four settlements had to 
begin the rapid work of creating functioning communities out of collections of people who had 
lived together in loose harmony for years. In each original settlement, one or two people stepped 
up to lead. These leaders had varying levels of education, confidence, and time to contribute to 
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the cause. Many of the community leaders encountered significant obstacles to organizing 
enough people to participate.  
The first major hurdle to getting people to join is a disbelief and distrust of the process. 
Many slum residents had been promised upgrades and welfare from the government before, only 
to have those promises broken. Even if they believed that the government would come through 
on its end, residents doing Baan Mankong have to have confidence in the other people they are 
doing it with. They have to trust that the time they are putting into the process will produce a 
tangible result, meaning that all those who join in will stick it out and the project won’t fall apart. 
Even more significantly, they need to trust that the money they are putting into collective 
accounts will not be mismanaged. In the case of FRSN B, one original settlement nearly fell 
apart when the leader spent a large amount of money on her personal expenses. Remarkably, 
though, her fellow residents forgave her and arranged a timeline for her to repay them. The 
rationale that allowed them to forgive this misstep was the knowledge that one of the reasons she 
misused the money was that she had been doing so much work organizing the community that 
she had not had time to run her food stall for several weeks, meaning she had had virtually no 
income. Another reason this issue was able to be settled was through the mediation of FRSN 
organizers, who facilitated a meeting, spoke with community members, pointed them in the 
direction of an agreement that would allow the leader to pay back what she owed, as well as 
putting another person on the account that everyone could trust.  
Though organizing community members and getting them to make savings payments on 
time may have been the most personally stressful aspect of the process for community leaders, 
they hit a number of other obstacles. However, with the support of their network and NGO 
organizers, they did not have to resolve these issues by accommodating existing practices or 
institutions. Instead, they sought changes. 
The community members and leaders were all dissatisfied with the initial housing designs 
by the architects CODI had assigned to them. The mockups they were given early in the process 
did not even indicate where the doors would be, and they did not take into consideration the fact 
that many of the residents were elderly or disabled. One community leader described the designs 
as looking “like an intern made them.” With the help of the FRSN, they responded by working 
with CODI and securing funding from an existing fund to support the elderly to create new 
blueprints based on universal design principles. 
The leaders and members of FRSN B have also played an active role in designing their 
future community environment. However, they have not done so alone. The current leader of the 
Progressive Network, Pi Dam, though new to the FRSN, has taken on a prominent role. He has 
taken to heart the FRSN’s political mission of furthering democracy and seeking justice and 
fairness for the poor. Having already moved to temporary housing on his community’s plot while 
they begin construction, he has begun several of the livelihood projects he hopes will help to 
sustain the community in years to come. They are fortunate to live in close proximity to a public 
lake, from which they can catch fish for consumption and to turn into bpla raa, a fermented fish-
based seasoning common in northeastern Thai food. There is also an area for raising fighting 
cocks, as well as space for gardens.  
Because NULICO B was able to get a good deal on their land, they will have more 
communal space than many other communities. They aim to develop it in steps. At one of only a 
handful of full community meetings in which all four settlements came together, one thing nearly 
everyone agreed on was the need for a community market. Other ideas for how to use the land 
was an extended space to grow crops or a playground for children. However, since they would be 
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located far from existing markets, and many of the women made their livings selling food and 
other small items, it was determined that this was necessary both for the livelihoods of residents 
and for the life of the community. They wanted a place to buy things and socialize. As of the end 
of fieldwork, the space that is slated to become the market has begun to be developed, but it will 
not serve as a market just yet. Instead, the shelter will serve as temporary housing for the first 
sub-community of FRSN B, since they had to vacate their land prior to their new houses being 
built. With the subsidy they received for building the temporary housing, they will be able to 
install some of the basic infrastructure that will then serve the market once they have moved on 
to their permanent houses. 
Creating their housing cooperative and getting their Baan Mankong project off the 
ground was a considerable hurdle for FRSN B. However, unlike NULICO B, they had 
significant support doing it. The Progressive Network has one professional organizer from the 
FRSN who is designated as their main “mentor,” and he works in consultation with the other 
NGO-based organizers when things get complicated. During the initial phases of forming the 
cooperative, negotiating with authorities, and purchasing land, at times FRSN B would go to 
meeting accompanied by three organizers plus members of the FRSN leadership and other 
members of the Progress Network. This support allowed them approach authorities with 
confidence, mediate internal conflicts, establish a feeling of solidarity with other communities, 
and create changes to better suit their collective needs.  
5.11.3 Creating Larger Institutional Changes 
 FRSN B, with the help of their network and NGO mentors, has been able to adapt some 
of the established practices of Baan Mankong to their own needs. However, their involvement in 
the network has also extended beyond the bounds of their own community. Community 
members, and leaders in particular, have been active in mobilizing for larger changes that will 
benefit the movement and the urban poor of the country more broadly.  
 Despite being relatively new to the network, multiple FRSN B leaders have begun to 
serve on the FRSN work teams, including the all-important housing and land teams. This 
incorporation of newer members into leadership roles is an explicit part of the FRSN’s mission. 
Work teams and leadership roles rotate on a yearly basis, in some cases through elections and in 
other cases through consensus approval of volunteers. This allows the network to have central 
leadership without allowing power to concretize in the hands of an established strata of old-guard 
leaders. It also permits new members to feel that they have a voice in the direction of the 
movement, rather than simply being advised by more experienced leaders.  
One area where FRSN B as a community has been at the vanguard of the network’s work 
is in an effort to solve the perennial problem of insufficient subsides for infrastructure. As both 
of the early communities demonstrate, insufficient funding for the public water pipes, electricity, 
roads, and other basic services has long been an issue for Baan Mankong. Unlike the early 
communities, however, who found a way to fund their infrastructure themselves through their 
own cooperative profits, FRSN B has been part of a broader FRSN effort to solve the problem 
without pushing the costs onto communities. After a long process of negotiation and 
coordination with numerous government agencies on the part of FRSN leaders and organizers, 
FRSN B is now a pilot community for a new program in which local authorities and government 
service providers will assist with the construction of community infrastructure, covering most of 
the gap between the Baan Mankong subsidy and the actual cost. CODI, the FRSN, and the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Administration are all looking to this work on infrastructure by FRSN B 
to be a model that can be used in other communities, as well. 
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FRSN B members have been active in the larger activities of the network, as well. Like 
FRSN A, FRSN B sent numerous members to the protest at the Ministry of Transport described 
in the introduction. They have also been involved in discussions among the FRSN and some 
CODI staff regarding the need to reform the Baan Mankong cooperative system so that they are 
less complicated, easier to manage, and do not result in the need for communities to run 
themselves like businesses. Unlike FRSN A, FRSN B was not able to resist forming a 
cooperative entirely because of the necessity of having a legal entity with which to purchase 
land. However, they have come up with their own principles for running the cooperative. As 
opposed to NULICO A, which prides itself on running the cooperative and views it as a key way 
to support the self-sufficiency of the community, Pi Dam, the leader of the Progress Network, 
explained in interviews and at community meetings that cooperatives are just one tool of their 
communities for creating the collective resources they need to push for greater fairness and a 
more open democracy. In these ways, FRSN B is actively molding institutions at the local and 
beyond to better serve both their immediate needs and the purpose of a larger political project.  
5.11.4 Commoning with a Purpose 
FRSN B has faced many of the obstacles that NULICO B has in the process of starting 
their Baan Mankong project. They are working within a set of established institutions and have 
been pushed to initiate their projects because of the development projects of state agencies. 
However, FRSN B, because of their involvement with the FRSN, has been able to push back on 
prescribed practices that do not work for them and have been active in adapting institutions or 
building new ones. In this way, even in an environment where communities are “being 
commoned,” they have initiated and carried out their own commoning.  
This commoning process is not necessarily one of unambiguous triumph. FRSN B will 
still be located on the outskirts of the city, making way for parks and new infrastructure at the 
sites of their former settlements for remaining residents of the central city to enjoy. The residents 
were still pushed into doing Baan Mankong by actions of the state, and the project has not been 
without its costs. Performing the work of creating FRSN B has caused leaders lose a significant 
amount of income due to community work while also facing blowback and personal animosity 
from their fellow community members. The stresses of organizing showed themselves in the 
leaders over the course of the process. One was hospitalized with a serious illness that it is 
believed was stress induced. Others showed up to meetings visibly exhausted, having lost or 
gained significant amounts of weight. When asked what the biggest obstacle they had faced 
during the process was, all of them answered their fellow community members. However, when 
asked what the best part of the process has been, multiple leaders responded that their new 
“family” of other leaders within the FRSN has been the most rewarding aspect. Others described 
how meaningful it has been to be part of the movement, to do something bigger than themselves. 
Many of the leaders of FRSN B and the Progressive Network, in describing the work they are 
doing, articulate its significance not just in terms of creating concrete housing outcomes, but in 
terms of taking part in democracy and creating a society is that is fair to people like them.  
5.12 Discussion 
Baan Mankong projects meet many of the criteria of a uniquely urban commons, 
according to the description put forth by Huron (2018). They are attempts to create ways to live 
and reproduce life that are alternatives to private property, a capitalist market, and the state. 
However, in order to do so, they must negotiate with the existing capitalist system in a densely-
populated area with intense land pressures, as well as the regulations and projects of the state. 
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The ways in which the four case studies do this face many of the same struggles. However, their 
responses to challenges vary according to the ideology of their networks and the particular 
conditions under which they take on their Baan Mankong projects.  
5.12.1 The Commoning Projects and Practices of the NULICO and FRSN 
In some ways, the Baan Mankong projects of the NULICO and the FRSN have much “in 
common.” Both of the community networks that support the majority of communities in carrying 
out their Baan Mankong projects must operate within the same market and state regulatory 
structures. In addition, the physical structure of the communities looks very similar on the 
surface. They have modest, mostly two-story homes whose floorplans are fairly uniform but 
whose facades reflect the individual tastes of their owners. Daily life looks quite similar, as well. 
The designs of their communities allow for informal monitoring of neighbors. This helps to keep 
kids in line and prevents bad influences from entering, but it also creates a sense of being 
watched, which residents have mixed feelings about. Finally, the collective work of managing 
the people and finances of the community falls disproportionately to women, reflecting 
Federici’s (2011) observation that the commons can create new burdens even as they 
emancipate.  
Despite these similarities, the networks differ in that they produce commons for vastly 
different purposes, employing different rhetorics that ultimately result in diverging practices 
among communities. NULICO, dominated by CODI, employs the rhetoric of self-reliance 
characteristic of the sufficiency economy principles that have long guided state discourses with 
respect to communities. This rhetoric is especially visible in the self-promotion of the NULICO 
A community in its interactions with outside entities, be they foreign or domestic, local 
authorities or private agencies. This same rhetoric is applied to NULICO B, but it comes less 
from the community itself and its leadership than from the various entities that come to advise 
and regulate it. A key aspect of this sufficiency economy rhetoric is the idea of being satisfied 
with what one has, not demanding more than what is strictly needed, and cooperation with 
outside agencies. It is a rhetoric that eschews confrontation and continually calls upon 
communities to “rise up” to do the work of organizing. The purpose of having community 
networks is to create a base of support to encourage self-sufficiency so that poor people do not 
have to rely on the state. Meanwhile, they work under the regulation and determination of state 
agencies. This includes local agencies, whose jurisdiction determine the membership in city-
level sub-networks, as well as CODI, whose staff face the pressures to move projects along in 
order to meet funding and contract deadlines. When NULICO members take part in efforts to 
take action at a scale beyond the community, it is usually under the direction of employees of 
state agencies, who offer a disciplining rhetoric but little sense of direction or solidarity. 
The FRSN, on the other hand, views the creation of these common property communities 
as a practice that provides an alternative to the capitalist private market, and they have created 
internal institutions to support this political motive. Their purpose in working as a network is to 
build a network that can hold the state accountable to its poor citizens. To do this, they maintain 
a smaller but more active network, assisted and guided by a team of NGO mentors who act as 
mediators both within communities and between communities and outside agencies. They have 
also instituted practices of regular turnover in leadership and work teams to allow newer 
members to play an active role in the network rather than only being on the receiving end of 
advice from those who went through the process before. In addition, the ability to adapt the 
larger network to the needs of new communities through instituting new sub-networks of self-
selecting communities permits new members to develop a sense of solidarity with others who 
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share their interests and exercise self-determination. Finally, the communities that are part of the 
FRSN take part in larger policy movements that do not directly affect them. This is evident in the 
protest at the Ministry of Transportation to open the lock on the number of communities able to 
rent SRT land. Both FRSN A and B sent a significant number of representatives to the protest, 
which successfully opened negotiations on the issue. Through actions like these, community 
members are continually exposed to the possibility that solidarity with other poor people can 
yield large-scale institutional change.  
5.12.3 New Communities: Navigating a Hardening Institutional Context 
NULICO B and FRSN B are both embarking on the Baan Mankong process in an era 
when many more of the institutional relationships of the policy have been established than had 
been in the early years. As opposed to the early communities, who had no choice but to be 
pioneers of the system they were building, these newer communities face an existing set of 
institutions and practice that were established by those who came before them. In some ways, 
this makes the process of easier, as more and more government agencies are now familiar with 
the concept of collective ownership, and many of the legal categories necessary for carrying out 
Baan Mankong projects have already been created. However, fact that these categories, 
institutions, and practices have a precedent presents its own challenges. These newer 
communities are expected to mold themselves into a model that has hardened over time. The 
capacity of these two communities to adapt the existing model to suit their own needs and desires 
varies depending on their network affiliation.  
Despite the fact that NULICO B is taking part in an effort to do city-wide upgrading in 
Bangkok for the first time, they do not have the sense of being pioneers. Instead, leaders have the 
sense of being pushed to follow an agenda set by CODI and the local district leadership. Their 
relationship with the larger supposed movement of the NULICO is largely as advisees. When 
NULICO representatives come to meetings and events, they do so in a capacity of consultants, 
rather than peers. When residents interact with the local authorities, it occurs through events that 
are constructed by the authorities, where the community puts on a show of a being “strong,” 
“traditional,” and “self-reliant.” They have little power or support for adapting the institutions, 
even though employees of state agencies are constantly urging them to “rise up” and lead. In 
sum, the community is being pushed to shape itself to an existing set of nested institutions that 
govern the greater project of creating communities that can manage themselves and foot a large 
portion of the bill for city beautification that is being led by state agencies. While they are doing 
the work of creating a commons, there is little sense that they are actively constructing a 
commons. Rather, the commoning project is being led by state agencies, and they are being 
commoned. 
FRSN B has had a much different experience than NULICO B. Being part of the FRSN 
has, in some ways, imposed another set of institutions on them. In order to receive the help and 
support of the FRSN for their individual commons, they must fulfill certain responsibilities to the 
larger commoning project. However, the strictures come with guidance that bolsters their ability 
to create and mold institutions to meet their needs. Like FRSN A, organizers and leaders of the 
FRSN take an active role in internal mediation and enforcement when needed. They also provide 
the knowledge and support that allows the community to call upon local officials to create new 
plans and policies, as is evident in the case of the universal design of their houses and the pilot 
project to extent free basic services infrastructure to Baan Mankong communities. This would 
not be possible without the experience and advice of leaders of established communities in the 
FRSN. In addition, because the FRSN B joined together with other new communities to form a 
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new subnetwork, they are able to maintain a sense or peer solidarity with the other communities, 
a feeling that they are figuring things out together. Beyond their own local projects, FRSN B also 
takes part in national initiatives to shape the larger institutional and political context in which 
they can create new spaces of common ownership. In this sense, they are able to practice 
commoning, even in at a time when the institutions of collective ownership are increasingly 
being utilized to serve state interests. 
5.13 Conclusion: Commoning Versus Being Commoned 
Fifteen years ago, a slum-based social movement and numerous government agencies 
created alliances to create the Baan Mankong program. Early communities, regardless of their 
political beliefs or network affiliations, had the sense of creating something new. They worked 
with government officials to shape new institutions and legal entities that could support the 
collective ownership of land and housing. In doing so, they also created ways in which 
communities in the urban poor take on a large amount of the labor and cost of producing new, 
more “orderly” housing. Many of these physical forms, features of collective life, and institutions 
have been replicated over and over again as the program has grown, giving a particular, 
recognizable shape to the Baan Mankong commons. 
The experience of doing Baan Mankong projects, however, has changed over the past 15 
years. In some ways, communities starting Baan Mankong now have an easier time of it than 
earlier pioneers. There is a clearer process for establishing a collective legal entity (the 
cooperative); there are advisors who have been through the process, and local officials are more 
likely to be aware of the Baan Mankong program. However, with that established track comes a 
loss of the sense of collective figuring-it-out that was so integral to the initial community 
building of the earlier communities. Now they are not fighting to establish this new program. 
They are struggling to fit themselves into the form that previous commoners established. And 
they are doing so in a climate where the state is well aware that Baan Mankong can be a 
politically acceptable way to deal with communities that stand in the way of its “developments.” 
The continual expansion of Baan Mankong and use in the state-making projects of the 
government reflect McShane’s (2010) warning that a self-governing commons can easily fall in 
line with neoliberal agendas. This echo’s Rose’s (1999) assertion that community has become a 
space of neoliberal self-responsibilization. Communities that fall into this trap, far from engaging 
in active commoning, end up going through Baan Mankong because they have little other choice. 
In this way, they are not so much commoning as being commoned. No where is this more 
evident than in the case of city-wide upgrading. 
I argue that the existence of institutions to support the commons does not necessarily 
mean that the commons produced are emancipatory or empowering for those involved. In fact, a 
pre-existing framework for supporting collective ownership of land and housing can easily be 
appropriating by the state to push marginalized groups into self-governance, decreasing the 
responsibility of the state to citizens and pushing the costs of urban development onto them. I 
cases where this happens, I argue that those involve are “being commoned” rather than 
“commoning.” However, when non-state institutions exist to continually push back against this 
appropriation by the state, commoning can still exist. As the experience of FRSN B 
demonstrates, the active movement to continually reshape institutions, a critical aspect of the 
type of incrementalism described by Ostrom (1990), also serves the purpose of re-territorializing 
that advocates of commoning as democratic practice (Blomley 2004; Harvey 2012b) would 
advocate. In their commoning efforts, community is used as a political unit to engage with the 
state, as described by Chatterjee (2004). 
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This continued commoning against the odds is enabled by particular set of institutional 
arrangements in the form of a community network that can both support and adapt to new 
communities. These institutions permit certain types of political action, and they did not arise by 
accident. They are, themselves, the product of political motivations, which include internal 
democracy and independence from state agencies in order to hold the state accountable to 
citizens. The network is mentored by NGO organizers whose main motivation and duty is to the 
network, not Baan Mankong. By contrast, NULICO has emphasized self-sufficiency at the 
community level and cooperation with state agencies. It has shaped its network to mirror their 
jurisdictions. In addition, projects are advised not by NGO mentors, but by CODI staff, whose 
primary responsibility is to the government, not the network of the member communities. This 
means that at every level, NULICO communities are open to cooptation. The comparison of 
FRSN and NULICO communities over time thus demonstrates the interplay between political 
motives and the institutions that govern the commons, showing how the institutional 
arrangement of the commons enable or foreclose certain kinds of politics, and vice versa, that the 
political intent of commoning drives the institutional arrangements of commoning movements. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 The Merits of a Policy in Motion 
Over the past five years that I have been investigating Baan Mankong, first by reading 
existing literature on it, then by following community members and staff of various 
organizations to all corners of Bangkok and beyond as they struggle to implement it, I have been 
plagued by a nagging question. It has been posed to me by others on numerous occasions, 
usually after hearing an elevator-pitch version of the research project. But more often I ask it of 
myself, over and over again in a constant, nagging refrain: “So…is it a successful policy or not?” 
This is not among the questions I set out to answer in this dissertation, for obvious 
reasons. As a research question, it would be impossible to answer; it lacks nuance and specificity 
and would require the type of blanket normative proclamation that scholars are loath to make. 
And yet it is impossible to dismiss. There is too much at stake. The issues that Baan Mankong 
seek to solve are so fundamental—insecurity of land tenure, lack of access to basic services, the 
inability to be seen and heard by those in power—that to completely ignore questions of whether 
the policy “is successful” or if it “works” in favor of a more intellectually interesting dilemmas 
would be glib. These fundamental questions of success underlie what Tanya Murray Li (2007) 
calls “the will to improve,” the genuine desire to better the conditions of existence. The will to 
improve lies at the heart of planning as a profession. This will brings all kinds of actors into 
contact in pursuit of programs and policies to solve problems. However, this complex amalgam 
of actors cannot help but bring about more than just their intended outcomes. The unintended 
results of interventions can be just as consequential as the intended ones. They therefore merit 
investigation just as much.  
There is no shortage of literature suggesting that Baan Mankong has achieved many of its 
intended results. It has been hailed as an “empowering” process of “self-determination” (Mitlin 
and Satterthwaite 2004) that is led “by the poor” (Somsook 2009) with the possibility of 
connecting the poor globally (Herrle, Ley, and Fokdal 2015). While I have called into question 
some of these claims, it is worth considering them in light of the world of alternatives that Baan 
Mankong is often set against. Das (2018) has provided some useful perspective, comparing Baan 
Mankong to several other “innovative” housing policies in Southeast Asia. Against these other 
programs, it does, indeed seem to be the better option. It looks even more attractive when 
compared to the many other options for housing the urban poor reviewed in Chapter Three—
low-quality high rise apartments on the outskirts of the city, market-enabling policies that never 
reach lower-income residents, or outright eviction with no reasonable resettlement 
accommodations. Beyond these arguments attesting to the quality of Baan Mankong, though, is 
the evidence of its achievements in terms of quantity. Above all, it has achieved the elusive goal 
of “going to scale” (Somsook 2005b), with over 100,000 households taking part to date 
(Community Organizations Development Institute 2017).  
The quantitative achievements of Baan Mankong flow logically from the qualitative ones. 
While advocates of Baan Mankong often use more complex language to describe its merits, what 
the praise amounts to is the proclamation that it is “successful”—or at least, it represents 
improvement. The impulse to declare whether something is successful or not is followed by an 
impulse to expand upon success. The cousin of the will to improve is the will to grow, to 
replicate, once improvement is deemed to have been achieved.  
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In this dissertation, I conclude not by discussing whether Baan Mankong is successful, 
but on how the quantitative expansion of a program enabled by declarations of success have 
changed the “successful” qualities it is purported to have. Namely, the celebrated qualities of 
openness and flexibility have hardened into concrete categories, forms, and institutions. In the 
first half of this dissertation, I illustrated the origins of many of the categories that Baan 
Mankong relies on, analyzing the intellectual trends and social movements that let to their 
creation, propagation, and institutionalization through the policy. In the second half of the 
dissertation, I look at how concepts like “community,” “participation,” and “rights” have been 
used in different ways by the various actors involved in the policy, focusing on two of 
community networks that have played prominent roles in its fate. Through this analysis, I show 
how these networks use these categories to either mobilize members to change the institutions of 
the policy or to manage the populations that take part in it, molding them to the institutions.  
6.2 Conflict, Cooperation, and Cooptation 
In Chapter Two, I traced the emergence of chumchon (“community”) in Thailand, both in 
practice and in the popular imagination. I demonstrated how the word and the practices around it 
were influenced by global currents of communism and efforts to suppress it. These conflicting 
efforts were not merely ideological, but they also played out on the ground in remote areas of the 
country, as young insurgents and government community development workers attempted to 
form the rural populace into collective units to serve opposing political interests. Out of this era, 
intellectual traditions arose that solidified chumchon in the Thai lexicon, but in paradoxical 
ways. It became both “natural” and “traditional” to Thai culture and the Thai way of life, while 
at the same time being defined as space in need of professional intervention. These interventions 
came from both the state and forces opposing the state.  
In Chapter Three, I showed how chumchon came to be the focus of urban housing 
policies, culminating in the creation of Baan Mankong. While the locations and predicaments of 
chumchon in the city are quite different from the rural settlements in the era of the insurgency, 
trends in interventions around urban chumchon bear certain similarities to that time. First, some 
of the same people who had worked to mobilize rural inhabitants as supporters of the Communist 
Party of Thailand were now working to create a movement of the urban poor to make demands 
of the state. This movement was met by state policies that created chumchon as a category of 
local governance and emphasized locally-based sustainable development in the form of the late 
King’s model of sufficiency economy. Just as in the era of the insurgency, local efforts were 
bolstered by global trends. In this case, international development agencies’ focus on good 
governance and the funding of civil society organizations met with the global travels of 
techniques of community organizing and models of participatory development. These popular 
movements and government efforts began to overlap in the form of land-sharing agreements and 
one-off projects that became the prototypes of Baan Mankong. In the process of developing 
prototypes, certain practices around chumchon solidified. These included the use of savings 
groups to manage collective finances, community committees as a basis of local governance, and 
networks for the purpose of knowledge exchange and building up bargaining power. These 
practices were spread, in part, by community members themselves. However, they were strongly 
guided by a field of professionals working for both state agencies and NGOs. While the 
numerous actors involved in these prototypes worked together to create many of these practices, 
they differed significantly in the importance they placed on key practices and values, including 
rights, democracy, and the importance of finance. By the time Baan Mankong came into being, 
 
149 
these different groups had established ways of working together while remaining distinct within 
the policy. 
In the Chapter Four I analyzed how these different philosophies are visible at the level of 
the community network. I demonstrated how the political motives of the FRSN and NULICO 
manifest themselves in different rhetorics and organizational structures, which in turn lead to 
different ways of working on the ground. These constitute contrasting forms and conceptions of 
participation. While the participation of the FRSN reflects ideals of democracy through 
struggling to demand justice and rights from the state, NULICO emphasizes the achievement of 
basic needs through self-reliance and compromise with government entities. Furthermore, the 
FRSN’s highest goals are building the national movement itself so that it can represent the 
interests of the urban poor on the highest level. However, the goals of NULICO follow CODI’s 
mission to do city-wide upgrading. Both networks consider themselves to be a movement of 
communities, in some way more independent of outside influence than the other. However, in 
both cases, the influences of professionals are profound. They influence the communities to work 
in very different ways, though, due to their affiliations and political commitments. The 
organizers of the FRSN, employed by NGOs, drive communities to make demands of state 
entities—including, at times, CODI—through well-established practices and hands-on 
involvement on the ground. NULICO, on the other hand, expects that the role of organizing 
should fall primarily to community members. However, in practice, CODI staff and leadership 
frequently step into this role, calling on NULICO members to provide labor in carrying the 
projects initiated by CODI. This work often takes the form of data gathering, carrying out the 
bureaucratic aspects of projects, or traveling to other communities to encourage them to do the 
same. In the end, these practices do not reflect the “demand-driven” process touted by CODI 
advocates (Somsook 2005b, 27), but rather a “command-driven” participation that places 
responsibility but not power in the hands of participants.  
The coexistence of these two very different forms of participation, I have argued, is not 
incidental to the maintenance and expansion of Baan Mankong. The cooperative, even 
acquiescent form of participation practiced by NULICO maintains the policy’s attractiveness to 
the highest levels of government. If all communities adopted the defiant manner of FRSN, 
government officials would be unlikely to continue to support it. However, the FRSN also serves 
an important function, which is to prevent state actors from pushing too much of the burden of 
the policy onto communities. This was most clearly evident in the protests the FRSN launched to 
prevent the privatization of Baan Mankong funding, but it occurs in smaller ways on a regular 
basis. In this way, these two forms of participation exist in tension, but also in symbiosis. This 
symbiosis has paved the way for the expansion of the policy. However, as I demonstrate in 
Chapter Five, this expansion has consequences.  
In Chapter Five, I examined the experiences of individual communities through the lens 
of the commons. In doing so, I looked at how communities have been affected by the political 
motivations of their networks, the higher-level institutions their communities sit within, and the 
time at which they began their projects. I demonstrated that early communities, no matter their 
networks, speak about their experiences in Baan Mankong in terms of creating something new 
and changing processes and institutions with the help of their mentors, be those mentors FRSN 
organizers or CODI staff. In this sense, I argue that these early communities were “commoning,” 
or actively determining the ways in which they would inhabit their collective land and govern 
themselves. However, as time has gone on and Baan Mankong has gone to scale, institutions and 
practices have become more concrete. There is less room to maneuver, and all new communities 
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must re-form themselves to the pre-set categories and processes set forth by their predecessors. 
While all communities experience this to some extent, new FRSN communities are able to push 
back to a much greater degree. This is because of their political emphasis on holding government 
accountable to citizens and their institutional arrangements. These institutional arrangements 
include a network organized around own political strategies, not government jurisdictions, and 
their connections to experienced NGO mentors. NULICO communities, on the other hand, are 
guided primarily by CODI staff, who are beholden to the demands of their government employer 
to grow the policy, approve and complete projects in a timely manner, and above all to form 
communities to fit a pre-set model of a self-governing, financially sound chumchon. Residents 
who go through this process are not so much creating institutions to manage their collective land 
and resources as being molded to fit a set of institutions that have placed on them. As opposed to 
“commoning,” I describe this process as “being commoned.”  
This phenomenon of being commoned becomes clearest in efforts to carry out the much-
touted “city-wide” upgrading. As I have argued, city-wide upgrading represents the ideal of 
decentralizing governance to the local level while incorporating a totalizing view of the city. 
This amounts to a utopian vision I have called participatory modernism, or the expectation that 
central planning should somehow be conducted by the spontaneous “rising up” of the 
disenfranchised. This belief places the responsibility for solving the inequalities of the city on the 
shoulders of the urban residents who experience those inequalities most acutely without a theory 
as to how existing power imbalances between the poor and government officials are to be 
overcome. In short, city-wide upgrading espouses a theory of government by the poor that is 
devoid of a theory of politics of the poor. I argue that the presence or absence of a larger theory 
of politics constitutes the fundamental difference from the practices of government of the FRSN 
and CODI/NULICO. 
6.3 The Struggle over the Meaning and Use of Chumchon 
Baan Mankong and its associated networks work through the formation of a specific type 
of social unit called a chumchon—a community. As I have demonstrated, this unit has long 
history in Thailand—but perhaps not as long as many assume. I believe Chairat (2017, 153) has 
perhaps said it best in explaining that,  
 
In the Thai studies circle that is interested in the Thai village/rural Thailand, we have 
not yet managed to settle whether a thing called a 'village' or a 'Thai village community' 
ever existed in the real world of rural Thai society...and through discourse analysis, one 
can see that the thing that is called "village" or "Thai village community" is only the 
construction of a discourse. And as a discourse, it is therefore an open platform for 
struggle over the definition/determination of its meaning. There is no fixed meaning.35 
 
This is a similar sentiment to what the community rights professor expressed to me in the 
interview described at the beginning of Chapter Two, when he said that “community is not 
settled. It’s dynamic, it’s fluid.”  Over the course of this dissertation, I have traced the path of 
                                                
35 ในแวดวงไทยศึกษาที+ สนใจเรื+ องหมู่บ้าน/ชนบทไทย ยังหาข้อยุติไม่ได้ว่ามีสิ+ งที+ เรียกว่า "หมู่บ้าน" และ "ชุมชนหมู่บ้านไทย" ในโลกแห่งความเป็น
จริงของสังคมชนบทไทยหรือไม่...และในขณะที+ การวิเคราะห์วาทกรรมเห็นว่าสิ+ งที+ เรียกว่า "หมู่บ้าน" หรือ "ชุมชนหมู่บ้านไทย นัSน เป็นเพียงการสร้าง
ขึSนมาของวาทกรรมชุดหนึ+ งมากกว่า และในฐานะที+ เป็นวาทกรรมจึงเป็นเวทีเปิดสําหรับการต่อสู้เพื+ อช่วงชิงการนําในการนิยาม/กําหนดความหมาย
ให้กับสิ+ งเหล่านีS จึงไม่มีความหมายที+ หยุดนิ+ งและตายตัว	
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chumchon through many decades, from the countryside to the city and into its current life as the 
core unit of intervention of the Baan Mankong policy. This is, indeed, a history of fluidity, of 
struggle over meaning. But the struggle is over more than just meaning; it is also about the 
possibilities for action, for as Rose (1999, 9) explains, "concepts are more important for what 
they do than for what they mean. Their value lies in the way in which they are able to provide a 
purchase for critical thought upon particular problems in the present.”  
Community has provided just such purchase for different groups involved in Baan 
Mankong to address problems as they see them. The problems that groups like the FRSN, 
NULICO, and CODI see are similar enough for them to work together—shelter insecurity, 
inadequate infrastructure, government officials who do not listen to the poor. However, they are 
they are not identical. As one FRSN organizer put it succinctly to me at the beginning of my 
research, “For CODI the issue is housing; for us it is land.” Likewise, the ways in which they 
imagine solutions through community look similar, but bear important distinctions. The 
awkward alliances arising from these not-quite-aligned understandings and priorities have 
produced the Baan Mankong policy and created the conditions under which it has been able to 
expand. Within this expanding policy, these different groups continue to use community in 
different ways and to different effect. I conceive of these differences in terms of management 
and mobilization.  
6.4 Management and Mobilization  
In the introduction, I discussed how two scholars, Partha Chatterjee and Nikolas Rose, 
have described potential relationships between community and government. Rose (1999) points 
to the possibility of “government through community” in the era of advanced liberalism, where 
NGOs perform many of the actions of “governance” that occur beyond the auspices of the state. 
Meanwhile, Chatterjee (2004) provides examples of how “the governed,” who are excluded from 
the narrow confines of civil society can engage in what he calls political society by imbuing what 
had previously been a mere population group the “moral attributes of a community.” I argue that 
within the case of Baan Mankong, community acts as both a means of government and a route to 
politics, but to differing extents depending upon the network affiliations of participating 
communities.  
Following an understanding of government as “all endeavors to shape, guide, direct the 
conduct of others” (Rose 1999, 3), both networks exercise government of their members. As 
Elinoff (2013) has argued, both the FRSN and CODI-affiliated networks approach potential 
member communities under the assumption that they are not yet proper political subjects and are 
therefore in need of formation. This formation occurs through acts of government. On one level, 
this government takes the form the repetition of rhetorics—be they about democracy or 
sufficiency economy—to motivate members to act in ways that align with the values of the 
larger organization. In even more concrete terms, it takes the form of acquiring the identity of a 
chumchon and performing the tasks associated with being a “strong community.” These include 
establishing a community committee, forming savings groups and cooperatives, and creating a 
physical environment amenable to collective living. All of these aspects of being a strong 
community involve the mutual monitoring of community members to ensure that they are acting 
in line with the prevailing values and rhetorics of their networks.  
While both the FRSN and CODI/NULICO exercise government of member communities, 
they differ in their emphasis. For CODI and NULICO, the emphasis is on management (kan jad 
kan). The primary focus of this management is financial. As has been argued by CODI’s main 
spokesperson,  
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If people can manage finance collectively, it means that they have the power and 
independence to do anything. This capability to manage finance as a group is not 
something that falls out of the sky – it is something that has to be learned and practised 
and strengthened and matured. Finance is so crucial – once people are able to do it as a 
group, to manage finance as a group, then they are free. It is a kind of maturity, which 
means that communities no longer have to be looked after by outsiders, by somebody 
else (Somsook 2005b, 45–46) (emphasis in original).  
 
The financial element of management is supplemented by a rhetoric of sufficiency economy, 
which Elinoff (2013, 13) has astutely argued acts as a “'managerial intervention' (citing Ong 
2000) into the affective lives of these citizens by attempting to substitute moderation for politics 
and temperance for more radical economic critiques."  
The combination of collective management and sufficiency reflects a long-standing belief 
about community established through the anarchic visions of self-sufficient settlements espoused 
through the community culture school of thought. That financially self-sufficient communities 
are “free” and not in need of being “looked after” fits with Thongchai’s (2008, 586) critique of 
community culture, that “The anti-statism is, of course, particularly useful in neoliberal times: 
the poor Thai peasant can conveniently be portrayed as too upstanding to need state handouts 
(and those who do need them can conveniently be portrayed as not authentically Thai).” While 
the members of Baan Mankong communities are not peasants, they are, just the same, portrayed 
as a class for which community is a primordial social form, as “It is always easier and more 
natural for poor people to deal with the collective land approach than for better-off groups." 
(Somsook 2009, 326). In this logic, poor people, if properly trained, are well suited to manage 
and provide for each other, without needing help from the state.  
It is no wonder, then, that the interventions of Baan Mankong have been met with such 
enthusiasm by so many state leaders. Replicating the model, ‘going to scale,’ means that the poor 
will carry the majority of the burden of providing better living conditions for themselves, both in 
terms of labor of finances. On top of this, they also learn to practice moderation, to not want 
more, to meet their own needs. Through the city-wide upgrading vision, community is imagined 
as a systemic way for poor populations to manage themselves in the city.  
The managerial aspects of community are not absent from the rhetoric and practices of 
the FRSN. To adhere to the demands of the policy, they also monitor the finances of members 
and encourage the accrual of collective resources. The difference, though, is that this 
management is viewed not as an end in and of itself, but as a means of meeting the material 
needs to members so that they can then continue to advocate for greater reforms. Management, 
in this view, is a necessary step in mobilization.  
The capacity to unite people, to centralize the energy and demands of members, allows 
the FRSN to achieve concessions from state agencies that are disproportionate to the size of their 
network when compared to NULICO. This is, in part, due to the appeal of their rhetoric, but it 
also has to do with the power of their methods of government. The FRSN also carries on the 
beliefs and practices of its forbears, but the practices are not around community culture or 
sufficiency. They are in a particular style of mobilization reminiscent of their roots in the 
community organizing and the tactics of the Communist Party of Thailand, which also achieved 
outsized victories for their size. This was due to a centralizing structure, internal discipline, and 
more careful selection of members (Morell and Chai-anan Samutwanit 1981). In the logic of the 
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FRSN, community is the smallest unit through which mass mobilization happens. Creating 
chumchon allows the poor to act politically.  
For both the FRSN and CODI/NULICO then, government is exercised through 
community. However, the end goals of that government are quite different. For one, government 
acts as a means to greater self-management of poor populations, so that they take on more of the 
functions and costs of the state. For the other, government is a necessary aspect of creating a 
movement that can make greater demands of the state. The purposes of community and their 
associated networks in these different visions is nearly opposite. However, they work through 
many of the same forms and categories. In the context of Baan Mankong, they even work 
through many of the same institutions. 
In Chapter One, I described a scene in which these two networks attempted to work 
together, only to find that their differences ran deeper than even they had appreciated. The 
presence of these different visions and practices is not incidental to the growth of Baan 
Mankong. While one network makes the practices of community acceptable to state leadership, 
the other keeps the state’s impulses to pass more and more of the costs of the program on to 
communities in check. The much-touted successes of Baan Mankong, then, are not the result of a 
single policy intervention, but of decades of movements and ideas, often opposed, that have 
produced this particular set of institutions through disagreements and uneasy alliances. Those 
same sets of “frictions” continue operate within the policy. What they produce is physical forms 
of communities that look remarkably similar considering that the processes and politics that 
underlie them are often starkly different. The deceptive similarities that exist in the case of Baan 
Mankong demonstrate the need for a type of policy analysis that goes beyond assessing whether 
or not programs are meeting their stated goals. More engaged investigations of where policies 
come from and how they operate within complex political fields have the power to reveal how 
planning actually takes place and the many unintended consequences planning interventions 
produce.  
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Appendix A: Frequently used Thai words and phrases and their translations 
 
Thai English 
amnat power 
Baan Ua Arthorn public housing, literally "We Care" housing 
ban house or village (colloquial) 
boran traditional 
chanod chumchon community land title deed 
chaoban villager  
chumchon community 
chumchon dang deum original community 
chumchon eh at  congested community 
chumnum a public gathering or direct action 
du ngan to go on a site visit, literally "watch work" 
jad kan ton eng manage oneself 
jaonathi functionary or low- to mid-level administrator 
kan patthana  development 
kan yeun nangseu the presenting of a document or letter (in this case, a list of 
demands) 
kanphatthana chumchon community development 
khabuan kan khleuanwai 
thang sangkhom 
social movement 
khao pa go into the forests 
khem khaeng strong 
khet district in Bangkok 
khon deuan tula Octoberist 
khreua khai  network 
luk kheun rise up 
meuang fai  system of collective irrigation management 
mi suan ruam participate 
muban village (administrative) 
muban jadsan pre-planned residentail development, literally "arranged village" 
ni not rabob informal debt 
nitibukkhon corporation or legal corporate entity 
ongkon chaoban villagers' organization 
ongkon mahachon public organization 
pen tham fair or just 
phai khao whtie menace 
phak prachachon the people's sector 
phatthanakon community development worker 
pheung ton eng self-reliant or self-sufficient 
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phi liang mentor 
phi nong siblings, literally "elders and youngers," commonly used like the 
English expression "brother and sisters" 
Prachachon citizen or "the people" 
prachasangkom civil society 
prachathibotai democracy 
riap roi orderly or proper and complete 
sahai comrade 
sakdina system of labor similar to feudalism 
salum slum 
Samacha khon chon Assembly of the Poor 
samachik member 
sanibat yaowachon young communists  
setthagit nok rabob informal economy 
setthakit phaw phiang sufficiency economy 
si-oh Community Organizing, "CO" 
sitthi chumchon  community rights 
sitthi manuthsayachon human rights 
soi alley or small street 
tambon commune or subdistrict 
tang khon tang yu to each their own 
thammarat good governance 
ti yu asai  home, literally "place to live" 
tua thaen representative 
wikrit tom yam kung East Asian Financial Crisis 
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Appendix B: Acronyms 
 
CPT Communist Party of Thailand 
BPP Border Patrol Police 
ARD Accelerated Rural Development program 
USOM United States Operations Mission  
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization 
CDD Community Development Department 
NSCT National Student Council of Thailand  
DPP Democracy Propagation Program 
ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency  
VIST Village Information System 
RTG Royal Thai Government 
BMR Bangkok Metropolitan Region 
BMA Bangkok Metropolitan Administration 
NHA National Housing Authority 
FRSN Four Regional Slum Network 
CODI Community Organizations Development Institute 
HDI Human Development Institute 
POP People’s Organization for Participation 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
HSF Human Settlement Foundation 
ACHR Asian Coalition for Housing Rights 
CPB Crown Property Bureau 
SRT State Railways of Thailand 
UCDO Urban Community Development Office  
UCDF Urban Community Development Fund 
GHB Government Housing Bank 
DPC Department for the Promotion of Cooperatives 
NULICO National Union of Low-Income Community Organizations 
P-MOVE People’s Movement for a Just Society 
COPA Community Organization for People’s Action  
CDFI community development financial institution  
CAD Cooperatives Auditing Department 
 
 
 
